As the world becomes less certain amidst Donald Trump’s imminent return to the White House alongside ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, the UK and Germany are pressing ahead with plans to deepen cooperation. JACK RICHARDSON asks, could this mean for military aviation?
Fourteen years have passed since a newly elected UK government made a bi-lateral agreement with a neighbouring country. In this case, the deal in question was the Lancaster House Agreement with France which made proposals such as the two countries sharing an aircraft carrier. Eventually though, little came of this agreement. With another new government, a new defence agreement has been made, in the form of the Trinity House Agreement between the UK and Germany. The headline elements of this deal, signed on 23 October by UK Defence Secretary John Healey and his German counterpart Boris Pistorious, involve Germany investing in the UK to manufacture artillery barrels in a new factor, but what are the aerospace elements of this deal?
Joining the patrol
German P-8 Poseidons are to operate from RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland. (Boeing)
A notable facet is the announcement that Germany will routinely operate its forthcoming fleet of Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft from RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland. This will provide interoperability (along with US and Norwegian examples) and increased capacity to patrol the strategically important Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. Earlier this year, the UK announced the integration of its Stingray anti-submarine torpedo onto the Poseidon so scope exists for Germany to deploy the weapon from its examples.
On a similar theme, the document contains a commitment for the two countries to cooperate in the development and deployment of UAVs in maritime roles. The UK has awarded a contract to Leonardo to develop a prototype rotary wing UAV under the PROTEUS programme, which will be able to deploy modular payloads for roles such as anti-submarine warfare, airborne early warning and logistics, complementing manned assets. With the prototype scheduled to fly for the first time in 2025, the need for both countries to take advantage of UAVs in the maritime domain presents a strong opportunity for cooperation. To underline the importance both sides attach to the new agreement, Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth paid a visit to Hamburg in November 2024, having taken part in earlier exercise with the Germany Navy involving Lynx maritime helicopters. The visit lasted for five days and involved high level talks between UK and German ministers with around 300 visitors including a dialogue hosted by the London-based think tank the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Although these hardware focussed initiatives will be welcome to both countries, there remain ambiguities around how the agreement will operate in relation to the wider NATO context.
Bigger picture
A German Eurofighter and RAF Typhoon fly together over Lithuania as part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission in 2020. (Crown Copyright)
On the subject of armaments, the UK and Germany and at the forefront of NATO initiatives to strengthen the alliance. The UK is leading NATO’ DIAMOND initiative to increase synergy between NATO weapon supplies, a lesson drawn from the importance of sustainable armament supplies to Ukraine’s war effort. At the same time, Germany is the lead nation in the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) which has the aim of European nations operating common air defence equipment to strengthen their defences. At total of 21 countries, including the UK, are now part of the ESSI. Exactly how the Trinity House Agreement will work alongside DIAMOND and ESSI is unclear, something in common with another emerging area of importance.
Also part of the agreement is a pledge to cooperate on the design and development of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), commonly known as an ‘loyal wingman’ for next generation fighter aircraft. The P-8 announcement can be seen as an extension of existing NATO practices but how the CCA collaboration will work is more open to question. These vehicles form parts of ‘Systems of Systems’ alongside sixth generation manned aircraft. The UK and Germany are currently part of different sixth generation programmes, the former with Italy and Japan in the Global Combat Air Programme and the latter with France and Spain in the Future Combat Air System. Little information is publicly available but from what is, these different programmes only cover the core crewed aircraft at the centre of each. Therefore, scope for cooperation could exist in producing the ‘loyal wingmen’ UAVs that are planned to accompany each design. An example of what could be possible was unveiled at the 2024 Farnborough International Airshow when Airbus showed a small UAV which the company said is designed to accompany larger, crewed, combat aircraft on their missions to add mass and if necessary, be attributable.
The UK has now committed to GCAP, while speculation has again grown that Saudi Arabia could join the project at some point. FCAS by contrast has been hit by disagreements between the partners over workshare and French claims Germany has undermined it through buying the F-35. These disputes have resulted in the suggestion that Germany could instead seek to join GCAP, although cooperation on collaborative and supporting systems remains more likely.
Managing expectations
HMS Queen Elizabeth sailing down the River Elbe to enter port in Hamburg on 18 November, 2024 (Crown Copyright)
Although the Trinity House Agreement contains significant potential for cooperation between the two countries, differences still remain. Following President Biden’s decision to allow the use of ATACAMS missiles inside Russia, the UK successfully obtained his permission for Ukraine to use the Storm Shadow missile in the same way. This was followed up with another batch of the weapons being donated. However, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz continued with his refusal to donate Germany’s bunker-busting Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. This decision, on the grounds that doing so could further escalate the conflict, has drawn criticism from opposition German politicians, some of whom say they could reverse this policy if elected at Germany’s forthcoming elections.
As well as these policy differences, precedents suggest hopes for bi-lateral deals should not rise too high.
In November 2010, The UK and France signed the Lancaster House agreement which committed the two countries to closer defence ties. Although this enjoyed some success with shared nuclear warhead testing and the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, little materialised in aerospace terms. For example, hopes that the two countries could jointly develop and field a Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV came to nothing. The UK’s high profile switch from the F-35B to F-35C then back again also meant the idea of the two countries regularly cross decking between their aircraft carriers could not be pursued. Reasons for the limited success include, but are not limited to, disagreements in the process of the UK leaving the EU. The Trinity House Agreement clearly represents a step towards the UK working more closely with one of closest its European neighbours on defence and elements such as long range missiles that the continent is lacking without American cooperation. Accordingly, the UK has joined the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA) alongside Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden. Trinity House commits the UK and Germany to new long range strike systems, but how this fits with other programmes remains unclear. Yet, with the UK now having left the EU, the way in which the country could be involved in any wider European defence cooperation pact is unclear.
As of December 2024, a complicating factor in any defence cooperation in Europe is the forthcoming return to the White House of Donald Trump. Amidst questions about how the incoming President will support Ukraine as well as his stance on the war in the Middle East, there is also the issue of how he will interact with NATO. During Trump’s last Presidency from 2017-21, he made clear his wish for European members of the alliance to increase their defence spending in exchange for continued US commitment. Although his earlier rhetoric on the US leaving NATO did not materialise, concerns remain on the continent about the extent to which the new administration will be willing to help protect Europe in a more uncertain world.
Waiting for the Review
Once again, the UK is in the process of completing a Strategic Defence Review which is likely to report around the middle of 2025. An early decision in November 2024 to decommission three warships, two auxiliary vessels and 31 military helicopters has heightened speculation about what the full review will contain. Within this rapidly evolving context, the authors of the document will be torn between a need to ensure security in the NATO area, while not neglecting interests in the Indo-Pacific, at the same time as ensuring stretched finances can meet demands for high tech equipment. The issue of the amount of national wealth dedicated to defence becomes even more important considering the value President Trump will place on European nations funding their own defences. The potential for the US to disengage from Europe superficially offers the opportunity for Trinity House and similar bi-lateral agreements to bridge gaps that may emerge from a US vacuum and straightened finances, but, the likelihood remains differing priorities and industrial considerations will limits its success.