Crowding in

I’m at two deficit conferences Wednesday — CAP in the morning, on what to do about the deficit, EPI in the afternoon, about why we need to run deficits now. I’m trying to organize my thoughts; in this post I’ll talk about the EPI issue, in the next the CAP issue.

So let me start with a picture, which I’ll leave hanging for a moment:

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Now for the discussion. Why, exactly, do we think that budget deficits are a bad thing?

The textbook answer identifies two reasons — two ways in which budget deficits now make us worse off in the future. They are:

(1) The fiscal burden: deficits now mean higher debt later, which will have to be serviced, and that means higher taxes and/or less spending on other, presumably desirable things

(2) Crowding out: when it runs deficits, the government competes with the private sector for funds, so deficits crowd out private investment, which reduces potential growth

All this makes sense under normal conditions. But right now we’re not living under normal conditions. We’re in a situation in which the economy is deeply depressed, and monetary policy — the usual line of defense against recession — is hard up against the zero-interest-rate bound. This weakens argument (1) — and it actually reverses argument (2).

On argument (1): it’s still true that an increase in government spending raises future debt. But not one for one: because higher spending raises GDP, it leads to higher revenue, which offsets a significant fraction of the initial outlay. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests something like a 40 percent offset is plausible, so fiscal stimulus only costs 60 percent of what it costs.

But the really dramatic difference is for argument (2). Under the kind of conditions we’re now facing, the main determinant of business investment is the state of the economy, as evidenced by the plunge in investment shown in the figure. This, in turn, means that anything that improves the state of the economy, including fiscal stimulus, leads to more investment, and hence raises the economy’s future potential.

That is, under current conditions deficit spending doesn’t lead to crowding out — it leads to crowding in. In fact, you could argue that the worst thing we can do for future generations is NOT to run sufficiently large deficits right now.

Things won’t always work this way. Eventually we’ll emerge from the liquidity trap, and the normal rules of economic prudence will reassert themselves. But we are not there, or anywhere close to there, right now.

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That is the point conservatives miss (or don’t care about). We are in a new economic regime brought on, one could argue, by unfetterred extremes of status quo selfishness . The Right claims a retreat to the past will fix it. May be but at what pain to the populus and then we will have the old model back. It’s a new age and we should embrace it. The old model is no longer competitive. The Nth order terms have grown in significance. These things have a way of working themselves out.

By the way, I have figured out an analog for the crazy right. They are short sellers.

Seems to make sense to me. One exception: his premise for (2) is fine, deficit spending does crowd out private investment, but his conclusion that this restricts potential growth is inaccurate. Without the deficit spending, private investment would be greater, but you go without the benefits of the fiscal stimulus. So, GDP might be greater for a year or two, so yes you would have greater growth immediately, but the problems that the private sector doesn’t address (social, environmental, equality) would worsen without the fiscal stimulus, and arguably (the country could become crippled without these issues being addressed) this could hinder growth worse than the deficit spending that comes with some crowded out investment.

I think an interesting thought experiment would be to think about a situation where the government does not do any deficit spending, and social/environmental/equality concerns go unattended to. Does the country really become crippled as a result of this? How, why? Would the private sector take it upon itself to address these concerns? How?

I would be more interested in a discussion of “what kind” of deficit to run. Do we have a choice, after all? I think we will run a deficit whether we want to or not.

There is the Japanese model to consider. I am not an expert but my understanding is that the bank balance sheet problem in Japan and the deflation of the nineties there was countered with large expenditures on infrastructure. Was there something better that could have been done?

I wonder if we are not mistaken in following the same path as Japan. We are keeping the large institutional players on life support and building roads. Ideas, people.

“monetary policy — the usual line of defense against recession ”

The irony here is that it’s monetary policy that caused the recession by trying to avoid recession earlier. We need to take our medicine, have interest rates rise to natural levels and realize that the accompanying pain was caused not by the new tight monetary policy but the loose monetary policy that came previous.

Only once we liquidate the bad debt and malinvestments can we return to real growth. Of course, we’d start it all over again unless we learned our lesson and restricted the government’s and the banks’ control of our money supply.

This is probably a dumb question, but why does #1 matter at all? If we owe the debt to ourselves, then who cares? It seems that it only matters if we owe the debt to foreigners, but even then it depends on the value of the goods we bought from them using the borrowed money. If they lend us money at incredibly low interest rates to buy goods that we would have been willing to buy at higher interest rates, then aren’t we better off? What am I missing here?

I totally see the crowding out argument (and the crowding in argument), but I’m a little fuzzy on #1.

The fall in private sector investment (and any cutbacks by state and local government on infrastructure and education spending and the sorts of welfare spending that directly effect the health and educational attainments of under 18s) will also reduce economic growth in the long run.

If the US comes out of the recession with clapped out business machinery and less technology, and with worse infrastructure, then that will knock on to economic growth and productivity growth in the long run.

This is precisely where the UK got to in the 70s and 80s. Literally decades of public sector spending squeeze (even before Thatcher got to power in 1979) left the UK with an inadequate infrastructure.

The utilities were forced to play a huge catchup game once privatised in the late 80s and early 90s.

And our transport infrastructure remains very bad. Some of the worst congestion and worst trains in western Europe. The poor condition and unreliability of the London Underground astounds visitors, especially from Asia.

Our building stock is one of the oldest, and most energy inefficient, in Europe.

Deficits AND high debts also reduce productivity of private investment, for ex. via decaying infrastructure. Deficit also generate a political economy that favors rent seeking. Most of all, you are kind of forgetting the microeconomics of deficits. Macro stimulus is ok for a while, but if you don’t use resources well and the Gov, runs out of resources to restructure the economy, then the economy will be stuck in a decline trap. So the message should be: deficit now is good but we’re only buying time, and a sustainable recovery of the private sector won’t come automatically. Use public money to clean the financial sector, save the planet, reduce the threat of nukes, insure beter some risks connected with ageing pop, then the deficit will be sustainable

No graph, chart, list of numbers, or well-reasoned analysis will change the minds of those who believe government is bad for everything and everyone. But I applaud your repeated attempts to dispel their dogma.

I learned through This American Life/Planet Money that the OECD calculates that there are $83 trillion in the world looking for fixed income investments – more than double the amount of some 6 years ago.

Life insurance companies and private pension funds are reducing the payout amounts because they can’t find enough good, safe investments.

There is the question if business investments could ever come close to absorbing a significant portion of that money. Therefore, we need government borrowings to provide a home for those funds.

Do you remember Greenspan worrying about the Clinton surpluses repaying the deficit and taking away that home for the money of those investors? That’s why he recommended the Bush tax cuts, as I recall.

I don’t think deficits (debt) as a general principle are a good idea. I’m a pay as you go sort of guy. But debt was invented for a reason. While Prof. Krugman does his best to explain it all, I have to think of all this in simplistic terms.

If you need a new roof, you go into debt and replace the roof. The roof lasts longer than it takes to pay off the debt, so the debt makes economic sense. Kind of like a rent-to-own deal. At the same time, the roofer makes money, the suppliers make money, and your property value increases.

You don’t go into debt to buy eggs or pay the baby sitter. Those are very short term consumption items that have no lasting economic value. (Whatever nutritional or child welfare benefits that accrue are too small to serve a funamental need.)

You may argue that the roof might be covered by homeowners insurance. That doesn’t change the economics. However, the federal government isn’t insured against economic disaster. Its insurance is the capital market and the “pool” is comprised of taxpayers rather than policy holders.

Household debt from a new roof crowds out other purchases like a new television or an iPhone or weekly dog grooming, but it doesn’t crowd out investments like replacing a furnace that has a cracked heat exchanger.

All in all, Prof. Krugman has convinced me that government debt is absolutely the primary solution to our current crisis. The alternative is to be wet and cold.

Normally I commend Prof. Krugman’s clarity; here, the point of this posting was far from clear.
Whether a deficit is bad or not depends on goals. If the goal is generating wealth, fine, but wealth needs to be understood as goods and services that individuals desire.
Normally, we do not need to decide what wealth is; individuals tell us by allocating resources that they own through non-coerced bargaining in a free market.
We might say that more wealth would be generated if resources were taken from the individuals who create them and dispersed as political processes determine. This presumes that President Obama and others guided by political processes understand the needs of economics, externalities, justice, and so on, in ways that markets do not, and therefore should take the fruits of individual laborers from those created them and allocate them in ways different from the market. This is (I think) Prof. Krugman’s point.
Some of us think that however defective the market is, the political process allocates resources more poorly, if wealth is the goal. We suspect that President Obama will act in his own rational self-interest, which may be to increase the wealth of the citizenry, and perhaps to help those who cannot produce wealth, but almost certainly will also redirect resources to Wall Street cronies who are likely to support his re-election (for example).
Set this way, the problem is not whether “deficits are a bad thing”. After all, a deficit can always be cured by either (a) raising taxes and removing more economic decisions from individuals, or (b) lowering spending, allowing individuals to do more of what they want with the resources that they have generated (i.e., receive wealth).
Over the last 30 years, the view has emerged that deficits do not matter. What matters is the fraction of the resources allocated by uncoerced individuals versus the fraction allocated by political processes. The first create (indeed define) wealth. The second end up in improving crossing stations on the Montana-Canada border, funding ACORN tax advisors, and other things that do not contribute to wealth, no matter how it is defined.

Please, either read or re-read Evsey Domar 1944.

Domar, Evsey D. 1944. “The “Burden of the Debt” and the National Income.” The American Economic Review 34:798-827.

And, empirically, the US has run federal surpluses 7 times in the history of the republic; each has been followed by at least a recession.

And there is theory to explain why. Easy theory.

The problem I have with this (and your post about the 8% output gap last week) is that the assertion that the economy is deeply depressed needs to be fleshed out. Surely the corollary of everything that we are seeing today is that the growth of 2002-07 was unsustainably high. We were living beyond our means during that period and excess demand surfaced in asset prices rather than cpi (where expectations were well anchored). There is a zeitgeist out there for consolidation and sustainability. Point 1) is the biggie. Pointing to recent -ve GDP and wincingly high unemployment is not enough to convince me that 2009 GDP plus 8% is a sustainable level. As long as I feel that way Ricardian equivalence is front and centre.

Having spent the afternoon reviewing the Mundell-Fleming model, this post makes me ask why you expect fiscal policy to be so effective with a floating exchange rate and a monetary policy that can no longer accommodate. Shouldn’t it merely increase the current account deficit? Can you elaborate?

“that means higher taxes”

How could anyone think this would be a bad thing, except for crackpot supply-siders? We had a debt of 120% of GDP after the end of WW II, top income tax rates were above 90% for most of the next 30 years, and this was one of the most prosperous times in U.S. history, not to mention that debt/GDP reached a minimum at the end of the high-tax period.

Paul has written a book about this period, yet he still seems to buy the absurd dogmatic arguments of the tax-cutters. People don’t like to pay taxes, and politicians can get elected by promising tax cuts, but these things should not be influences on the “science” of economics. If politicians promised to repeal the law of gravity would physicists go along?

Crowding In-Finally a principle of the new economics, and well named too.

I’ve been calling it the government guarantee function that lets market participant’s piggy-back on the governments spending, the government puts a floor under the economic activity and stabilizes economic growth which encourages private participants to come back into the economy.

Nothing kills an economy faster than wild uncertainty as Stiglitz pointed out in his book “Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics” where he predicted the inter-bank breakdown due to asymmetric information.

P.S. It’s a prescient book for anyone interested in understanding the principles of what happened.

You can learn a lot about what really works in a liquidity trap, the financial equivalent of a black hole, like Crowding In.

“and monetary policy — the usual line of defense against recession — is hard up against the zero-interest-rate bound.”

For most expenditure decisions in which an interest rate plays a significant deciding factor, it is longer and long-term interest rates that are the relevant rates, not they yield on the federal funds rate of on 3-month treasury bills. Therefore the yield on 10 year U.S. treasury notes is a bette proxy for “the” interest rate than those very short-term rates. And the Fed can bring the yield on the 10-year treasury notes down by engaging in open market purchases of them and other longer-term bonds. Monetary policy continues to be effective. It is only the TECHNIQUES of pegging the federal funds rate that no longer works.

That does not change the fact that an expansionary fiscal policy would also be effective. For a serious recession such as this, both tools should be used.

What if the effectiveness of fiscal spending is near zero or even negative long term? What if it results in a slow down in the velocty of money due to malinvestment by govt (like the housing tax credit)?

What then?

Where is the proof that govt spending gets us out of the liquidity trap? Surely lower prices would do the same thing?

Dear Dr. Krugman,

Some time ago, I asked myself the very same question: Why are budget deficits a bad thing? As I have no training in economics, the answers I came up with are different from yours. I suspect that the misunderstandings and errors implicit in my answers may be common among the general public, so if you would care to discuss any of the issues raised below in future columns or blog posts, I would appreciate it.

Disadvantages of budget deficits:

1) all other things being equal, deficit spending leads to higher interest rates.
2) tax revenues are diverted to pay interest on the federal debt rather than to provide goods and services to the American public.
3) we’re billing our children and grandchildren for our expenditures, which I think is fundamentally unfair.
4) It always costs more to pay for something on credit, because even the Federal government borrows money at an interest rate that exceeds inflation.
5) Deficit spending encourages us to spend money on things we’re not willing to pay for.

I also thought of one advantage of deficit spending:

1. Money spent to improve the productivity of the economy
will enhance our welfare and provide higher tax revenues in the future.

The claim (2) is invalid in its basic assumption. The governmental spending can crowd out the private investment – this basically requires a crowd of private investment. This is not true. There is no crowd for the government to drive out. Rather government just tries to create a scenario or market so that private investors would really see a benefit and crowd in.

Hicksian liquidity trap is something everyone refuses to recognize and understand. You can wake up someone who is asleep. You cannot however wake up someone who pretends to be asleep.

//sunnyeves.blogspot.com/

As to (2), which is the most important point: The crowding-in argument cannot be emphasized too much: Investment depends usually, and especially in the current state of the economy, more on product demand and only a little the rate of interest. This is usually overlooked when people assume that investment automatically fills the gap between consumer demand, government spending, and the balance of trade at full employment, which is the basis of the crowding-out argument.

As to (1), this seems to me to be misleading. As Abba Lerner has pointed out a long time ago, there is no economic argument supporting “normal rules of economic prudence.” An economy that grows at full employment will need a certain flow of investment, but there is no mechanism, neither in the short run nor in the long run, that adjusts savings to the corresponding required level, especially if the (real) interest rate is practically fixed by the central bank. If people save too little, government has to run permanent surpluses to compensate, and if people save too much, government has to run permanent deficits. Contrary to a wide-spread belief this would not entail deficits or surpluses that get out of control. On the contrary, such a policy would stabilize a certain proportion of government surplus or government debt, see

//epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2143/2/schlicht-public-debt-13-RP.pdf

In particular, the service for the debt will notinduce the necessity of offsetting higher taxes, although the argument given by Professor Krugman (that debt increases production, income, and tax receipts) will not apply in a full employment setting.

But we have to remember that Dick Cheney said that President Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter, although he probably meant that deficits run up by Republicans don’t matter.

The point I believe you overlook is Keynes’ view that if we run continuous and substantial trade deficits — even when to some extent their impact is buffered or delayed by significant debt financing of those deficits — we can still expect the economy to eventually find equilibrium at a lower level of aggregate demand at some future point which, as we are beginning to observe, entails reduced production and employment, ergo, the feeble “recovery” and the continuing high unemployment we now observe. No recovery we can reasonably expect will be sustainable.

Your view and that of too many other Keynesians seems to be, it just business as usual and we will be out of this slump and humming along at some point. Keynes says, no: the recession will persist for the reasons I describe. The CBO and all the Keynesians I have encountered seem to not believe Keynes on this point; either that, or they don’t know or misunderstand what he said.

Obviously, to the extent we spend a significant portion of our disposable income on imports, we don’t spend that portion on domestically produced goods and we can expect domestic aggregate demand to drop accordingly to a new lower level, as the impact of those continuing deficits works its way through the economic system as it is now largely doing, I suspect.

Government intervention to bolster aggregate demand will not repair the problem. It will only give us a transient bump up and we will drop back to the new lower level of demand again and have even more debt. I don’t think the effect of our continuing trade deficits has been properly factored into virtually anyone’s thinking and no one, especially the CBO, addresses Keynes’ contention that if large trade deficits persist, so will the ensuing recession.

In short, it is unreasonable to expect a significant, sustainable recovery, whether of a V or W variety. We are in for the L scenario, until we drown in debt, it becomes unmanageable and sales of it start going poorly. We can then expect the Fed to monetize the debt and serious inflation will ensue. Then we will face the prospects of an on-going recession (or worse), another predictable financial collapse, high unemployment, an irate public and perhaps even hyperinflation — what Richard Duncan calls the “Fall of Rome” scenario. It becomes much more likely.

All because everyone’s thinking stays in the conventional box it has been in; everyone ignores Keynes and the obvious; everyone looks only at flow variables in the short run, and ignores accumulating stock variables in the longer term; and everyone doesn’t understand how slowly the impacts of our ongoing trade deficits have been at working their way through the economic system, largely because those impacts have been buffered somewhat by accumulating foreign/household debt.

But now we have started to save and curtail our domestic spending to address that debt and the impact comes home strongly. Did we really believe there would be no serious or noticeable consequence to our continuing and large trade deficits?

Dear Professor Krugman,
Please read my previous comment, posted on May 20, (referring to your Jan 13 Bang for the Buck post)
which, for convenience I reproduce below.
If it is correct, an even smaller cost seems to be associated with your argument 1).
I would appreciate your opinion.
Antonio Barbosa

Dear Professor Krugman,

In a previous post (Bang for the buck) you clearly showed that “the cost of an effective fiscal stimulus, in terms of adding
to the government’s debt, can (and should) be much less than the headline cost.”
Now, in a recent post (www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3589), Max Corden seems to extend your point by suggesting a somewhat more rosy picture, in the sense that even the increased public debt created by the stimulus could be matched and cancelled with the additional savings generated by the stimulus (to use your notation total savings, I guess, in the amount (1-c)(1-t)/(1-c(1-t))) .
I would be very grateful for your kind opinion on this additional point raised by Corden.
Best regards from Lisbon.

Antonio Barbosa

Paul,
Hypothetically, if your intentions as the leader of a group were to get the American people to transfer as much of what they make to the Government, could you come up with a better plan that what is unfolding in front of our eyes? Is this not the moment to make it happen? Will the country be poised this way in the next 100 years? Don’t let a good crisis go to waste!