Why Apple's Fight With The FBI Is About More Than Privacy vs. Security
Wickr Foundation

Why Apple's Fight With The FBI Is About More Than Privacy vs. Security

Apple’s battle with the FBI has dominated headlines for the last couple of weeks. What some see as a defining moment for privacy, others view as the FBI exercising its right to unlock one phone in the name of security and protection.

To break down what is really going on here, I asked Nico Sell, the co-founder and co-chairman of mobile application Wickr and founder of the Wickr Foundation, to weigh in. Wickr claims to be the most secure messaging platform in the world, encrypting your data so that anything shared through the platform is never saved -- anywhere. Given the stakes that a potential Supreme Court case could have on her business and the work of her foundation, Sell gives her take on the biggest issues at hand right now. 

 

Caroline Fairchild: What's your take on the FBI/Apple news?

Nico Sell:  To us at Wickr Foundation, the issue at stake is the tension between security and government access to data. This isn’t about one iPhone; it is about setting a legal and a political precedent that would allow governments to gain access to private networks and products. The OS Apple is required to build would be general, it would work on any phone of the same model, it will have to be tested to ensure it properly performs the task. This is exactly what a backdoor looks like. Clearly, we are in uncharted territory here and are testing the bounds of the law, cyber security policy and consumer trust.

CF: What does the future of customer data protection look like?

NS: Our belief is that the next decade will be about building security into technology. The most secure and reliably growing businesses will be the ones that have successfully reimagined their business models to only collect user data that they realistically are capable of protecting. Otherwise, they will suffer significant economic consequences as a result of data breaches and targeted malicious attacks. 

CF: Where has the conversation on customer data and encryption shifted the most in the past 5 years since Wickr was founded?

NS: The change in public interest and understanding of the need for encryption is very significant, particularly since the Snowden revelations. Last year, 29% of North American traffic, including communications and banking, was protected by encryption of various degrees of sophistication. That number has been steadily growing since it was recorded at 2.29% in 2013. Through our education work, we see a huge shift among human rights activists working in authoritarian countries, journalists and kids – they now realize how exposed they are by simply using consumer tech.

CF: How, if at all, does the FBI/Apple case affect the technology space and the educational work Wickr Foundation is doing?

NS: The main concern is that this order to force Apple to “hack” its own customers may result in stifling innovation in privacy and security. How can we expect the U.S. tech sector to remain innovative in building security products when they know they can be asked to nullify their products' integrity? And that will result in weaker security for all – American consumers, businesses, and government entities. On the education side, we believe it is more important than ever to focus on raising awareness among policy-makers and the public about the digital security hygiene and the implications of critical policies currently considered by Congress.

 CF: What do you think is missing from the debate?

NS: The missing piece is clearly the understanding of technology. Most parties to this debate operate with sound bites that have very little connection with how security actually works. It is important for us all — law enforcement, policy-makers, and technologists — to work together in finding a way to secure our critical infrastructure, communications networks, and our businesses from data breaches, instead of weakening our protections.

CF: What do you think would be the worst possible outcome for tech companies with this decision?

NS: If Apple is forced to build a compromised version of iOS, more government requests will flow through the courts. More nations will demand similar access to the U.S. tech products. The legal precedent will be used to require companies to “customize” their security in a variety of applications – to enable law enforcement to turn on a mic in your car to record your conversations, to activate a camera on your smart TV in aid of government surveillance, etc. Everyone’s security in the world where the Web is a global resource is at stake. Because when the Web is not secure, it is safe for no one.

This Q&A is part of a weekly newsletter I send with my favorite posts on Pulse from the world of venture capital and startups. Subscribe here and click the follow button at the top of this post for more stories like this one.

I have something to say about this and will do it on my page update!

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CJ Burke

Director at Burke & Associates

8y

Dave: I’m guessing that you haven’t had a chance to read all of the zillions of preceding comments that address your question. I understand :} Let me summarize: 1. It’s argued (and I agree) that this has zero whatsoever with protecting people. I’m far from convinced that there’s any actionable intel on that phone. The question is one of privacy versus LE’s ability to get data off any phone somewhat at will. The law is far from solid on the search and seizure procedures at this time. 2. Terrorists don’t use Apple encryption, for reasons that must be all to obvious (at least not trained operatives.) Nor do educated or professional criminals. 3. What hacker got into what phone? I don’t follow you there… 4. Burdensome: because Apple needs to construct a parallel OS, and not just this one time; for every new upgrade. Because Apple would have to not just do the development; it’d also have to build and maintain tech and customer support operations that operate separately from their existing operation (as the security requirements as a para-government operation as described may require a whole different set of security clearances for tech support). Apple will have to build and maintain a SCIF. Apple will have to develop something on the order of many recurring VPN tunnels if LE is to oversee the ongoing operation as required by the Pym Court Order. Apple will certainly lose customers; I think in droves. Apple is to do this without recompense (none has been offered or described at this time). And lastly, Apple will be conscripted to do something that they as an American private entity has always avoided and considered repellent. 5. All this will be handled under the authority of the All Writs Act of 1789, mostly because Rule 41 Search and Seizure laws don’t allow this. 6. This action may be in contravention of CALEA and other laws. Hope that summarizes the answers to your questions! :}

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Thank you, Caroline and Nico. Freedom may be kept through vigilance and involvement in society and government. We let others make choices for us and now those we ask to rep us are repping themselves. You share your vigilance and that is good for us all. Thanks again.

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