INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
INTR 13-303 CHINESE DEFENCE POLICY
The New Security
Concept
China’s 21st Century
Security Strategy for a
Multi-polar World
Pat Blannin
February 2011
Words
China’s New Security Concept is new in name only and was
conceptualized through the influence of Chinese strategic
culture, a dynamic international political environment and a
constant strategic re-assessment by the CCP to achieve their
security goals and protect China’s interests.
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
The spectrum of international security has developed exponentially since the end of
the Cold War. The subsequent introduction of nascent non-state threats combined with a
resurgent Middle Power sector disrupted to the traditional security mindset thus requiring
states to adjust to a diverse security environment. The New Security Concept (xin anquan
guandian) is China’s response to contemporary global conditions by delivering a
comprehensive 21st century security strategy for a potential multi-polar world. This paper
argues that China’s New Security Concept is new in name only and was conceptualized
through the influence of Chinese strategic culture, a dynamic international political
environment and a constant strategic re-assessment by the CCP to achieve their security
goals and protect China’s interests. The following essay introduces The New Security Concept
and examines just how new the concept is by analysing China’s interaction with the
international community from the current rhetoric emanating from the PRC through a
process of devolution to find the concepts origin.
The New Security Concept, herein-after the NSC, attempts to address what China
perceives to be an outdated ‘Cold War Mentality’ and containment by the United States,
through the promotion of peace and prosperity. The NSC’s creators seek “to rise above one-
sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial cooperation”,
exploiting global common interests and therefore facilitating social development. The NSC
progresses China’s regional leadership aspirations through the creation of a non-threatening,
conscientious and transparent security mechanism. China has based the NSC on the
fundamental principles of common security1, rather than the emerging comprehensive
security model2, because the political dimension of the comprehensive concept contradicts
the PRC’s traditional respect for a state’s political ideology. Cooperative security transcends
traditional inter-state military conflict and avoids heightened threat perceptions caused by
targeting specific adversaries establishing a ‘win/win’ security environment.
1
Sha Zukang, (2000). The Ambassador insisted that the promotion of common security throughout the region “should be
the fundamental objective” of the PRC to establish a sustainable regional security environment, see
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/backup/jksbf/cjjk/2622/t15411.htm
2
Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). Introduction. p.8. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner
Publications: London. Comprehensive security comprises five sectors: Military, Political, Societal, Economic and
Environmental.
1
INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
Academics such as Robert Kaplan deny the possibility of a ‘win/win’ scenario for a
rising China. Kaplan argues that China’s gain is a U.S. loss and views an increasingly powerful
China as a security destabiliser, disregarding the stabilising role of China during the 1997
Asian financial crisis and during the current global downturn, tensions on the Korean
Peninsula as well as China’s peacekeeping involvement and MOOTW3. Criticism comes not
surprisingly from the US who perhaps expect more from the NSC that China can legitimately
produce given its large population, developing economy (although it continues to deliver
strong growth figures) and the continuing modernisation of the PLA. Realist critical analysis
such a Kaplan’s, justify China’s insistence that the current order is mired in Cold War
mentality because it is increasingly apparent that “security problems are not exclusively in
the military domain”4.
Marc Lanteigne claims that the contemporary international security environment,
most notably the dominance of non-traditional security threats has presented China with an
opportunity to advance its “proposals involving alternative forms of cooperation to address
non-state threats”5. Lanteigne also claims that the rapid change in China’s security strategy
in the past two decades can be linked to the PLA’s focus on modernisation, professionalism
and adaptation6. This paper argues that while the PLA have certainly modernised their
capabilities across all sectors, the modernisation was required to fulfil the NSC’s desired
outcomes and not as Lanteigne infers that the NSC was a reaction to the PLA’s
modernisation. Chinese foreign affairs analyst Chu Shulong summarises the NSC as
consisting of the “the four no’s: no power politics, no hegemonism, no military alliances and
no arm’s races”7, a statement tilted in the United States’ direction without specifically
naming them as a specific target.
3
MOOTW is an acronym for the PLA’S Military Operations Other Than War and are referred to in each of China’s National
Defence white papers. MOOTW are essentially a broad range of confidence and security building measures.
4
Lampton, D. (2010). Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations. The
National Bureau of Asian Research. p.10, see http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/preview/A10_US-
China_preview.pdf
5
Marc Lanteigne, (2009). Strategic Thinking and the Role of the Military. Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction. p.83.
6
Ibid; Boris T. Kulik. National Policy Making by the CCP: The Role Of Domestic Factors. In January 1980 Deng Xiaoping
began his policy to “accelerate the course of modernization....without losing a single day we must concentrate all our
efforts....”. However this essay shows that the NSC precedes 1980 by at least 25 years an arguably 5000 more.
7
Dr Denny Roy, (2003). p.3, See http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/ChinasPitchforaMultipolarWorld.pdf
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
Beijing believes that the “first twenty years of the twenty-first century would be a
window of ‘strategic opportunity’”8 and that global tensions will be reduced through a
comprehensive mechanism encompassing multi-lateral dialogue, expanded economic
interaction and a broad range of CSBM’s9, therefore nullifying the threat from the use of
force. China’s growing economic, political and military capabilities necessitated the creation
of a security strategy which aligned with the PRC’s strategic foreign policy goals10. Invariably
the NSC reflects Beijing’s improved self-confidence and understanding of international
norms. Dr Denny Roy from the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies claims that indeed the
NSC is not new. Dr Roy claims that “the NSC is best understood as a tactical adjustment to
China’s external circumstances rather than a dramatic change in the PRC’s foreign policy
outlook”11. Dr Roy’s statement corresponds with the thesis of this essay and will be used as a
point from which to commence this essay’s devolution of the NSC.
To begin an analysis of the innovation of the NSC several examples are presented to
indicate how consistently and effectively the NSC is used in contemporary Chinese
diplomacy. Hu Jintao has sought to take advantage of China’s improved international
standing by advocating the ‘theory of opportunity’, stressing that China can and should
8
Bates Gill. (2010). Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy. p.6, Jaing Zumin spoke of this ‘strategic opportunity’ in
speech delivered to foreign ministers in Geneva in 1999. The 2002 CCP Congress declaration includes a similar notion
st
that the early 21 century is the right time to implement the NSC, p.5 ;The 2010 US DoD’s Report to Congress on
Military and Security Developments involving the PRC also mentions the ‘strategic window of opportunity’ when
explaining China’s rapid expansion of military capability, See United States Dept. of Defence, Report to Congress.
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Democratic Republic of China 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf
9
Confidence and security building measures. CBSM’s produce more tangible results than traditional CBM’s, for
example: Arms control, non-proliferation and joint military exercises.
10
China’s Position Paper on the New Security Concept (2002), states that “Under the new historical conditions, the
meaning of the security concept has evolved....extending from military and political to economic, science and
technology, environment, culture and many other areas”, See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC. http://www.china-
un.org/eng/xw/t27742.htm ; Similarly, China’s interpretation of liberal economics with Chinese characteristics including
finite boundaries rather than applying the Lassies Faire fundamentals of the ILEO presented China with the opportunity
to securitize its economic sector, therefore enabling Beijing in the future, if inclined, to pursue true comprehensive
security in a way that no other contemporary liberal state can Comprehensive Security, according to its developers and
most reverent supporters, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, requires each of the five sectors of security to be controllable
to some extent in order for each sector to be legitimately securitized. The ILEO however, because it’s unregulated
nature and ‘invisible hand’ doesn’t support the required control. See Buzan, B., Waever, O. and de Wilde, J. (1998). How
Sectors are Synthesized. (p.p.110 and 165). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner Publications:
London.
11
Dr Denny Roy. op. cit. p.1.
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INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
improve its security and strategic policies by continuing its good neighbour policies while at
the same time expanding beyond Asia12.
On the 11th February 2010 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's was asked
about NATO’S closer security engagement with the BRIC13, counties to which the foreign
minister replied “China has had some contact with NATO and is ready to continue relevant
engagement with it based on the new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual
benefit, equality and coordination”14. During the 64th General Assembly session of the
United Nations in October 2009 China’s Ambassador to the UN gave a speech in which he
claimed that:
“China has called on the international community to join hands in the
march forward, uphold the ideas of peace, development, cooperation, win-
win progress and tolerance, and work towards a harmonious world of
enduring peace and common prosperity” and has “set their sight on the
goal of universal security, uphold the new security concept characterized by
mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”15
The Ambassador recalled his leader President Hu Jintao’s comments at an earlier
General Assembly session in which he boldly called for all nations to “join hands and march
forward....towards a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity” 16. The
four characteristics of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation encapsulate
President Hu’s ‘Harmonious World’ concept, which proposes that the security and prosperity
of one country cannot be sustained through the disadvantage of another. Harmonious World
relies on countries cooperating with each other across all sectors of security which facilitates
“a harmonious environment in which countries respect one another, treat one another as
equals....and track towards win-win results, benefit-sharing and common prosperity”17. The
12
Marc Lanteigne. (2009). Who Makes Chinese Foreign Policy? op. cit.p.23
13
The BRIC acronym refers to the emerging or resurgent (depending on one’s interpretation of historical events)
economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China.
14 Ma Zhaoxu, (2010). Press Release, 2nd February, 2011. PRC Embassy, Germany. See
http://de.chinaembassy.org/det/fyrth/t657877.htm
15
Zhenmin, L. (2009). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t618520.htm
16
Ibid.
17
Zhaoxing,l. (2005). Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC. See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wshd/t214571.htm
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
NSC has enabled the PRC to promulgate ideas such as Harmonious World and The New
Historic Missions18, by aligning them with the NSC’s transparent and consistent international
security message.
The New Security Concept can be traced from its current manifestation through the
Chinese National Defence White Papers from 2008, 2002, 2000 and 1998 as well as releasing
the ‘Position Paper on the New Security Concept’ during the ASEAN meeting in Brunei in
August 2002. Although the NSC was included in the 2004 and 2006 white papers it did not
develop any significant enrichment. This was not the case however as the PRC embraced the
new millennium and also as the decade drew to a close. The ripple effect from the Global
Financial tsunami emanating from the United States was clearly visible on Beijing’s radar,
required another conceptual update19. Each Chinese National Defence white paper, released
by the Information Office of the State Council, begins with a Preface or in some years a
Foreword, where China’s yearly progress is evaluated and key principles are reinforced20.
The subsequent section in the white paper is titled The Security Situation which equates to
Beijing’s strategic assessment of the international security environment for the short to
medium term. The Security Situation draws on the traditional strategic concept of shi and its
contemporary equivalent comprehensive national power (CNP)21, at times referred to as
18
Daniel M. Hartnett. (2009). Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/written_testimonies/09_03_04_wrts/09_03_04_hartnett_statement.pdfOn
December 24, 2004, Chinese leader Hu Jintao outlined to the Central Military Commission a set of missions that would
complement the modernization of the PLA. The “new missions can be summarized in four separate subtasks:
To ensure military support for continued Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule in Beijing
To defend China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security
To protect China’s expanding national interests
To help ensure a peaceful global environment and promote mutual development”.
The third and fourth components of The New Historic Missions would not be plausible under a traditional, military
focused security concept; Bates Gill claims that Beijing’s security diplomacy had begun to track towards Harmonious
World and Peaceful Rise for a decade before the concepts were openly discussed op.cit. p.4
19
An article in the People’s Daily Online quoted Yuan Zhengling, a chief Chinese military strategist and one of the
drafters of the 2008 defence white paper, who insisted that the concept’s re-assessment was to be expected because “a
th
large developing country should have its own voice on security issues”. See People’s Daily Online, 27 December 2004,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200412/27/eng20041227_168809.html
20
The 2008 Preface reiterates China’s determination to achieve peaceful development, socialist modernisation,
harmonious world and developing closer connections to the international community. see
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf
21
Dan Blumenthal and Christopher Griffin, ‘Understanding Strategy: A Delicate Dance’, Armed Forces Journal, April 2006,
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/04/1813794 , “Chinese analysts have devised complex algorithms to give
relative weights to the various components of national power and create qualitative values for international comparison”.
5
INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
‘comprehensive national strength’ (CNS) . Shi has historically has been utilized by China to re-
assess, plot and project their strategic path thereby maximising China’s potential. Lacking a
Western equivalent for the concept, Western analysts express shi as ‘disposition’, of
strategic advantage and maximising current conditions22. Shi infiltrates the battlefield and is
also applied to statecraft, where it encompasses “broader strategic factors such as political
disposition, the strength of alliances and the robustness of an opponent’s politics”23. David
Lai from the Strategic Studies Institute claims that Chinese linguists explain shi “the
alignment of forces....potential borne out of disposition” that Chinese strategists use to
exploit and manipulate a more powerful opponent24. Evidently the connection between
China’s contemporary security origins and traditional strategic culture are emerging at this
early stage of analysis and may yet be found to dominate the NSC.
Chinese officials first introduced the NSC in 1996 at the CCP National Congress,
although the NSC was officially presented by Chinese President Jiang Zumin at the 1997
ASEAN general conference25. Beijing deliberately selected the 1997 ASEAN meeting for two
reasons, firstly South-East Asia would be a more receptive audience than the UN General
Assembly because developing regional understanding and cooperation in the security sector
was essential for the wider acceptance of the concept in the future and secondly because
China was anxious to establish good relations in the region as China’s economic potential
began to fully materialise. Since then the NSC commonly features in most public discussions
on security and Beijing has continually “reiterated the NSC, adding details and modifications
;See also Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, 2000, Ch.
5, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/part08.htm ; See also United States Department of Defence. Report to
Congress. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.
(2002).http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf, The U.S. DoD includes a section dedicated to the concept
of shi and Comprehensive national power. The DoD claims that CNP is a combination “qualitative and quantitative
evaluations of politics, economics, military, science and technology and foreign affairs to determine relative CNP”p.p.5-6
22
Ibid. The authors cite Francois Julien’s ‘The Propensity of Things: Towards a History of Efficacy in China’ which states
that in battle, shi allows Generals to observe “all of the circumstantial factors that can give advantage to or enervate an
army”.
23
Ibid, Moral disposition and social climate are examined to formulate strategy.
24 David Lai, (2004). Learning From The Stones: A Go Approach To Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi. Strategic
Studies Institute. p.6, See http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB378.pdf
25
China became a full dialogue member of ASEAN in 1996. The following December during their first joint summit,
President Jiang Zemin and ASEAN issued a joint statement, announcing their decision to establish a 21st century-oriented
partnership of good neighbourliness based on mutual trust between.
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
that shed additional light on the strategic significance of the concept”26. An address by
Lieutenant General Li Jijun at the U.S. Army War College in 1997 one month after Jiang
Zumin’s ASEAN speech is an example of Beijing’s NSC reinforcement. The timing of his
address was crucial as China hoped to define the concept to the United States before the
military realists hijacked Beijing’s agenda. Lieutenant General Li Jijun explained China’s
comprehensive approach and spoke of the negativity directed towards China’s ‘rise’ and the
‘China Threat’ theory by insisting that these “proposition ignores the facts and confuses
what is right and what is wrong....the common interests that we share are greater than our
differences27.
The NSC is primarily driven the “present security environment, which the PRC insists is
based on outmoded Cold War thinking or a Cold War mentality”28. China has seen that Great
Power states have struggled to escape the confines of bi-polarity and great power conflict
and continue to disregard the smaller countries despite the emergence of non-state actors
who parallel traditional security threats. Beijing is adamant that there is a need for a
comprehensive approach to security, not just military, which would facilitate the input of
smaller and developing states into the contemporary international security debate.
Beijing regularly introduces the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence into the
discussion of the NSC, which have maintained primacy in Chinese foreign diplomacy since
1955. The Five Principles are “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual
non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence”29. One such example of the PRC reaffirming the Five Key
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence is the 1998 Chinese Defence White Paper which states,
“Each country has the right to choose its own social system, development strategy and way
of life, and no country should interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way
26
Roy, D. op. cit. p.2
27
Jijun, Li. (1997). Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China. p.5 and p.7. Strategic Studies
Institute. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/china-li.pdf , Lt Gen. Jijun continued the NSC core values by
stating Economic policies that are mutually beneficial are preferable to economic sanctions....mutual respect is better
than discrimination, just as trust is better than suspicion”. p.9. (Italics added by P. Blannin).
28
Roy, D. op. cit.
29
Warnapala, W. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Bandung Conference of 1955 on the Resurgence of Asia and Africa. Daily
th
News Online. Retrieved 28 January, 2011 from http://www.dailynews.lk/2005/04/21/fea01.htm
7
INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
or under any pretext, much less resort to military threats or aggression”30. This declaration
coincides with China’s expanding regional influence and international recognition and Beijing
felt confident enough to proclaim that it is a state’s sovereign right to decide its own path to
development which was undoubtedly delivered as a thin-veiled response to those in the
West who continued to construct the ‘China Threat’ theory31.
China developed the NSC during the embryonic stages of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and the SCO continues to act as a vehicle for the NSC’s evolution through its
multi-lateral security dialogue exchange. The concept’s principles were labelled the
‘Shanghai Spirit’ but followed the core principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality
and consultation32. The Shanghai Cooperative Organization is the most current and visible
regional demonstration of how the NSC would function on a global scale. The SCO’s primary
purpose, embedded in the preamble of the Shanghai Convention, is combating terrorism,
separatism and extremism. Beijing labels these threats ‘the three evils’ and gives an
indication to the growing regional acceptance of the NSC33, while the SCO often acts as a
surrogate mouthpiece for the NSC. According to an official Beijing press release, the SCO is
guided by the principles of “non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of any
other country or region”34, which is often referred to as the “Shanghai Spirit”35
The decision by China to develop the New Security Concept was only possible during
the mid-late 90’s for three reasons: Firstly the end of the Cold War and the restructuring of
the international system, secondly due to China’s rising economic and diplomatic power,
thirdly and most importantly this was possible because China emerged from an internally
focused, internationally neglected state to a position of global systemic strength. The NSC
would not have been a practical policy for a fragile China to adopt earlier and may have led
30
The State Council Information Office, China's National Defence in 1998. PRC. op. cit.
31
Lampton, D. op. cit. p.4, Some examples of China Threat literature include: The Coming Conflict with China,
China Can Say No, China Is Unhappy, Unrestricted Warfare, and The Coming Collapse of China and what
Lampton labels “China on steroids” literature; When China Rules the World.
32
The State Council Information Office, China's National Defence in 2002. PRC. http://www.china.org.cn/e-
white/20021209/index.htm
33
Shanghai Convention on the Struggle against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001.
http://www.kfm.ru/eng/files/unconv2001.doc ,each member of the SCO are signatories to the Shanghai Convention and
remain committed to the organisations regional security framework.
34
Roy, D. op. cit.
35
Liping, X. (2004). The New Security Concept in China’s New Thinking of International Strategy. Shanghai Institute for
International Studies. International Review Spring 2004. http://www.IRChina.org
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
to ridicule from regional and global actors. The NSC both compliments and facilitates China’s
evolution from its victim mentality of the 100 years of humiliation into a pro-active member
of the international community by re-inventing the widely endorsed common security
theory with Chinese characteristics.
At the end of the Cold War China perceived itself emerging as one of the key
international actors however the actions of the United States during the 1991 Gulf War and
their projection of military strength, forced China to adjust their perception and most likely
influenced Chinese policy makers to develop the Five Key Principles of Peaceful Coexistence
into the NSC. An important aspect of the 91’ Gulf War was that “vast quantities of Chinese
weaponry” was in the hands of Iraqi soldiers as they were overpowered by what Bates Gill
labelled “an awesome display of power”36. This undoubtedly reaffirmed to Beijing that if
China was to reach beyond its strategic frontier, it needed a concept based on trust,
cooperation and shared interests and not primarily on military capability37.
In 1982 Deng Xiaoping showed tremendous insight to forecast the end of the Cold
War. Once again Chinese strategic culture materializes as President Deng enlisted the
traditional concept of shi in calculating that the Soviet decline would result in a more
cooperative, potentially multi-polar international system; the die was cast, and the NSC
would be China’s security policy to engage with the new security environment. The venue
for the delivery of Deng’s analysis was the Twelfth Party Congress of the CCP and the
assembly was significant for it was also where Deng claimed that “the universal truth of
Marxism must be integrated with the concrete realities of China and China must blaze a trail
of its own, building socialism with Chinese characteristics”38. President Deng’s
announcement was in contrast to the Moist strategy of “an early war, a major war and
nuclear war” and the disastrous consequences that befell the Chinese population as a
result39. From this moment onwards China had begun to re-emerge from its self imposed
36
Bates Gill. op. cit. p.3
37
Blumenthal and Griffin. op.cit. In an attempt to counter China’s ‘peaceful rise’ concept the authors point to the PLA’s
strategy of “preparing for local wars under modern high-technology conditions” indicating a level of preparedness to
attack. To achieve this China would develop weapons capability to defeat US weapons not US soldiers.
38
Deng Xiaoping. China Corner.com. http://china-corner.com/article_list.asp?id=329
39
Bates Gill. op. cit. p.3
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INTR 13-303 Chinese Defence Policy Pat Blannin
cacoon, maintaining CCP doctrine but developing strategies such as the NSC as the nation
gained momentum.
The concept can be traced further by confirming that the NSC is an evolution of the
Five Key Principles of Peaceful Co-existence introduced in 1955 at the Bandung Conference of
Asian and African nations in Indonesia and Chinese Premier Zhou Ehlai formulated them into
China’s foreign policy at the first CCP National Congress the following year. Following on
from the Bandung Conference, the Five Key Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were adopted
as a foundation of foreign policy many countries in the third world primarily across Asia and
Africa and in turn, those state’s realised they could assert themselves as responsible players
in an international system which at the time was enveloped by the increasing restrictions of
the Cold War40. The so-called ‘Bandung Spirit’ was delivered in foreign policy declarations
across the developing world throughout the 1960’s41.
To solidify the connection between the New Security Concept and the Five Key
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, one can compare both concepts by reducing them to
their basic framework, without the impediment of additional rhetoric. During the Bandung
Conference the five principles were presented as; “mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non interference in each other's internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence”42, leapfrog 50 years and they mirror
Chu Shulong’s ‘Four No’s’43. Now compare those principles with the core elements of the
NSC delivered by Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan to the 54th Session of the UN General
Assembly in November 2000 where the foreign minister announced that “the core of the
new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”44.
Upon reflection, from 2011 one can definitively link the NSC to 1996 and its universally
agreed45, official introduction into Chinese diplomacy and extend those linkages to the
1980’s and Deng Xiaoping’s seminal oration in 1982, continuing through to the mid 50’s and
40
Jawaharlal Nehru gave the concept the name “Panchaseela principles”; see also Gill, B. op. cit. p.5;
41
Lanteigne, M. Moving Beyond Asia: China’s cross-regional diplomacy. op.cit. p.133
42 th
Warnapala, W. Bandung Conference of 1955 on the Resurgence of Asia and Africa. Daily News Online. Retrieved 28
January, 2011 from http://www.dailynews.lk/2005/04/21/fea01.htm ; see also Lanteigne, M. op.cit. p.133
43
See footnote no.4 (Roy, 2003).
44
Liping, X. op.cit. p.2
45
See Gill, B. op. cit. p.5; Liping, X. op.cit. p.2; Lanteigne, M. op. cit. pp.87-88;
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
the introduction of Chinese Premier Zhou Ehlai’s Five Key Principles of Peaceful Co-existence
and the demonstrated conceptual overlap with the NSC.
Lieutenant General Li Jijun declared “to have a better understanding of the current
strategy, it is necessary to gain some knowledge of traditional Chinese thinking” 46, therefore
from 1955 this essay addresses the linkages between the NSC and ancient Chinese Strategic
Culture. The traditional notion of shi has previously been examined and a deeper
investigation of Confucian and Taoist philosophy reveals similar connections such as
the concept of yin-yang. The four key aspects of shi which Sun Tzu outlines in The Art of War
can be directly correlated to the NSC. Firstly the notion of regularity (zheng) and knowing
when to deviate from the status quo (qi) which the NSC facilitates by resisting the Cold War
mentality and approaching security through common interests and win/win. The second
aspect involves China creating overwhelming force, which would usually exist in the military
realm however through the NSC China hopes to develop strong economic and diplomatic
relations throughout the world, creating a quasi alliance framework that wields tremendous
power. The third element is directly applicable to the NSC and that is the need to establish a
favourable environment in which to reach political objectives. Finally, shi entails seizing and
sustaining the initiative which Beijing has done by introducing the NSC itself but also through
the cooperative security mechanisms that the NSC creates47.
Likewise ‘Comprehensive National Power’, although a relatively new entry into China’s
analytical lexicon, has its conceptual foundations in ancient Chinese culture. Confucianism
dictates that Yin and Yang are at the root of all things. They are complimentary forces in our
world where Yin is seen as passive, yielding, and nurturing and thus facilitates the NSC’s core
elements of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit while Yang is active, dominating,
and creative and would support cooperation to address non-state threats, the promotion of
trust among states and peace, prosperity and social progress. The most important feature of
Confucius and Taoist philosophy for the NSC is flexibility, for just as water ebbs and flows to
suit its environment, slowing where obstructed and changing the landscape when
46
Lieutenant General Li Jijan. op. cit. p.1
47
David Lai. op. cit. Lai examines the chapter of Art of War that is dedicated to shi. Lai describes zheng and qi
as rigidity and fluidity or regularity and variation, p.p.6-7.
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unfettered, the structure of the NSC allows it to adapt to the dynamics of international
security. Also applicable are the Confucian notion’s of wen (civility) over wu (martiality), or
to simplify the notion; diplomacy over military threat. “Wu was only to be resorted to
if wen failed and, indeed, wu was believed to most effective when the treat of it was not
dominant over wen”48. In the conceptual framework of the NSC, Again we see the principle
of yin-yang in that a balanced or stable order needs to be pursued and the method of doing
so should be subtle and well-timed rather than overt and aggressive. Continuing the
correlation between the Taoist and Confucian philosophy’s of Chinese strategic culture and
the NSC enables China to “excel through strength of character rather than force of arms”49.
At this stage of the analysis it is important to note that any “states security strategies
do not exist in a vacuum”50, they are as reactive or proactive as the external environment
allows. China is no exception in this respect, therefore in parallel with China’s strategic
culture and its association with the NSC, one must consider that the international socio-
political atmosphere since Mao and the CCP gained control of China in 1949, has also
contributed to China’s security strategy. Such influence can be observed when scrutinizing
the international events that preceded the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the
introduction of the Five Key Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Prior To 1955, China was
impacted by; the effects of the Korean War, the declining Sino/Russian relationship, the
nascent ‘China Threat Theory’ that was gathering momentum, a looming Taiwanese Strait
crisis and crucially the CCP were conducting internal discussions on how to acquire a nuclear
capability of their own, an idea that was denounced previously51. Combined with these
48
Dellios, R. (1996). "Mandalas of Security," Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic
Studies. (vol. 2). Iss. 1, Article 1. p.18, http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=cm; also
Dellios, R. (1994).Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 - The Heritage from the Past. Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic
Studies Research Paper No. 1 April. file:///C:/Users/pat/Desktop/Chinese%20Strategic%20Culture%20%20Part%201.htm
49
Dellios, R. (1994).Chinese Strategic Culture - Part 2: Virtue and Power. Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies
ResearchPaperNo.2,November.
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=cewces_papers
50
Russell Ong, 2007
51
Shen Dingli. (2009). Towards A Nuclear Weapons Free World: A Chinese Perspective. Lowy Institute for International
Policy. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1206 , Dingli claims that China has “openly advocated nuclear
abolition from the very day of its first nuclear weapons test in 1964”, p.1; Lieutenant General Li Jijan. op.cit. Lt Gen. Jijun
devotes a sizable section of his address the U.S. Army College to China’s nuclear capability and ambition, p.p.5-6
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
major international issues were the domestic security problems that all states must
negotiate.
Andrew Scobell, in another forensic analysis of Chinese strategic culture in October
2005 insists that “Culture has long been considered a critical dimension in China’s approach
to strategy and warfare”52. Scobell continues that in the last three decades, ‘strategic
culture’ has begun to permeate discussions of Beijing’s security agenda; however
Confucianism was believed to be the dominant facet of Chinese strategic thought. Through
the dedication of scholars such as Scobell and Iain Johnston53, Western analysts perception
that Chinese strategic culture could be understood by examining Sun Tzu’s Art of War has
been reassessed and thus Confucianism’s exclusivity has been adapted to “include such
traditions as Legalism and Daoism as well as popular myths and folk traditions....political,
civil-military, organizational and strategic”54, conditions are all elements of the strategic
culture amalgam. Scobell’s explanation of China’s strategic culture offers analysts and policy
makers on both sides of the Pacific increased flexibility when engaging each other and
although his version will never satisfy the likes of Kaplan and Meirshiemer, it hopefully
mitigates the misinterpretation that currently undermines potential cooperation. Tony Corn
alludes to a lack of understanding of Chinese strategic culture in a 2010 article where he
claims that “all three IR schools (realism, liberalism, constructivism) hedge their bets by
offering both a pessimistic and an optimistic variant – a tacit admission that, on the most
burning issue of the day, the predictive value of IR theory is close to nil”55.
By using Scobell’s hypothesis that Beijing’s security decisions are a combination of
current realities and past experiences it is feasible to suggest that with its tenets of mutual
trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, the NSC may facilitate China’s contemporary
‘Age of Discovery’. Whereas Zheng He peacefully navigated a fleet of ships through a new
52 Scobell. A. (2005). Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie? Strategic Insights, (vol. 4).
Issue 10, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA519824
53
Iain Johnston has written extensively on Chinese strategic culture and together with Andrew Scobell has
contributed such titles as:
54
Ibid.
55
Corn, T. (2010). 'Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics', Small Wars
Journal, June 2010, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/06/grand-strategy-with-chinese-ch/
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world, China can use the NSC to convey “friendship and goodwill and to promote economic
and cultural exchange between China” and the rest of the world 56. Comparisons like these
are not unfounded when one examines Deng Xiaoping’s assessment of the future security
environment was that "the growth of the world's forces of peace exceed the growth of the
forces of war"57. From this viewpoint the NSC is a continuation of China’s belief that one
must inherit the past and update it to suit current conditions.
Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane claim that policy such as the NSC can be explained by
“increased communications, movements of peoples across international borders and foreign
investments....significant changes in attitudes and conduct of states such as China, can take
place without China realising it”58. Such a theory denies the proven strategic planning ability
of the PRC and especially the ability of the Socialist government to manipulate foreign policy
to ensure its political survival, however China’s strategic planning capabilities are not the
sole domain of the PRC and permeate deep into China’s history as this essay has shown. The
1998 Chinese National Defence white paper proudly states that for over 5000 years of
Chinese civilization, China’s strategists advocated “peace in the world and for relations of
friendship with the people of other countries”59. This essay’s thesis is based on the logic that
“each civilization has its own notion of war which cannot help but be influenced by its
cultural background”60 The U.S. Department of Defence’s Report to Congress for 2010
maintains that the New Security Concept is China’s attempt to proactively engage with the
international system while at the same time protecting China’s strategic priorities which
include “perpetuating CCP rule, sustaining economic growth and development, maintaining
domestic political stability, defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity and
56
Lieutenant General Li Jijan. op. cit. p.2, Zheng He was not under instruction to conquer new territory for the
emperor, but simply to embark on a voyage of discovery throughout Asian and African nations.
57
Pillsbury, M. op. cit.
58 st
Russell Ong. (2007). The drive to global power status. (p.p.113-124). China’s Security Interests in the 21 Century.
Routledge: London, p.119.
59
The State Council Information Office, Chapter 2, National Defence. China's National Defence in 1998. op. cit.
60
Lieutenant General Li Jijan. op. cit. p.1
China’s 21st Century Security Strategy for a Multi-polar World
securing China’s status as a great power”61. China’s strategic priorities are often referred to
as their grand strategy by many Western analysts.
The thesis of this essay is derived from an analysis of contemporary and historical text
however reinforcement for the thesis can be drawn unexpectedly from the U.S. DoD report
which dictates that “China’s grand strategy has been influenced primarily by a combination
of the ancient tenets of Chinese statecraft as well as more modern national development
theory”62, although Beijing does not subscribe to this grand strategy proposal. The NSC
therefore is not a new concept but merely a bridge between historical Chinese strategic
thought and contemporary Chinese national interests. If as the West prophesize, China has a
grand strategy, then the NSC is simply a new label applied to China’s long-term strategic
plan to fulfil a grand strategy with Chinese characteristics.
Lieutenant General Li Jijun believes that world should “marvel at the tremendous
power of history....the Cold War is over and the trend towards multi-polarity is
irreversible”63; therefore there is a need to generate security concepts that draw upon
historical events and culture as well as contemporary interests and threats. The devolution
of the NSC as part this papers comprehensive analysis supports the argument that the New
Security Concept is new in name only and was conceptualized through the influence of
Chinese strategic culture, a dynamic international political environment and a constant
strategic re-assessment by the CCP to achieve their security goals and protect China’s
interests.
61
Dept. of Defence, Report to Congress. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (2002),
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf
62
United States Dept. of Defence, Report to Congress. (2002). op.cit. p.7
63
Lieutenant General Li Jijan. op.cit. p.9. Lt Gen. Jijun defended China’s strategy, claiming “Cooperation is better than
confrontation....consultation is better than conflict”.
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