Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí Peace and Security Council Report (Institute for Security Studies) Country Analysis: SOMALIA June 2013, num. 47 Advance copy Andrews Attah-Asamoa Senior researcher, Institute Security Studies (Pretoria, South Africa) and Neus Ramis Seguí PhD Researcher, Institute Security Studies (Addis Abeba, Ethiopia). Previous PSC and AU Communiqués The Peace and Security Council (PSC) held its 375th meeting on 10 May 2013 during which the Commissioner for Peace and Security briefed members on recent developments in Somalia and the progress being made in the consolidation of the state and restoration of normalcy in the country. The communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCLXXV)) of the meeting welcomed progress being made in Somalia, particularly, in resolving outstanding issues about the provisional federal constitution; efforts to rebuild the armed forces of Somalia and integrate defecting militias; and discussions on the status of Somaliland. The communiqué also welcomed the outcomes of the recent London Conference on Somalia held on 7 May 2013 under the auspices of the British Government to discuss the way forward for Somalia. The PSC, however, urged partners at the meeting to honour their commitments and to ensure effective follow-up of important decisions made. The Council also commended the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for its contribution towards peace and stability but took the opportunity to call on the United Nations (UN) and other partners to provide greater support in equipping the mission with the requisite equipment to enable it achieve its goal of consolidating stability in the liberated areas. On the issues emerging from UN Security Council Resolution 2093 (2013) which requested the AU to provide regular updates on the implementation of the AMISOM’s mandate, the PSC requested that a report be submitted in 30 days. As part of this process, the Council also took note of the planned establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM) and expressed appreciation for the work of Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, 1 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who is being replaced. Crisis escalation potential Since the establishment of Somalia’s new government in September 2012, there has been notable progress in the areas of security and the advancement of political processes in the country. Regarding security, there has been some extension of security beyond Mogadishu and commendable military successes by AMISOM and its allied forces. The most visible political achievement is in the successful inauguration of the Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid and his cabinet, including the first female Foreign Minister for Somalia. The leadership of the country has since gained express recognition from a number of Western countries, including the United States. The president has also made a number of high-level international visits to Addis Ababa, Ankara, Brussels, Cairo, Doha, Kampala, London, Nairobi, Riyadh and Washington in line with its commitment to adopt a robust international relations policy. In addition to initiatives towards political and judicial reforms, the government so far appears to be laying the necessary foundation for reconstructing Somalia with clearly articulated areas of focus. The new government has outlined (i) the establishment of functioning institutions; (ii) the spearheading of economic recovery; (iii) the promotion of sustainable peace; (iv) the provision of services to citizens; (v) the undertaking of robust international relations; and (vi) working towards reconciliation, political dialogue and national unity, as the six priority tasks of the administration. Despite progress, however, Al-Shabaab still remains the primary threat to the survival of the new Somali government and the realisation of peace in the country. As was anticipated, the group’s primary strategy has shifted from direct engagement with the military forces to the use of guerrilla-style tactics involving targeted attacks through bombing, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings. Targets have included journalists and symbols of Somali statehood, including the Courts and the airport. The last major coordinated attacks by Al-Shabaab in this line of strategy took place on Sunday 14 April 2013. These attacks involved the coordinated use of car bombings at the airport, suicide bombings and shootings at the Supreme Court that resulted in the deaths of more than thirty people and more than 50 injured. The complexity of the operation and the involvement of suspected foreign members of Al-Shabaab have pointed to the capacity of the group, the nature of the threat posed to the attainment of peace in the country, and the overall 2 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí difficulties surrounding the security stabilisation in the country. The evolution of the Islamist group appears to be aiming at a future objective where it might not be in charge of the country but where it could make the country ungovernable by dictating the dynamics of security on the ground and the threat perception of citizens and development partners. The latter particularly raises questions about the ability of emerging security structures to address the increasing sophistication and evolution of AlShabaab. This is particularly important given threats by Ethiopia to pull out troops from Somalia. In an address to parliament on 23 April 2013, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia indicated that Ethiopian troops would be withdrawn from Somalia soon. The basis for this decision is that despite repeated requests for African Union troops to relieve Ethiopian troops, and assume responsibility for areas that the latter are currently holding; there has been no response. The high cost of Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia is another factor that has influenced this decision. The EU largely funds the African Union forces in Somalia. However, as Ethiopian forces do not operate under the auspices of the African Union mission, they are self-funded. Following a recent unexpected unilateral withdrawal by Ethiopian troops from the town of Huddur, capital of the Bakool region, Al-Shabaab fighters quickly took over the town. This development gave a clear indication that the Islamist group was closely monitoring events in the liberated areas and was capable of taking swift advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of AMISOM and its and its allies. Clearly, more also needs to be done in dealing with the Al-Shabaab menace since its presence can still not be hastily discounted. If Ethiopia should pull out, there would be a quick reversal of gains made in the areas under Ethiopian control with dire implications for the progress made in the country so far. Going forward, however, priority should be given to building robust Somali National Security services capable of sustaining progress and propping up the emerging institutions of the state. The second thorny issue with escalation potential is the Jubaland process. Months after its liberation, there are still indications that the withdrawal of AlShabaab from the port-city has left a leadership vacuum. Consequently, there is tension over the control of Kismayo and its surrounding areas. Different interests by various stakeholders surrounding the formation of a Jubaland state, made up of the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions have become a bone of contention capable of derailing progress made in the fight against Somalia’s Islamist fighters and the advancement towards peace in the country. Following an open declaration by the Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, that a convention of delegates to craft the state was unconstitutional, the process still went ahead and has led to the election of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe as 3 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí president of the region on 25 May 2013. Sheikh Madobe’s pro-government Ras Kambuni militia is credited with liberating Kismayo with the support of Kenyan troops. His election has, however, generated controversy as the government has yet to recognize the process that led to his election, and therefore his presidency of the region. Another warlord and former Somali defence minister, Barre Hirale, has since the election of Madobe also pronounced himself president thereby leaving the region with two acclaimed presidents. Given the nature of clan relations in the region, tension between Mugadishu and the local process, and inherent regional and local stakes around the Jubaland process, the situation raises the risk of clashes between rival militias in and around the southern port city of Kismayo. With Al-Shabaab’s presence and previous hold on the region, any deterioration of security as a result of this situation will be exploited by the group and will play directly into their propaganda machinery with dire consequences for the gains made in the country. The status of Somaliland in relation to Somalia remains a thorny issue in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Somalia. This is because, on the one hand, granting independence to Somaliland has implications on the character of emerging regional administrations. On the other hand, not resolving the issue has implications on the relations between the two entities, the nature of Somali representation, the on-going lobby for recognition by Somaliland and the overall access to resources from external development partners in diverse ways. In the past, the issue had been shelved principally because there was a transitional government in Mugadishu and the entire process towards the consolidation of political leadership was still evolving. With the end of the transition, talks between the two entities are being facilitated by the Government of Turkey and has so far been progressing well, though without clarity as to the possible outcome. Given the stakes involved for both parties, the talks might not progress in the cordial way that its preliminary meetings have shown. This is precisely because if it comes to the substantive issues touching on the independence of Somaliland, the stakes for the two parties will rise and dictate the dynamics of their cooperation and commitment to the talks. This will in turn have direct implication on the relationship between Hargeysa and Mugadishu. Even though this is not expected to easily turn violent between the two entities at any point in time, any strain in relationship could have enormous implications on peaceful cooperation between the two. In the unlikely event that this relationship turns violent, there are indications that many regional actors may take sides and will provide the basis for souring relationships between Somalia and those countries that are pro-Somaliland but not necessarily antiSomalia. 4 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia and President Ahmed Silanyo of Somaliland are likely to find themselves in the midst of tensions emerging from positions they take during the talks. Already there are indications that unionists in the northern parts of the country feel President Hassan’s government did not consult them enough before the meetings and are also worried about the possibility of Mugadishu making concessions that may not further their unionist stance. Similarly in Somaliland, the interests of separatists will emerge as a thorny issue the President Silanyo will have to deal with. Any move against the wishes and interests of such groups are likely to raise tensions within and for the government in Somaliland. A section of Somalilanders have already criticised the initial meetings by arguing that it holds out the possibility for future reunification. Going forward, however, the imperatives for the resolution of the question of the status of Somaliland get more important by the day. The increasing international goodwill towards Mugadishu and the likelihood that this will be translated into international commitments by the new government can become another tipping point. For instance, bordering on matters of postconflict reconstruction commitments and World Bank loans, the question remains as to whether Somalia’s external debts to be accrued will be done with the consent of Somaliland or without; and whether that will have any implications on Somaliland’s contribution to the use and payment of those debts. Key issues and internal dynamics The formation of federal states in line with the provisional constitution continues to animate political activity in Mogadishu. Of the many on-going attempts, however, the formation of Jubaland out of the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba have emerged as a major bone of contention between local proponents of Jubaland and the central government. Despite objection and lack of recognition from the central government, the local processes have gone ahead. The Somali Federal Government (SFG) has several reservations about the local processes for the formation of Jubaland. Key amongst them is the procedural issue originating from disagreements over who is driving or facilitating the process. According to a press release from the Somalia Federal Government (SFG), the Mogadishu leadership prefers to facilitate the formation of SFG-mandated local administrations as foundation stones for the eventual formation of federal states, as is the case with consultative engagements in the Baydhabo and Beled Weyne regions. Given that the ongoing process towards the creation of Jubaland is neither driven from Mogadishu nor has the involvement of the SFG, the latter regards the process as unilateral and therefore unconstitutional. 5 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí The government is particularly concerned about the representativeness of the process and fears the possibility of Ogaden sub-clan dominance and the marginalisation of others. Many clans inhabit the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba areas of Somalia. These include the Darood, Hawiye, Dir and other ethnic minorities such as the Bantus. The region is therefore a melting pot of important identity compositions. Historically, even within the Darood, the three main sub-clans, namely the Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti, are not known to have a history of peaceful co-habitation and have had difficulty in sharing Kismayo. They have fought over the territory several times. The SFG fears that without adequately addressing issues of representivity in the ongoing process in Kismayo, clan-based grievances and tensions could emerge to undermine reconciliation in the country. Emerging tensions following the election of Ahmed Madobe as president seem to validate the SFG’s concerns about the representativeness or inclusivity of the process and the need to make sure that any local administration that emerges in the region is sustainable and can ultimately become a building block for federalism in Somalia, and not another source of instability. Going ahead without the support and participation of Mogadishu means that the Federal Government’s Roadmap for the Formation of Juba Region’s Federal Unit might have to be revisited. In line with the SFG’s bottom-up approach to the formation of federal units in the country, the SFG outlined a three-phase process for the formation of a state from that region. This involved the conversion of the Kismayo process into a Kismayo Reconciliation Conference aimed at promoting reconciliation in the region between April and June 2013. This would then be followed by the appointment of interim district and regional administrations and the election of local representatives by the SFG through a consultative process by December 2013. The final phase would have seen a regional dialogue process committed to the formation of federal units between January and May 2014. Given the inability to tap into the momentum of the local process, it remains to be seen how Mogadishu and the emerging leadership in Kismayo will deal with their differences so as to prevent the exploitation of their divisions by Al-Shabaab. In response to the rising tension, IGAD’s Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government tasked an ambassadorial team, led by Ambassador Mahboub Maalim, to conduct a confidence-building mission to collect the views of various stakeholders about the situation. After visiting both Mogadishu and Kismayo from 16 – 19 May 2013 to speak to the principal parties and various stakeholders, the team concluded: (i) that despite a collective agreement for the process to be based on the constitution, there are differences in the interpretation of what the constitution actually says about the process; (ii). that the inclusivity of the process is disputable, despite assurance by local Jubaland actors that it is inclusive; (iii), that the process lacks the leadership of Mogadishu even though all parties appreciate the need 6 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí for such leadership; (iv) that the support of IGAD is welcome; and (v) that the Jubaland process has helped in dealing with the Al-Shabaab menace in the region, but that divisive internal tensions threaten to erode gains made and could lead to the empowerment of the Islamist group. Among other proposals, the team also recommended a process of dialogue and reconciliation under the facilitation of IGAD and that the Federal Government and parliament speed up processes towards the enactment of laws that will facilitate the formation of regional administrations, among other stabilising mechanisms. Whereas such recommendations are necessary, their swift implementation holds the key to addressing the simmering tensions in the region. As part of the efforts towards the building of strong institutions, the SFG has embarked on a programme to reform the Justice sector. These efforts have culminated in two major meetings aimed at defining the way forward for the process. In a working group meeting on 21 February 2013, the government’s coordination of the justice sector and the need for a participatory and inclusive dialogue process between that sector and civil society were the major issue discussed. Subsequently about 200 participants attended a five-day national dialogue conference which reviewed the justice system and made recommendations for legislative and institutional reforms. Among other important recommendations, the meeting called for the establishment of a National Law Reform Commission to review and update all existing laws to make them consistent with the Provisional Constitution. The meeting also recommended conducting an inventory of the physical infrastructures of the court buildings so as to identify those needing refurbishment and also reiterated the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the various branches of government. The recommendations of the meeting provided the basis for a two-year action plan towards strengthening the legal and institutional framework of institutions in the justice sector to enable them to perform their requisite roles for strengthening the state by delivering justice.T The international approach regarding support for Somalia’s constitutional and administrational development appears to be mainly security-oriented, hence efforts towards rebuilding the security and judicial sector have been prioritised. As noted in the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) of the UN (19 April 2013), the new UN Assistance Mission, that will be deployed by the 3rd June 2013, will assist the Federal Government in coordinating international support towards transforming and building the security sector and the justice institutions and aligning support with the Government’s National Security and Stabilization Plan. 7 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí Concerning the Somali National Police Force (SNPF), the Federal Government has set out the Strategic Action Plan for Policing (2013-2017) that will be financially supported by international partners with capacitybuilding programs, technical advice and equipment. The TAM mentions that, as part of the Federal stabilisation strategy, the new UN Assistance Mission will assist the Federal Government in revising legislation regulating the police and in establishing the police service outside Mogadishu. As the TAM points out, Somalia security gains need to be sustained by the Federal Government and the AMISOM forces. The role of an effective SNPF in complementing the AMISOM police component is crucial to enable the AMISOM military component to continue to defeat Al-Shabaab in those areas controlled by the latter. Geo-political dynamics Africa and RECs Under the auspices of the IGAD Office of the Facilitator for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation, the Joint Committee on Grand Stabilization of South Central Somalia Plan was launched on 6 December 2012. The plan aims at supporting the Somali Government in extending its federal authority throughout the liberated areas in South Central Somalia, by assisting the government to establish local administration, institute rule of law as well as provide security and public services to the population, among others. A Memorandum of Understanding between the IGAD Joint committee and the Federal Government was agreed on late December 2012 with a view to strengthen the implementation of the Plan and establish the institutional base through which the cooperation and support to the government should be undertaken. On 19 May 2013 a delegation from IGAD regional governments met Somali traditional elders from Juba regions with the purpose of undertaking a fact finding mission that might contribute to clarifying the recent events and the position of both leaders that claim the Jubaland’s presidency. IGAD’s intentions in remaining involved as a facilitator of the mediation process of Jubaland can be understood in the context of the implementation of the Plan. The Somali political situation was extensively discussed either at the 47th Extra-ordinary IGAD Council of Ministers Meeting held in Addis Ababa on 02 May 2013 and also at the 21st Extraordinary Summit of IGAD Heads of States. In both meetings, the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia were duly acknowledged in areas such as reconciliation. Members also stressed the need and readiness of IGAD to remain at the forefront of the 8 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí search for peace for Somalia and the need for the support from the international community. United Nations Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2093 (6 March 2013), a technical assessment mission (TAM) was deployed to Somalia in March 2013 on the implementation of a new UN mission. The TAM has subsequently proposed the new United Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) with the aim of politically and technically advising the Federal Government in its efforts towards the achievement of a sustainable peace and a functioning federal state. The mission is mandated, among other things, to bring its good offices and mediation capacities to bear “in respect of political and reconciliation processes at the federal and regional level”, (b) politically and strategically advice the Federal Government in peacebuilding and statebuilding strategies; (c) assist the Federal Government in building a legal architecture for the preservation of human rights, child protection and prevention of conflictrelated sexual violence, and (d) support the Federal Government to better coordinate international funding support. The implementation of the new mission implies an end to the mandate of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) which has since 1995 been an important actor in the political processes and quest for peace in Somalia. The decision to structurally incorporate the humanitarian component into the new Mission has raised questions since the UN Country Team has expressed concerns that such integration could lead to local perceptions that humanitarian aid has political objectives. The new UN Mission entails a shift in the mandate of the humanitarian component from focusing on humanitarian aid to development work. By institutionally enhancing the mandate and supporting mechanisms of the UN’s presence through the new UN Mission, the UN is clearly demonstrating its eagerness to expand the role of the organisation in Somalia. The reinvigorated role places the UN as the main international supporting institution in the country. The fact that the new UN Mission will also be run from Mogadishu might help improve its contribution to the efforts of the new government. International community Welcoming the momentum that Somalia was experiencing in both the security and the political spheres and recognising the necessity to better coordinate international initiatives towards the country, an International Donors’ Conference on Somalia took place at Lancaster House in London on 7 May 9 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí 2013. The conference aimed at enhancing international coordination and aligning international support strategies with the efforts of the government. The conference outlined a number of practical mechanisms to support the government’s Six Pillar Policy. Measures put forward by the Communiqué of the meeting touched on security, public financial management or good governance, and justice. One of the commitments of the meeting was to support the efforts of the Somali government towards eradicating piracy and maritime crimes through the establishment of “internationally recognised Somali waters, which will help it protect its abundant maritime resources and revitalise economic activities, as well as end toxic dumping and illegal fishing.” The need to encourage the Government to set up measures to address sexual violence and to investigate and prosecute the killing of journalists was also underscored as a measure to enhance the respect and preservation of human rights in Somalia. The meeting proposed the establishment of funding mechanisms such as the Special Financing Facility and the Rule of Law Fund as measures to facilitate the management of international support. Civil Society The involvement of the Somali civil society as a key decision-making partner in reforming the security sector and the judicial institutions, as well as in crafting reconciliation programmes is vital to ensuring the sustainability and inclusivity of the processes. Despite the fact that the Government has repeatedly stated the necessity to promote and even prioritise bottom-up dynamics in carrying out state building programmes, the perception that key decisions on the country is largely driven by non-Somalis particularly the International community persists. Therefore, the need both from the Federal Government and from the international community to engage the Somali civil society in policy making is important in dealing with the perceptions of lack of ownership of ordinary people. The 2013 London Conference could have represented a platform for the civil society to express their views on the direction of the country. However, civil society did not participate in the event given the fact that it was largely at the national level. Besides these, the role of youth in the quest for national reconciliation and the economic recovery of the country is gradually becoming a major focus of discussion within the Somali civil society. On 15 May 2013 a roundtable on peace building was held in Mogadishu in which the mainly youthful participants made a number of recommendations. Considering the fragile peace that Somalia is holding, the need to promote youth employment was stressed as a way to prevent insecurity and youth criminality. The fact that the development of the country is in part relying on the capacity of youth to empower themselves as pro-active players in the social and economic 10 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí spheres, place them as key actors to consider in the attainment of the governmental goals. The conference emphasized the need from international partners to allocate funding in the creation of youth employment opportunities and in capacity building programs with a view to improving their skills and encouraging businessmen to employ them or promote entrepreneurship among young people. Civil society organisations have also been involved in several initiatives towards institution-building including the working group meeting on 21 February 2013 which saw the need to highlight the need for the inclusion of the civil society in seeking reform of the justice sector. Scenarios The trajectory of the many issues the Somali Federal Government is currently grappling with may change in various ways in response to the underlying dynamics. Given the dynamics around the Somaliland talks and the tensions surrounding the Jubaland process, the following could take place: Scenario 1 Discussing substantive matters about sovereignty in the on-going Somaliland talks could end up straining the relationship between the two partners. Such a situation could also worsen the cordial relationship between many countries in the region, particularly the relationships between countries that adhere to proSomaliland foreign policies. If the contention surrounding Sheikh Madobe’s presidency of Jubaland is not resolved quickly, the nature of resultant tensions could turn violent. This is particularly worrying because the various warlords involved are capable of mobilising support to back up their views through the use of force.. Such a situation could undermine public confidence in the new government and the emerging local administration as well as provide the context for a robust propaganda operation by Al-Shabaab in the Jubaland region. Scenario 2 The Somaliland talks could end up in a stalemate. This could be a situation where both parties agree to disagree over the existing ambiguity over the status of Somaliland and leave the current situation as is. Such a situation would have implications for future relations between Mogadishu and Hargeysa and the question of resource management between the two capitals. 11 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí The Jubaland tensions could also continue.. The leadership in Mogadishu might maintain its position as has been the case until now, thereby maintaining the status quo of the current strained relationship. Scenario 3 The Somaliland talks could make significant progress and reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties. The tensions over Jubaland could also end with realistic concessions made by both the Somali government and Sheikh Madobe’s administration. Options The PSC could consider the following policy responses: Option 1 The PSC could support the negotiations between Somaliland and Somalia, by providing dialogue platforms and technical support, where necessary. This could also include lobbying Turkey to advance its approach in resolving the issue from a single state affair to an international issue supported by multilateral institutions, particularly the AU. Both the AU and the UN could also endeavour to expressly recognise and support the mediation efforts by Turkey. Option 2 The PSC could consider issuing a statement about the tensions in Jubaland, urging the relevant parties to make the necessary concessions so as to resolve the tensions surrounding the Jubaland process in the interest of peace and sustaining progress on the ground. The findings of IGAD’s Confidence-building team report could provide a concise analysis of the genesis of the crisis and the way forward. It is also important for the PSC to remain involved in, and supportive of the outcomes of the IGAD’s engagement. The PSC could also consider specifically assigning the AU Special representative to Somalia to directly support the IGAD process and to collaborate towards facilitating the recommended dialogue between Mogadishu and Kismayo. Option 3 Given the fact that Al-Shabaab still controls parts of the country, it might be important for the PSC to discuss ways of supporting Mogadishu’s quest for reconciliation and security sector reform in the country. It will be, particularly, necessary to review the existing modalities for dealing with the Al-Shabaab 12 Andrews Attah-Asamoa // Neus Ramis Seguí menace within the context of reconciliation and a commitment to engage with willing partners or actors. Option 4 The support of African countries towards the construction of a sustainable security sector cannot be overemphasised. Sustainability of gains made in Somalia depends on the establishment of a strong Somali sector. The PSC could consider calling on members of the AU to support all initiatives of the government in this direction. Documentation PSC communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.1 (CCCLXXV) 13