Trade union bill analysis: Professor Ralph Darlington

The
Conservative
Government’s

Proposed
Strike
Ballot
Thresholds:

The
Challenge
to
the
Trade
Unions

Salford
Business
School

Research
Working
Paper

August
2015

Professor
Ralph
Darlington

Salford
Business
School,
University
of
Salford,

and
Dr
John
Dobson

Riga
International
College
of
Economics
and
Business
Administration

Corresponding
author:
Professor
Ralph
Darlington,
Salford
Business
School,
University
of

Salford,
Salford
M5
4WT;
r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk;
0161-‐295-‐5456

Ralph
Darlington
is
Professor
of
Employment
Relations
at
the
University
of
Salford.
His

research
is
concerned
with
the
dynamics
of
trade
union
organisation,
activity
and

consciousness
in
Britain
and
internationally
within
both
contemporary
and
historical

settings.
He
is
author
of
The
Dynamics
of
Workplace
Unionism
(Mansell,
1994)
and
Radical

Unionism
(Haymarket,
2013);
co-‐author
of
Glorious
Summer:
Class
Struggle
in
Britain,
1972,

(Bookmarks,
2001);
and
editor
of
What’s
the
Point
of
Industrial
Relations?
In
Defence
of

Critical
Social
Science
(BUIRA,
2009).
He
is
an
executive
member
of
the
British
Universities

Industrial
Relations
Association
and
secretary
of
the
Manchester
Industrial
Relations

Society.

John
Dobson
has
published
widely
on
the
operation
of
labour
markets
in
Central
and

Eastern
Europe
and
is
currently
Associated
Professor
at
Riga
International
College
of

Economics
and
Business
Administration,
Latvia.
He
was
previously
a
senior
lecturer
in

Industrial
Relations
at
the
University
of
Salford,
where
he
was
Head
of
the
School
of

Management
(2002-‐6)
and
President
of
the
Salford
Branch
of
the
University
and
College

Union
(UCU)
from
2007-‐9.
He
also
served
on
the
UCU
National
Executive
from
2009-‐11.

CONTENTS

Abstract
and
Summary
of
Key
Findings

Introduction

Justification
and
motivation

Illogical
implications

Competing
models
of
union
democracy

Other
potential
factors
influencing
participation
rates

Evidence
from
database

Three
enabling
features
of
participation

Union
responses

References

1

Abstract
and
Summary
of
Key
Findings

Persistent
disruptive
bouts
of
strike
action
in
recent
years
by
teachers,
civil
servants,

firefighters,
and
rail
and
London
Underground
workers
amongst
others,
sometimes
called

with
only
a
small
proportion
of
union
members
voting
in
favour
of
strike
action,
has
provided

the
backcloth
to
the
publication
on
15
July
of
a
Trade
Union
Bill
by
the
newly
elected

majority
Conservative
government.
The
Bill
promises
(amongst
a
variety
of
other
measures)

the
most
sweeping
and
radical
tightening
of
the
rules
on
industrial
action
seen
since
the

Thatcher
era
of
the
1980s
with
a
minimum
50
per
cent
ballot
participation
threshold

alongside
a
requirement
for
unions
in
‘important
public
services’
to
obtain
a
minimum
40
per

cent
majority
of
all
those
eligible
to
vote.
It
would
have
a
devastating
effect
on
many
unions’

ability
to
take
lawful
industrial
action.

This
Salford
Business
School
Research
Paper
explores
the
following
research
questions:

• To
what
extent
are
the
Conservatives
justified
in
pointing
to
a
‘democratic
deficit’
in

which
a
majority
of
indifferent
union
members
have
surrendered
control
over

whether
to
strike
to
a
committed
minority?

• How
can
we
explain
strike
ballot
participation
rates?
Why
do
some
union
members

not
vote?

• To
what
extent
does
the
secret
individual
postal
balloting
process
affect
the
level
of

participation?

• What
other
factors
might
potentially
influence
whether
union
members
vote
or
not?

• How
are
the
unions
likely
to
fare
in
the
face
of
the
Conservative
government’s
two

new
balloting
thresholds?

To
answer
such
questions
the
paper
first
explores
the
justification
and
underlying

motivation
for
the
introduction
of
new
tougher
strike
ballot
laws,
and
the
illogical

implications
of
such
provisions
which
do
not
apply
to
any
other
ballots.
After
considering

some
alternative
ways
to
potentially
increase
ballot
turnouts
advocated
by
the
TUC
and

some
unions,
notably
online
voting,
the
paper
questions
whether
the
implementation
of
such

an
essentially
technical
and
procedural
measure
would
increase
balloting
turn-‐outs
to
meet

the
Conservatives’
threshold
levels.

Drawing
on
a
range
of
existing
academic
and
practitioner
literature
over
a
number
of

years,
it
compares
the
restrictive
parliamentary
model
of
democracy
underlying
the
secret

individual
postal
balloting
process,
compared
with
a
participatory
model
of
democracy

based
on
collective
decision
making
at
workplace
union
meetings.

It
proceeds
to
identify
the
multi-‐dimensional
enabling/inhibiting
factors
for
strike

ballot
participation,
including
both
general
factors
(economic/employment
restructuring,

employment
legislation,
strike
defeats
and
‘demonstration
effect’,
and
electoral
and
political

disengagement
within
society
more
generally)
as
well
as
specific
factors
(size
and
nature
of

unions,
nature
of
the
workforce,
management
structures
and
behaviour,
role
of
national

trade
union
leadership,
and
health
of
workplace
union
organisation.

2

In
order
to
examine
the
potential
effects
of
the
proposed
legislation,
the
paper
then

retrospectively
applies
it
to
previously
held
ballots
by
analysing
a
database
the
authors
have

compiled
of
162
industrial
action
ballots,
158
of
which
are
strike
ballots,
involving
28

different
trade
unions
(including
BFAWU,
CWU,
FBU,
NUT,
RMT,
UCW,
Unison
and
Unite)

over
the
period
1997-‐2015.
Although
the
database
confirms
Electoral
Reform
Services

statistics
which
show
unions
have
generally
been
overwhelmingly
successful
in
winning

majority
‘yes’
votes
in
favour
of
strike
action
under
the
existing
legislation,
it
also
provides

evidence
to
suggest
they
have
often
failed
to
achieve
the
Tories’
proposed
50
per
cent

participation
threshold:

• Only
85
of
the
158
strike
ballots
covered
by
the
database
reached
the
50
per
cent

target,
and
the
number
of
workers
who
failed
to
reach
the
target
was
completely

disproportionate
to
those
that
did
–
while
444,000
workers
could
have
taken
strike

action
because
they
had
a
turnout
rate
of
over
50
per
cent,
3.3
million
workers
would

have
been
prevented
from
going
on
strike.
Even
if
you
take
out
the
large-‐scale
2011

public
sector
strikes,
it
still
means
880,000
workers
would,
under
the
proposed

legislation,
no
longer
have
been
able
to
go
on
strike.

As
a
result
some
major
national
strikes
would
have
been
deprived
of
legal
protection

under
the
proposed
legislation,
especially
those
relating
to
national
bargaining
in
the
public

sector.

Even
when
unions
have
succeeded
in
reaching
the
50
per
cent
turnout,
some
would

still
fail
to
obtain
the
40
per
cent
majority
threshold
of
those
eligible
to
vote,
although
these

would
not
necessarily
be
affected
by
the
proposed
legislation
which
only
applies
to
the

specified
‘important
public
services’.

• Out
of
90
strike
ballots
in
the
‘important
public
services’
covered
by
the
database,
55

of
them
produced
turnouts
in
which
more
than
40
per
cent
of
the
electorate
voted

‘yes’,
such
that
the
proposed
legislation
would
have
reduced
the
number
of
strikes
in

these
areas
by
nearly
40
per
cent.

However
there
are
important
differences
by
sector:

• The
proposed
legislation
would
have
had
no
effect
on
the
Fire
Service
because
all
11

strike
ballots
cleared
the
40
per
cent
threshold
with
an
average
of
54
per
cent
of

balloted
workers
supporting
strike
action.

• The
picture
is
completely
different
in
Health
where
only
2
of
the
5
national
strikes

would
have
cleared
the
40
per
cent
threshold.
Of
those
that
failed
to
meet
the
40
per

cent,
only
20
per
cent
of
eligible
voters
supported
the
action.
It
is
the
small
specialist

unions
that
achieved
the
highest
turnout
and
high
support
for
strike
action.

• The
picture
in
education
is
more
nuanced;
only
19
of
the
29
strike
ballots
would
have

been
able
to
go
ahead,
but
while
every
ballot
conducted
in
an
individual
school
would

have
passed
the
40
per
cent
threshold,
only
two
national
strikes
did
so
and
neither
of

these
involved
the
main
teaching
unions.

3

• In
transport,
only
23
of
the
44
strikes
cleared
the
40
per
cent
threshold,
so
the

proposed
legislation
would
have
prevented
half
of
transport
strikes.
However,
again

there
was
variation,
for
example,
while
the
BA
cabin
crew
ballots
easily
cleared
the

40
per
cent
hurdle,
a
recent
Greater
London
bus
workers
ballot
would
not,
and
while

the
proposed
legislation
would
have
little
effect
on
strike
ballots
in
the
railway
sector

it
would
have
prevented
most
strikes
on
London
Underground.

• The
one
strike
ballot
that
could
be
regarded
as
border
security
would
have
been

prevented
by
the
new
legislation.

On
the
basis
of
the
database
evidence
available,
while
the
50
per
cent
threshold

would
dramatically
reduce
the
number
of
legally
protected
strikes,
the
introduction
of
an

additional
40
per
cent
threshold
for
the
‘important
public
services’
would
have
very
little

further
effect.
Nonetheless,
overall
many
unions
will
find
the
legislation
will
make
it
very

difficult
for
them
to
mount
officially
sanctioned
strikes
as
a
means
of
challenging
employers

in
national
negotiations
and
in
response
to
government-‐initiated
austerity
measures,

especially
those
relating
to
national
bargaining
in
the
public
sector.

The
paper
identifies
some
important
contributory
factors
to
more
positive
voting

participation
rates:

• There
is
a
clear
overall
tendency
for
workplace,
area
or
single
employer
ballots
to

obtain
‘higher’
turnouts
and
national
ballots
to
obtain
‘lower’
turnouts.

• Unions
with
members
who
have
close
occupational
identities
and
solidaristic
loyalties

also
appear
to
often
be
able
to
generate
relatively
higher
strike
ballot
votes
than

more
general
unions.

• There
is
evidence
the
role
of
union
leadership
-‐
specifically
the
influence
of
left-‐wing

leadership
-‐
can
also
be
a
positive
enabling
factor.

The
paper
concludes
by
reflecting
on
the
unions’
potential
response
to
the

forthcoming
new
legislation,
including
official
union
opposition,
the
use
of
more
strategic

balloting
of
selective
groups
of
workers
confident
of
achieving
the
thresholds,

‘leverage’
and

‘citizen
bargaining’,
and
unofficial
and
‘wildcat’
strike
action.

4

The
Conservative
Government’s
Proposed
Strike
Ballot
Thresholds:

The
Challenge
to
the
Trade
Unions

Introduction

Even
though
strike
levels
in
the
UK
have
fallen
to
their
lowest
ever
historical
levels,
the
far

reaching
effects
of
persistent
bouts
of
strike
action
in
recent
years
(notably
within
the
public

sector),
sometimes
called
with
only
a
small
proportion
of
union
members
voting,
has

provided
the
backcloth
to
the
publication
on
15
July
of
a
Trade
Union
Bill
by
the
newly

elected
majority
Conservative
government.
National
strikes
by
teachers,
civil
servants,
and

firefighters,
a
threatened
national
strike
on
Network
Rail,
and
the
complete
shutdown
of
the

London
Underground
network
by
four
unions
engaging
in
24-‐hour
strike
action,
have
all

served
to
illustrate
the
potential
disruptive
impact
of
strike
action
on
the
wider
public.

Hence
the
government’s
attempt
to
rush
into
law
the
most
sweeping
and
radical
tightening

of
the
rules
on
industrial
action
seen
since
the
Thatcher
era
of
the
1980s
with
new
voting

thresholds
in
trade
union
strike
ballots,1

as
well
as
a
variety
of
other
restrictive
measures

beyond
the
remit
of
this
paper.2

The
legislation
proposes
enormous
obstacles
to
unions’

ability
to
strike
and
may
produce
the
biggest
showdown
over
industrial
relations
for
a

generation.

Between
1980
and
1993,
a
series
of
Conservative
laws
made
it
more
difficult
for

unions
to
take
strike
action
and
remain
within
the
law,
with
specific
measures
requiring

unions
to
organise
secret
postal
ballots
in
respect
of
industrial
action
contained
within
the

Trade
Union
Act
(1984),
Employment
Act
(1988)
and
associated
regulations
and
Code
of

Practice
(Undy
and
Martin,
1984),
which
the
New
Labour
governments
during
1997-‐2010

and
the
Conservative/Liberal
Democrat
coalition
government
of
2010-‐15
left
on
the
statue

book.
As
a
result
of
such
changes,
the
UK
laws
on
industrial
action
ballots
are
widely

regarded
as
some
of
the
strictest
in
Europe;
even
though
making
comparisons
with
other

1

While
strictly
speaking
the
legislation
proposed
refers
to
‘industrial
action’
and
thereby
embraces
both
strikes

as
well
as
action
short
of
a
strike,
this
paper
will
concentrate
attention
and
refer
from
here
on
to
‘strike

ballots’.

2

This
paper
concentrates
purely
on
the
strike
balloting
thresholds,
but
amongst
other
measures
included
are:

the
removal
of
the
ban
(in
place
since
1973)
on
using
agency
workers
to
cover
for
striking
workers;
a
new

requirement
for
14
days’
notice
(instead
of
the
current
7
days)
of
planned
strike
dates;
a
time
limit
of
4
months

after
the
date
of
each
ballot
to
prevent
unions
undertaking
action
based
on
historic
strike
ballots
and
to
make

it
harder
to
engage
in
rolling
strike
action;
making
it
an
offence
for
trade
unions
not
to
supervise
picketing

arrangements,
with
a
named
individual
required
to
be
available
to
ensure
union
members
comply
with
an

existing
Code
of
Practice
that
sets
a
maximum
number
of
only
six
pickets
and
requires
only
peaceful

persuasion
(rather
than
‘intimidation’)
of
others
not
to
work;
moves
to
force
unions
to
make
members’

contributions
to
their
political
fund
an
‘opt-‐in’
arrangement
(rather
than
as
currently
‘opt-‐out’),
to
be

confirmed
every
5
years,
in
an
effort
to
reduce
the
ability
of
trade
unions
to
donate
money
to
the
Labour
Party

or
any
other
party,
as
well
as
a
wide
range
of
other
non-‐party
political
activities;
regulations
requiring
public

authorities
to
publish
detailed
information
on
union
reps
employed
by
them
who
have
to
time-‐off
work

(‘facility
time’)
to
carry
out
union
duties
and
activities,
in
a
bid
to
encourage
employers
to
set
a
limit
on
the

proportion
of
working
time
taken
and
the
total
amount
of
money
spent
on
such
facility
time;
measures
to

increase
the
remit
and
powers
of
the
Certification
Officer
to
investigate
alleged
breaches
of
statutory

provisions
and
to
impose
financial
penalties
on
trade
unions.

5

countries
is
not
straightforward,
in
some
countries
unions
are
not
required
to
hold
a
ballot

to
call
industrial
action,
and
of
those
that
do,
few
specify
a
turnout
threshold;
most
require

a
simple
majority
to
back
action.

The
new
Conservative
majority
government’s
proposed
legislation
aimed
at
further

tightening
up
such
balloting
regulations
contains
two
aspects
with
respect
to
strike

mandates.
First,
all
unions
will
have
to
persuade
a
minimum
of
50
per
cent
of
their
members

eligible
to
vote
to
participate
in
any
strike
ballot
in
order
for
it
to
be
lawful
(currently

balloting
rules
do
not
require
any
specific
level
of
participation
by
union
members).
Thus
in

a
strike
ballot
of
1,000
eligible
union
members
at
least
500
would
have
to
participate;
a

participation
rate
of
499
members
would
be
invalid
on
the
basis
of
being
less
than
the

required
50
per
cent
threshold.
The
PCS
civil
servants’
union,
which
frequently
calls
strikes

amongst
its
members,
has
never
achieved
a
50
per
cent
turnout
on
a
national
ballot
in

recent
years;
neither
on
a
national
ballot
has
the
NUT
teachers’
union.

Secondly,
in
six
specified
so-‐called
‘important
public
services’
–
health
services,

education
of
those
aged
under
17,
fire
services,
transport
services,
border
security,
and

nuclear
decommissioning
including
the
management
of
radioactive
waste
and
spent
fuel
–

an
additional
threshold
will
have
to
be
met.
As
well
as
obtaining
the
50
per
cent
minimum

turnout,
at
least
40
per
cent
of
those
eligible
to
vote
must
support
strike
action
for
it
to
be

lawful
(ballots
currently
require
a
simple
majority
to
back
action).3

Thus
in
a
strike
ballot
of

1,000
eligible
union
members
(embracing
such
workers
as
firefighters,
nurses,
teachers,
or

railways
and
tube
workers)
at
least
400
would
have
to
back
strike
action.
A
vote
by
399

members
in
favour
of
strike
action
and
no
votes
against
(in
other
words,
a
100
per
cent

majority
of
those
who
voted)
would
be
regarded
as
invalid
on
the
basis
of
being
less
than

the
required
40
per
cent
majority
threshold.
As
TUC
general
secretary
Frances
O’Grady
has

claimed:
‘The
Conservative
Party
is
not
just
proposing
a
few
more
bureaucratic
obstacles

that
will
make
life
a
bit
more
difficult
for
trade
unions...
they
would
effectively
ban
strikes
by

the
back
door….[introducing
a]
threshold
no
other
ballot
in
Britain
is
required
to
meet
and

that
many
would
fail….effectively
end[ing]
the
right
to
strike
in
the
public
sector’
(BBC
News,

7
September,
2014).

The
clamour
to
introduce
higher
strike
ballot
thresholds
gathered
pace
in
June
2010

with
a
Confederation
of
British
Industry
report
entitled
Making
Britain
the
Place
to
Work

(CBI,
2010)
which
aimed
to
set
the
agenda
for
the
new
coalition
government’s
labour
policy.

The
CBI
argued
that
the
individual
and
collective
rights
introduced
under
New
Labour
had

made
the
British
economy
uncompetitive
in
a
changed
global
economy.
Alongside
a
raft
of

measures
to
roll
back
the
new
employment
rights,
the
CBI
proposed
the
introduction
of
new

requirements
for
a
minimum
threshold
of
40
per
cent
support
among
members
for
strike

action.
The
right-‐wing
press
(in
particular
the
Express
and
Times
in
their
editorials)

enthusiastically
took
up
the
campaign.
Mayor
of
London,
Boris
Johnson,
following
clashes

with
the
RMT
union
over
a
London
Underground
strike
organised
on
the
basis
of
a
relatively

low
ballot
turnout,
took
the
CBI
proposals
to
the
Conservative
Party
conference,
focusing
in

particular
on
the
restriction
on
the
right
to
strike
which
he
argued
was
needed
in
order
to

avoid
disruption
to
the
Olympic
Games
in
2012
(Daily
Telegraph,
4
October
2010).
Similar

3

This
is
the
same
threshold
that
applies
in
ballots
for
union
recognition
under
the
statutory
recognition

procedure).

6

arguments
were
marshalled
in
a
Policy
Exchange
think-‐tank
report
(2010)
and
Greater

London
Authority
Conservatives
Report
on
the
London
Underground
(Tracey,
2013).

The
‘democratic
legitimacy’
of
strike
mandates
and
the
debate
about
minimum

turnouts
in
union
ballots
was
subsequently
brought
into
sharp
relief
following
alleged

derisory
voting
levels
in
ballots
by
a
number
of
other
public
sector
workers.
For
example,

when
PCS
threatened
strike
action
over
cuts
to
jobs
and
a
pay
freeze
by
border
agency
and

passport
guards
on
the
eve
of
the
2012
Olympics
on
the
basis
of
a
20
per
cent
ballot
turnout

of
members
(on
a
57.2
per
cent
vote
in
favour),
Dominic
Raab,
Conservative
MP,
said:

‘These
reckless
and
damaging
strikes
strengthen
the
case
for
a
voting
threshold,
so
the

militant
minority
can’t
hold
the
hardworking
majority
to
ransom.
It
can’t
be
right
that
union

bosses
can
paralyse
vital
infrastructure
and
humiliate
the
nation
on
a
malicious
whim,
when

just
11
per
cent
of
their
members
support
strike
action’
(Daily
Telegraph,
19
July
2012).

With
such
considerations
in
mind,
this
paper
seeks
to
explore
the
following
research

questions:

• To
what
extent
are
the
Conservatives
justified
in
pointing
to
a
‘democratic
deficit’
in

which
a
majority
of
indifferent
union
members
have
surrendered
control
over

whether
to
strike
to
a
committed
minority?

• How
can
we
explain
strike
ballot
participation
rates?
Why
do
some
union
members

not
vote?

• To
what
extent
does
the
secret
individual
postal
balloting
process
affect
the
level
of

participation?

• What
other
factors
might
potentially
influence
whether
union
members
vote
or
not?

• How
are
the
unions
likely
to
fare
in
the
face
of
the
Conservative
government’s
two

new
balloting
thresholds?

To
answer
such
questions
the
paper
first
explores
the
justification
and
underlying

motivation
for
the
introduction
of
new
tougher
strike
ballot
laws,
and
the
illogical

implications
of
such
provisions
which
do
not
apply
to
any
other
ballots.
After
considering

some
alternative
ways
to
potentially
increase
ballot
turnouts
advocated
by
the
TUC
and

some
unions,
notably
online
voting,
the
paper
questions
whether
the
implementation
of

such
an
essentially
technical
and
procedural
measure
would
increase
balloting
turn-‐outs
to

meet
the
Conservatives’
threshold
levels.
Drawing
on
a
range
of
existing
academic
and

practitioner
literature
over
a
number
of
years
(including
Fairbrother,
1984;
Fredman,
1992;

Martin
et
al,
1991;
1995;
Simpson,
2002;
Undy
and
Martin,
1984;
Undy
et
al,
1996),
it

compares
the
restrictive
parliamentary
model
of
democracy
underlying
the
secret
individual

postal
balloting
process,
compared
with
a
participatory
model
of
democracy
based
on

collective
decision
making
at
workplace
union
meetings.

It
proceeds
to
identify
the
multi-‐dimensional
enabling/inhibiting
factors
for
strike

ballot
participation,
including
both
general
factors
(economic/employment
restructuring,

employment
legislation,
strike
defeats
and
‘demonstration
effect’,
and
electoral
and

political
disengagement
within
society
more
generally)
as
well
as
specific
factors
(size
and

7

nature
of
unions,
nature
of
the
workforce,
management
structures
and
behaviour,
role
of

national
trade
union
leadership,
and
health
of
workplace
union
organisation.

In
order
to
examine
the
potential
effects
of
the
proposed
legislation,
the
paper
then

retrospectively
applies
it
to
previously
held
ballots
by
analysing
a
database
the
authors
have

compiled
of
162
industrial
action
ballots,
158
of
which
are
strike
ballots,
involving
28

different
trade
unions
(including
BFAWU,
CWU,
FBU,
NUT,
RMT,
UCW,
Unison
and
Unite)

over
the
period
1997-‐2015.
Although
our
database
confirms
Electoral
Reform
Services

statistics
which
show
unions
have
generally
been
overwhelmingly
successful
in
winning

majority
‘yes’
votes
in
favour
of
strike
action
under
the
existing
legislation,
it
also
provides

evidence
to
suggest
they
have
often
failed
to
achieve
the
Tories’
proposed
50
per
cent

participation
threshold,
and
that
even
when
they
have
done
so,
some
unions
have
still
failed

to
obtain
the
40
per
cent
majority
threshold
of
those
eligible
to
vote,
albeit
there
are

significant
variations
across
different
sectors,
unions
and
ballots.
While
the
introduction
of

an
additional
40
per
cent
threshold
for
the
‘important
public
services’
would
have
little

further
effect,
many
unions
will
clearly
find
the
legislation
will
make
it
very
difficult
for
them

to
mount
officially
sanctioned
strikes
as
a
means
of
challenging
employers
in
national

collective
bargaining
negotiations
and
government-‐initiated
austerity
measures.
The
paper

identifies
some
important
contributory
factors
to
more
positive
voting
figures,
including
the

size
and
location
of
the
numbers
of
workers
being
balloted
(local
v
national);
degree
of

occupational
identity
and
solidaristic
loyalty;
and
the
link
between
left-‐wing
union

leadership,
collective
mobilisation
and
strike
ballot
participation
rates.
It
concludes
by

reflecting
on
the
unions’
potential
response
to
the
forthcoming
new
legislation.

Justification
and
motivation

Not
surprisingly
many
business
leaders
have
welcomed
the
prospect
of
another
round
of

legislation
on
strike
action
with
its
introduction
of
ballot
participation
thresholds,
concurring

with
the
Conservatives
that
it
would
stop
strike
action
on
the
basis
of
ballots
that
only

involve
a
minority
of
members,
thereby
increasing
the
democratic
legitimacy
of
action
taken

by
unions.
As
the
new
Conservative
government’s
Business
Secretary,
Sajid
Javid,
has

claimed:
‘We’ve
seen…in
the
last
five
years,
strike
action
that
took
place
where
perhaps
only

10
per
cent
to
15
per
cent
of
the
members
of
that
profession
actually
voted
for
it,
and
that’s

not
right,
it’s
unfair’
(BBC
News,
12
May
2015).
It
has
been
claimed
that
of
the
119
major

ballots
for
industrial
action
between
August
2010
and
December
2014,
nearly
three
quarters

would
have
been
invalid
under
the
proposed
rules,
with
strikes
in
some
cases
going
ahead

with
the
support
of
as
few
as
one
in
10
workers
(Daily
Mail,
12
May
2015).4

In
addition,
business
leaders
have
welcomed
the
Conservative’s
plans
to
introduce
a

second
majority
vote
threshold
in
‘important’
public
services,
on
the
basis
that
strike
action

in
these
areas
can
have
far-‐reaching
adverse
effects
on
a
wide
range
of
third
parties
who

have
no
association
with
the
dispute,
with
a
strike
in
health
impacting
on
patients,
a
strike

in
teaching
affecting
parents
and
a
transport
strike
affecting
commuters
and
businesses

(DBIS,
2015a).
Thus
while
Simon
Walker,
director-‐general
of
the
Institute
of
Directors,

acknowledges
the
right
to
strike
is
a
‘fundamental
part
of
our
democracy’,
has
argued
‘that

4

It
should
be
noted
the
source
of
these
figures
is
unstated
and
is
unknown
to
the
authors.

8

does
not
mean
public
sector
unions
should
be
able
to
bring
mass
disruption
to
commuters,

parents
and
people
who
need
public
services
on
the
basis
of
…very
small
turnouts’

(Financial
Times,
10
January
2015).
Likewise
John
Longworth,
director-‐general
of
the

Chambers
of
Commerce,
has
commented:
‘When
it
comes
to
transport,
education
and

health,
which
individuals
and
business
depend
on,
the
right
to
strike
must
only
be
exercised

with
the
greatest
restraint.
So
higher
standards
should
apply
when
a
strike
would
put

people
at
risk
or
affect
the
ability
of
large
numbers
of
their
fellow
citizens
to
earn
a
living’

(Financial
Times,
10
January
2015).
As
Sajid
Javid
has
made
clear,
‘by
increasing
the

thresholds
it
will
certainly
increase
the
hurdles
that
need
to
be
crossed’,
and
at
the
same

time
tackle
the
‘disproportionate
impact
of
strikes’
in
these
areas
(BBC
News,
12
May
2015).

In
the
process
the
proposals
are
seen
as
a
‘commonsensical
attempt
to
prevent

unrepresentative,
highly-‐politicised
activists
from
hijacking
unenthusiastic
workforces’
on

the
basis
‘there
has
always
been
a
gulf
between
union
leaders
and
their
membership…this
is

the
government’s
chance
to
isolate
and
discredit
the
headbangers’
(Daily
Telegraph,
13
May

2015).

Katja
Hall,
CBI
deputy
director-‐general,
has
welcomed
the
reforms
to
‘outdated

industrial
relations
laws’
(Guardian,
15
July
2015),
with
the
introduction
of
balloting

thresholds
‘an
important,
but
fair,
step
to
rebalance
the
interest
of
employers,
employees,

the
public
and
the
rights
of
trade
unions’
(Daily
Mail,
10
January
2015).
By
contrast
the
TUC

have
claimed,
imposing
such
minimum
turnouts
would
leave
unions
with
‘about
as
much

power
as
Oliver
Twist
when
he
asked
for
more’
(Guardian,
12
May
2015).
Certainly,
as
a

recent
International
Labour
Organisation
report
(ILO,
2015)
has
reiterated,
the
right
to
strike

is
a
fundamental
right
to
free
association.
But
it
is
not
simply
a
right
to
come
together
as
a

discussion
group
or
to
advocate
an
idea
or
a
cause;
it
is
the
right
to
act
in
concert
as
much
as

it
is
to
combine.
With
the
social
and
economic
power
of
employers
much
greater
than
that

of
the
individual
worker,
the
right
to
strike
is
a
necessary
collective
means
to
redress
the

imbalance
of
the
employer/employee
relationship
(Kahn
Freund
and
Hepple,
1972;

McFarlane,
1981;
Wedderburn,
1995).

From
this
perspective,
the
government’s
legislation
would
effectively
undermine

collective
bargaining
by
removing
the
implicit
strike
threat
from
the
union
side.
Such
a
shift

in
the
balance
of
power
away
from
ordinary
workers
would
further
undermine
the
pay
and

conditions
of
workers,
exacerbate
the
growing
gulf
between
wages
and
the
cost
of
living,

increase
inequality,
and
destroy
long-‐established
workplace
rights
introduced
to
protect

employees
from
exploitation
(Labour
Research,
2014;
Centre
for
Social
and
Labour
Studies,

2015).
Ironically,
although
Prime
Minister
David
Cameron
has
declared
he
wants
the

Conservatives
to
be
the
‘party
of
working
people’
(Daily
Telegraph,
12
May
2015),
he
is

committed
to
making
it
harder
for
those
people
to
organise
themselves
in
a
trade
union.

In
some
respects,
the
pledge
to
introduce
further
restrictive
regulation
of
strike

balloting
might
seem
ironical
given
that,
according
to
the
three
different
main
indicators
of

strike
activity
in
the
UK
(number
of
strikes,
number
of
workers
involved,
and
number
of

strike
days
lost),
strike
activity
has
for
the
last
20
years
remained
at
historically
low
levels.
Of

course
there
have
been
some
very
large
set-‐piece
one-‐day
public
sector
strikes
over

pensions
in
June
and
November
2011
and
over
pay,
pensions
and
workload
in
July
2014

(Gall
and
Cohen,
2013;
Hale,
2007;
2008;
2009;
2010;
2012;
Lyddon,
1998;
2007;
2009),
but

such
spikes
have
not
altered
the
overall
trend.
Nor
has
sporadic
one-‐day
national
strikes
by

9

civil
servants,
teachers,
firefighters,
and
rail
network
and
London
Underground
workers.

Whatever
the
public
profile
of
such
disputes,
levels
of
strike
action
remain
at
very
low
levels

compared
to
the
heyday
of
union
militancy
in
the
1970s
and
1980s,
with
average
number
of

working
days
lost
through
strikes
between
1980-‐1989
at
7.2
million
compared
to
the
period

2010-‐14
when
it
was
647,000,
albeit
slightly
higher
in
2014
at
788,000
(Office
for
National

Statistics,
2015).
Indeed
what
is
notable
about
when
the
Conservative
government

introduced
balloting
reforms
in
the
early
1980s
is
that
it
was
on
the
back
of
a
wave
of

industrial
discontent,
whereas
today
union
militancy
has
been
considerably
diminished.
So

what
is
it
that
actually
explains
the
pressure
for
legislative
change,
and
what
are
the

underlying
real
motivations?
Arguably
there
are
three
factors
at
play.

First,
there
is
the
Conservatives’
ideological
agenda
of
seeking
to
utilise
austerity
and

the
government’s
neoliberal
offensive
as
a
means
to
impose
even
further
restrictions
on
a

relatively
weak
and
defensive
trade
union
movement
so
as
to
cement
that
weakness.

Second,
there
is
the
location
of
those
strikes
that
still
do
take
place,
namely
in
so-‐called

‘monopoly
sectors’
like
transport
and
communication
and
the
public
services,
and
the

nature
of
these
strikes,
which
have
tended
to
be
relatively
large
and
with
immediate
and

direct
effect
on
essential
services
and
the
public,
for
example
closing
down
schools,

disrupting
the
fire
service,
and
paralysing
the
railway
and
London
tube
networks
(Gall,

2010).

Third,
notwithstanding
historically
low
levels
of
strike
activity
overall,
it
would

appear
the
Conservatives’
perceived
‘problem’
is
less
one
that
exists
now
than
one
than

what
is
foreseen
and
feared
in
the
future.
With
an
economic
and
political
imperative
to

proceed
with
much
deeper
spending
cuts
than
previously
and
to
maintain
a
1
per
cent

freeze
on
public
sector
pay
over
a
4-‐year
period,
the
new
Conservative
government’s

proposed
legislation
appears
to
have
been
principally
designed
to
try
to
make
it
much

harder
for
unions
to
take
strike
action
and
to
weaken
potential
future
union
resistance
to

more
austerity.
As
Dave
Ward,
the
new
general
secretary
of
the
Communication
Workers

Union
(CWU),
has
said:
‘This
is
a
Tory
government
that
is
planning
to
undermine
the

incomes
and
conditions
of
working
people
whilst
at
the
same
time
cynically
sabotaging
the

very
means
they
have
to
speak
out
in
protest’
(Express
and
Star,
27
May
2015).

Illogical
implications

Stanley
(2014)
has
compellingly
pointed
out
there
is
illogicality
to
the
Conservative’s

requirements
for
strike
ballots
to
have
a
50
per
cent
turnout
before
they
are
considered

valid.
He
utilises
the
example
of
two
hypothetical
strike
ballots
of
two
different
1,000
strong

workforces.
In
Acme
Rivets,
there
is
an
overwhelming
vote
for
action,
with
495
in
favour

and
4
against,
whereas
in
Gradgrind
Mills
the
workforce
are
more
divided,
voting
for
action

by
just
one
vote,
251
in
favour
and
250
against.
Union
negotiators
might
be
wary
of
calling

action
in
Gradgrind
Mills
as
the
vote
reveals
a
divided
workforce,
and
the
employer
might

not
feel
under
pressure
to
make
a
much
better
offer.
But
in
Acme
Rivets
there
is
a
clear

mandate
for
action,
and
any
employer
would
find
the
vote
impressive.
However,
under
the

Conservative’s
plans,
a
strike
in
Acme
Rivets
would
be
illegal
as
the
turnout
is
just
below
the

50
per
cent
threshold
needed
to
make
action
lawful.
By
contrast,
despite
the
split
vote
at

Gradgrind
Mills,
and
even
though
244
fewer
workers
voted
for
action,
a
strike
would
be

10

legal.
But
if
only
one
person
who
voted
‘no’
abstained
instead,
the
vote
would
become

invalid
as
the
turnout
would
no
longer
be
in
excess
of
50
per
cent.

As
Stanley
(2014)
has
explained,
under
the
proposals
the
people
who
do
not
vote
in

a
strike
ballot
attain
a
special
status.
First,
they
are
assumed
to,
in
effect,
be
opponents
of

strike
action.
Yet
arguably
whilst
apathy
or
lack
of
opinion
might
be
anathema
for
active

trade
unionists,
it
is
nonetheless
a
legitimate
position,
and
does
not
equate
to
supporting

one
side
or
the
other.
The
fact
that
they
do
not
vote
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
if
they

had
they
would
have
voted
against
taking
strike
action.
Second,
the
special
status
of
the

person
who
does
not
vote
goes
further
in
that
they
can
potentially
have
greater
weight
than

those
who
oppose
the
action
and
take
the
trouble
to
register
a
vote.
So
if
there
were
1,000

people
eligible
to
vote
in
a
strike
ballot
and
499
voted
in
favour
it
would
nullify
the
validity

of
the
vote,
as
the
turnout
would
fall
below
50
per
cent
on
the
basis
of
one
abstention.

In
reality,
we
cannot
really
infer
the
intent
of
those
who
do
not
vote.
All
we
really

know
about
non-‐voters
is
that
they
don’t
know,
are
not
sure,
or
do
not
care
enough
to

participate
when
they
are
provided
a
chance
–
and
therefore
it
could
be
argued
that
they

should
not
get
to
help
to
decide.
In
fact,
thresholds
would
make
it
theoretically
more

beneficial
for
active
opponents
of
strike
action
to
collectively
non-‐vote
if
they
knew
they

were
in
the
minority,
since
by
not
voting
they
could
prevent
it
reaching
the
imposed

‘legitimatising’
threshold
and
thus
defeat
the
strike
decision,
whereas
by
actually
voting
‘no’

when
they
knew
most
would
vote
‘yes’
they
would
be
guaranteeing
passage.
In
other

words,
the
legislation
could
potentially
reduce
participation
rates.

Strike
ballots
were
initially
enacted
in
the
early
1980s
with
the
expectation
that

union
members
would
generally
be
reluctant
to
take
action
and
would
vote
accordingly,

such
that
the
incidence
of
strikes
would
be
reduced.
Yet
the
argument
that
the
so-‐called

‘silent
majority’
would
vote
in
a
ballot
against
‘hot-‐headed’
militant
union
leaderships
has

proved
to
be
false;
since
strike
votes
have
been
formally
measurable
it
can
be
shown
that

most
members
support
their
leaders’
recommendations
to
strike.

Trade
union
strike
ballots
2007-‐2014

Year
Ballots
calling
for

‘strike
action’

Ballots
voting
FOR

strike
action

Ballots
voting

AGAINST
strike

action

Split
result

2007
713
637
64
12

2008
794
658
123
13

2009
561
458
93
10

2010
555
487
61
7

2011
964
904
51
9

2012
585
487
89
8

2013
469
417
48
4

2014
628
550
68
10

Source:

Office
for
National
Statistics,
2015

11

The
frequent
amendments
to
the
legislation
on
industrial
action
ballots
(of
which
the

threshold
measures
are
the
latest
initiative)
are
no
doubt,
in
part
at
least,
a
response
to

employers’
concerns
that
members’
support
for
union
claims
registered
in
ballots
can

actually
strengthen
unions’
bargaining
position.
Likewise
the
repeated
legal
challenges
and

threats
of
injunctions
to
trade
unions’
calls
on
members
to
take
strike
action
which
have

been
made
by
employers,
often
on
the
grounds
of
alleged
failure
to
satisfy
the
complex

statutory
prescription
for
ballots
and
associated
notices
to
employers
(Simpson,
2012;

2013).
Sometimes
this
legal
action
has
succeeded
and
resulted
in
the
ballot
being

suspended
or
strike
cancelled
(Gall,
2006);
for
example,
Unite
was
taken
to
the
High
Court

by
British
Airways
in
2010,
over
a
long-‐running
dispute
with
cabin
crew.
Despite
eight
out
of

ten
workers
voting
for
strike
action
on
the
back
of
a
78
per
cent
ballot
turnout,
the
High

Court
judge
banned
the
strike
because
the
union
had
failed
to
give
notice
by
text
message

that
eleven
out
of
9,282
votes
had
been
spoilt.
But
the
employers’
use
of
legal
action
is
also

a
reflection
of
the
fact
that
the
introduction
of
postal
industrial
action
ballots
has
manifestly

failed
in
its
intention
of
preventing
workers
from
voting
in
favour
of
strikes.

Unions
do
not
necessarily
take
strike
action
following
a
positive
mandate.
Indeed

there
have
always
been
far
more
successful
ballots
and
notices
of
strike
action
than
actual

strikes.
It
is
the
willingness
of
union
members
to
vote
in
favour
of,
and
participate
in
strike

action,
that
has
resulted
in
unions
using
ballots
as
a
negotiation
tactic,
as
a
means
of

attempting
to
force
employers
to
make
concessions
previously
denied.
Often
the
strike

threat,
stemming
from
a
successful
ballot,
can
act
as
a
proxy
for
a
strike
itself,
as
the

employer
becomes
willing
to
make
compromises
and
the
union
is
able
to
achieve
a
more

favourable
settlement
without
the
need
to
take
action
(Brown
and
Wadhwani,
1190:
62).

Nonetheless,
a
sizeable
number
of
ballots
will
result
in
a
credible
prospect
of
strike
action

occurring
(Gall,
2006:
335-‐6).

There
is
also
the
argument
that
it
is
not
reasonable
to
impose
electoral
thresholds

which
do
not
apply
to
the
UK’s
political
system
generally.
Thus
there
have
been
a
number
of

recent
local
elections
in
which
turnout
has
been
nowhere
near
50
per
cent.
In
the
2008

London
Mayoral
election
it
was
just
45
per
cent
and
in
2012
Boris
Johnson
was
elected
with

less
than
50
per
cent
of
both
first
and
second
preference
votes
and
on
a
turnout
of
only
38.1

per
cent.
The
lowest
ever
by-‐election
turnout
of
18.2
per
cent
was
recorded
in
the
2012

Manchester
Central
by-‐election
(with
the
incumbent
Labour
MP
Lucy
Powell
winning
with

just
12
per
cent
support).
Recent
local
Police
and
Crime
Commissioner
elections
have

resulted
in
turnouts
as
low
as
16.4
per
cent
in
Northumbria
and
10.3
per
cent
in
the
West

Midlands.

A
similar
pattern
has
been
played
out
in
general
elections.
Turnout
for
the
2014

European
Parliament
elections
was
just
over
34.2
per
cent,
and
for
the
2012
Alternative

Vote
(AV)
electoral
system
referendum
it
was
just
41
per
cent.
In
the
May
2015
general

parliamentary
elections
only
37
per
cent
of
voters
and
less
than
25
per
cent
of
the
eligible

electorate
as
a
whole
supported
the
Conservatives.
David
Cameron
managed
to
obtain
60.1

per
cent
of
the
vote
on
a
turnout
of
70.2
per
cent,
but
only
41.1
per
cent
of
the
eligible

electorate,
and
the
Chancellor
George
Osbourne
managed
to
obtain
58.6
per
cent
of
the

vote,
on
a
turnout
of
70.2
per
cent,
but
only
41.1
per
cent
of
the
eligible
electorate.

12

Yet
despite
these
poor
turnouts
for
political
elections
the
Conservatives
have
not

proposed
similar
thresholds
to
those
that
trade
unions
are
going
to
be
expected
to
meet.

Competing
models
of
union
democracy

The
TUC
and
many
unions
have
pointed
out
that
there
are
more
proportionate
and

measured
ways
to
address
the
issue
of
low
ballot
participation
rates,
and
which
attempt
to

overcome
what
is
regarded
as
the
main
obstacle
to
higher
voting
levels:
secret
individual

postal
ballots
sent
to
the
home.
As
Frances
O’Grady
has
said:

It
is
everyone’s
interest
to
ensure
that
as
many
people
as
possible
participate,
but
the
government

has
saddled
unions
with
twentieth
century
postal
balloting
methods
that
make
it
harder
for
working

people
to
do
just
that.
Online
voting
is
the
way
to
bring
balloting
bang
up
to
date
and
help
ensure

some
equality
in
the
workplace
(Independent,
21
March
2015).

Removing
the
requirement
for
unions
to
post
ballot
papers
to
their
members’
home

addresses
(notably
in
an
era
when
most
post
tends
to
be
junk
mail
or
bills)
and
instead

allowing
union
members
to
complete
ballot
papers
electronically
via
a
secure
online
link
on

their
work
computers,
home
laptops,
tablets
or
smartphones
would
seem
likely
to

encourage
increased
voter
turnout,
as
well
as
reduce
the
cost
of
ballots
on
unions

considerably.5

Such
an
initiative
is
part
of
a
wider
drive
by
pressure
groups
such
as

WebRoots
Democracy,
who
campaign
for
the
introduction
of
an
online
voting
option
in
UK

elections
on
the
basis
that,
despite
being
able
to
email,
follow,
and
tweet
their
elected
MPs

online,
electors
are
not
yet
able
to
vote
for
them
online.
The
pressure
group
maintain
that

to
reverse
growing
political
apathy
and
low
electoral
turnout
in
the
UK,
particularly
among

young
people,
the
UK
needs
to
introduce
an
online
voting
option
in
time
for
the
2020

General
Election,
as
well
as
online
trade
union
strike
ballots
by
2016.
It
is
claimed
the

introduction
of
an
online
voting
option
could
increase
turnout
in
a
General
Election
by
up
to

79
per
cent,
with
up
to
an
extra
9
million
voters
(WebRoots
Democracy,
2015:
11-‐13).

Likewise,
according
to
PCS
general
secretary
Mark
Serwotka,
turn-‐out
in
strike
ballots
would

‘rocket’
if
union
members
were
allowed
to
vote
electronically
or
by
phone
(BBC
News,
19

May
2015).

However,
online
voting
does
not
always
increase
turnout,
with
data
from
Estonia
–

where
online
voting
has
been
available
since
2005
–
showing
that
it
is
often
people
who

were
voting
already
who
are
switching
to
the
service.
Evidence
from
the
University
and

College
Union’s
(UCU)
2014
post-‐strike
action
online
consultative
ballot
(as
opposed
to
a

strike
ballot,
albeit
further
strikes
were
implicit
in
a
‘no’
vote)
on
whether
to
accept
revised

pension
change
proposals
was
that
voting
levels
may
have
been
encouraged
slightly,
with
a

turnout
recorded
of
39.1
per
cent
(15,706
in
total),
involving
10,538
(67
per
cent)
voting

‘yes’
to
accept
and
only
5,168
voting
‘no’
to
reject
(32.9
per
cent).
(UCU
Circular,
26
January

5

The
cost
of
strike
ballots
was
initially
borne
by
the
state.
The
1980
Employment
Act
encouraged
the

extension
of
postal
ballots
by
providing
state
funding
for
the
first
time
under
statutory
instrument;
initially

these
applied
to
closed
shop
ballots
but
were
extended
by
later
Acts
to
include
strike
ballots.
After
a
number

of
ballots,
including
strike
ballots,
had
been
made
effectively
compulsory,
state
funding
was
withdrawn
with

effect
from
1996
by
Statutory
Instrument
in
1993.
The
result
has
been
that
since
1996
unions
can
be
obliged
to

spend
many
thousands
of
pounds
on
the
balloting
process.

13

2015).
Yet
even
though
online
voting
would
undoubtedly
make
it
technically
easier
for

union
members
to
participate
in
strike
ballots,
it
is
not
does
overcome
the
inherent

fragmentation
and
atomisation
of
the
balloting
process.

The
more
fundamental
underlying
problem
is
the
way
government
legislative

initiatives
with
respect
to
strike
ballots
over
the
last
30
years
have
often
been
successfully

portrayed
as
a
necessary
means
to
increase
union
membership
participation
in
critically

important
decisions,
and
thereby
improve
democracy
-‐
when
arguably
it
has
had
very
little

to
do
with
democracy,
the
objective
being
simply
to
make
strike
decisions
and
action
more

difficult
(McCrystal
and
Novitz,
2012).
This
linking
of
ballots
and
democracy
has
always
been

central
to
the
debate
about
secret
postal
ballots.
A
1976
Conservative
Party
manifesto,
The

Right
Approach,
argued
that
the
system
of
union
democracy
enshrined
in
union
rulebooks

did
not
function
in
practice.
Because
the
members
of
many
unions
were
required
to
attend

branch
meetings
if
they
wished
to
vote
on
policy
issues,
elect
their
general
secretary,
or

vote
for
industrial
action,
it
was
claimed
they
were
controlled
by
unrepresentative

minorities
of
militant
and
left-‐wing
politically
motivated
activists.
The
vast
majority
of

members
were
not
willing
or
able
to
attend
branch
meetings
or
to
take
part
in
policy

debates
and
elections.

The
solution
was
seen
to
lie
in
introducing
legislation
that
would
make
it
compulsory

for
unions
to
involve
members
through
secret
postal
ballots.
This
would,
it
was
claimed,

take
power
away
from
the
militants
and
‘give
the
unions
back
to
the
members’.
Union

members
would
receive
a
ballot
paper
through
the
post
and
be
asked
in
the
isolation
of

their
own
homes
to
exercise
their
choice
as
to
whether
to
vote
‘yes’
or
‘no’
to
industrial

action
proposals
(Undy
And
Martin,
1984:
15;
Farnham
and
Pimlott:
1995:
127-‐128).
The

presumption
was
that
decisions
would
be
made
on
a
more
‘rational’
basis
if
the
individual

worker
was
insulated
from
the
direct
pressures
of
work
colleagues
and
union
activists
and

the
emotion
of
the
mass
meeting
(Martin,
et
al,
1991:
198).

A
central
objective
of
the
legislation
was
to
sanctify
through
particular
ballot

procedures
union
members’
participation
as
individuals
rather
than
as
members
of
a

collective
-‐
involving
a
separation
of
the
receipt
of
ballot
papers
from
the
workplace
and
the

elevation
of
individualist
over
collectivist
values
as
a
means
of
subverting
collective
union

organisation
and
orientations
(Smith
et,
1993;
Martin
et
al,
1995;
Undy
and
Martin,
1984;

Undy
et
al,
1996).
On
the
basis
of
what
could
be
viewed
as
a
parliamentary
model
of

democracy,
the
level
of
participation
in
strike
ballots
has
been
viewed
as
a
measure
of
union

democracy,
such
that
the
higher
the
participation
rate
the
more
democratic
the
union

(Edelstein
and
Warner,
1979:
63).
In
the
process,
it
effectively
dispensed
with
the
need
for

dialogue,
debate
and
continuous
involvement
by
an
active
membership,
and
replaced
it

with
a
highly
atomised
one-‐off
vote
by
a
collection
of
aggregate
individuals
as
the
total
sum

of
membership
participation
(Davies
and
Freedland,
1993:
484;
Fredman,
1992:
29).

Critics
of
this
parliamentary
model
of
democracy
argued
the
balloting
legislation

failed
to
recognise
trade
unions
as
collective
organisations
that
were
formed
in
order
to

increase
the
power
of
individual
employees,
with
union
strength
dependent
on
members

acting
collectively
to
organise
and
express
the
conflicts
inherent
in
the
employment

relationship
(Mcllroy,
1998:
154).
Replacing
collective
decision
making
by
individual
secret

ballots
undermined
(or
prevented
the
emergence
of)
the
solidarity
required
for
effective

14

strike
action.
It
essentially
counter
posed
the
idea
of
working
class
collective
strength
with

that
of
individual
rights
and
decisions,
thereby
fragmenting
and
isolating
union
members

away
from
their
fellow
workers
and
in
circumstances
where
they
were
most
open
to
self-‐
doubt
and
moderate
ideas
(Hyman,
1989:
247).

Fairbrother
(1984)
advocated
an
alternative
participatory
model
of
democracy
which

emphasised
the
central
importance
of
collective
membership
participation
and
decision-‐
making
via
a
process
of
discussion,
debate
and
examination
of
policies
and
decisions

founded
on
the
continuous
interaction
between
union
members
and
their
reps.
From
this

perspective:

Union
democracy
is…a
continuous
process
rooted
in
the
daily
experience
of
most
workers
and

involving
a
continuous
struggle
about
the
conditions
of
employment,
the
authority
of
employers
and

the
organisation
of
work…

Disagreement
and
discussion,
argument
and
counter-‐argument,
are
the
key
features
of
this
process
–

a
sign
of
the
vitality
and
indeed
the
essence
of
union
organisation.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
the

experience
of
members
is
often
varied
and
there
are
not
always
obvious
and
clear-‐cut
ways
to

proceed
and
advance
the
interests
of
the
membership.
Through
meetings,
discussions
and
debate,

decisions
are
made
and
policy
formulated
(p.
23-‐24).

From
this
viewpoint
it
was
argued
that,
compared
with
the
secret
individual
postal

ballot,
a
much
more
effective
–
and
more
genuinely
democratic
–
channel
for
participation

would
involve
discussions,
debates
and
decisions
taken
at
workplace
union
meetings.
This

would
allow
questions
to
be
raised
about,
for
instance,
the
likely
length
of
the
strike,
its

objectives
and
the
‘bottom
line’
for
a
settlement.
Under
such
circumstances,
in
which

members
were
encouraged
to
actively
participate
in
the
deliberations,
they
would
be
more

likely
to
understand
the
issues
and
arguments,
and
be
in
a
better
position
to
consider
their

collective
interests
than
if
they
voted
as
isolated
individuals
at
home,
and
where
the
only

real
‘discussion’
of
the
proposal
for
many
members
would
come
in
the
form
of
a
positive

union
recommendation,
on
the
one
hand,
and
negative
media
campaign,
on
the
other.
It

would
vastly
increase
membership
participation
in
the
process
and
be
hugely
more

democratic.

Certainly
when
the
Trade
Union
Act
1984
(TUA
1984)
introduced
a
statutory

requirement
for
trade
unions
to
hold
industrial
action
ballots
which
could
be
workplace

ballots
and
to
achieve
a
majority
vote
in
favour
of
industrial
action,
it
had
the
effect
of

increasing
the
levels
of
membership
participation,
according
to
an
analysis
of
the
turnout
in

workplace
ballots
between
1985
and
1993
(Undy
et
al,
1996:
p.
220).
A
number
of

interviewed
trade
union
officers
estimated
that
turnout
averaged
20
per
cent
in
union

branch-‐based
systems
and
50
per
cent
when
conducted
at
the
workplace.
In
one
district
of

the
AEU
engineering
union
an
average
turnout
of
81
per
cent
was
recorded
in
17
workplace

industrial
action
ballots
held
during
1987,
similar
to
the
level
achieved
by
the
National
Union

of
Mineworkers’(NUM)

traditional
workplace
ballots.
But
in
1993
workplace
ballots
for

strike
action
were
banned
by
the
Conservatives
and
only
fully
postal
balloting
was
allowed,

with
the
effect
that
it
reduced
the
turnout
compared
to
workplace
ballots
(p.
242).

According
to
the
Electoral
Reform
Balloting
Services
(ERBS,
1994:
3)
who
looked
at
242

postal
ballots
in
1994,
in
ballots
of
over
1,000
members
it
fell
to
approximately
44
per
cent.

In
other
words,
if
the
concern
is
simply
to
increase
turnout
then
workplace
ballots
would

15

appear
to
represent
a
much
better
channel
than
a
secret
individual
postal
vote,
but
of

course
democracy
and
strike
ballot
legislation
is
not
simply
about
turnouts.

As
for
the
type
of
direct
union
democracy
signalled
in
workplace
mass
meetings
and

show-‐of-‐hands
strike
votes,
in
the
1960s
and
1970s
these
were
often
either
held
in
canteens

or
in
the
car
parks
outside
car
factories
and
other
workplaces
(Thornett,
1987:
47-‐8;

Darlington,
1994:
234).
They
were
an
expression
of
a
collective
form
of
decision
making

based
on
open
debate,
in
an
atmosphere
of
strong,
dynamic
worker
interaction
(Cohen,

2006:
166-‐7).
The
NUM’s
method
of
holding
such
ballots
at
the
pithead
was
particularly

attractive,
as
it
gave
every
union
member
the
right
to
vote,
but
under
conditions
which

encouraged
voting
by
reference
to
collective
rather
than
merely
individual
self-‐interest.

Indeed
one
commentator
has
gone
so
far
as
to
comment:
‘…the
use
of
strike
meetings
for

reaching
strike
decisions…is
perhaps
the
clearest
expression
to
be
found
of
industrial

democracy
at
work’
(McFarlane,
1981:
92-‐3).

Yet
even
in
their
heyday
the
notion
of
such
mass
workplace
union
meetings

appeared
to
cut
against
the
grain
of
society.
As
Beynon
(1973:
305)
noted,
‘it
is
anathema
to

many
people.
Few
things
raise
middle
class
Britain
to
a
greater
show
of
moral
outrage
than

workers
packed
into
large
halls,
voting
on
important
issues
by
a
show
of
hands’.
Despite
the

caricature
of
the
‘bad
old
days
of
trade
union
militancy’
of
the
1970s
painted
by
the
tabloid

press,
in
which
allegedly
there
was
the
potential
for
‘intimidation
by
union
firebrands’
at

such
open
mass
meetings
(Crossman,
2014),
it
was
not
always
the
case
that
militant
shop

stewards
were
able
to
win
support
amongst
shopfloor
members
for
strike

recommendations;
sometimes
the
decisions
made
at
such
meetings
involved
constraints
on

the
activities
of
stewards,
with
leadership
strike
calls
being
rejected
(McCarthy,
1967:
22;

Goodman
and
Whittingham,
1973:
191;
1999;
Batstone
et
al,
1977:
92-‐3;
Darlington,
2006:

494-‐497).
Conversely
although
postal
ballots
have
probably
reduced
industrial
militancy
by

denying
union
negotiators
the
opportunity
to
call
for
strike
votes
at
mass
meetings
in
which

appeals
for
solidarity
could
potentially
more
effectively
overcome
concern
with
individual

profit
and
loss,
postal
ballots
have
not
guaranteed
moderation,
such
that
the
method
and

location
of
voting
has
not
been
a
major
determinant
of
outcome
(despite
its
effect
on

participation)
compared
with
other
contingent
factors
(McCrystal
and
Novitz,
2012:
212).

Moreover
there
is
much
justification
to
the
view
that
workers
should
have
the
right

to
take
decisions
at
open
workplace
union
meetings,
whether
this
is
by
a
show
of
hands
or

by
a
secret
ballot
held
after
the
meeting
-‐
potentially
in
today’s
world
being
facilitated
via

online
channels
after
the
meeting
-‐
with
all
such
elections
subjected
to
independent

scrutiny.
It
should
be
noted
as
a
result
of
the
New
Labour
government’s
Statutory

Recognition
Procedure,
under
which
unions
were
given
rights
with
respect
to
union

recognition,
balloting
takes
place
at
the
workplace,
in
secret
and
under
the
supervision
of
a

qualified
independent
person.
A
similar
procedure
in
the
case
of
industrial
action
ballots

could
be
introduced
in
a
fashion
that
would,
to
some
extent
at
least,
address
the
problem
of

low
voter
turnouts.

But
even
if
such
alternative
ways
of
attempting
to
increase
ballot
vote
participation

are
both
justified
and,
if
implemented,
likely
to
succeed,
there
is
nonetheless
still
a
serious

doubt
as
to
whether
they
would
materially
increase
the
turnout
sufficient
to
meet
the

Conservatives
new
ballot
thresholds.
Even
if
many
unions
were
able
to
obtain
a
50
per
cent

16

participation
rate,
they
would
still
find
it
very
difficult,
if
not
virtually
impossible
in
some

cases,
to
obtain
the
necessary
40
per
cent
majority
vote.
Such
apparently
insurmountable

dilemmas
raise
the
more
underlying
question
of
why
exactly
turnouts
in
strike
ballots
are
not

higher,
and
whether
there
are
broader
problems
at
stake
for
the
unions
-‐
than
merely

attempting
to
ameliorate
through
technical
means
the
method
and
location
of
voting
–
in

confronting
the
Conservative’s
proposed
stringent
legislation?

Other
potential
factors
influencing
participation
rates

How
can
we
explain
strike
ballot
participation
rates?
Why
do
some
union
members
not

vote?
What
are
the
different
enhancing
or
inhibiting
factors
affecting
participation?
There

are
many
potentially
related
and
complex
factors
that
could
explain
this.
As
we
have
seen,
if

unions
did
not
have
to
jump
through
the
hoop
of
a
bureaucratic
and
atomising
secret

individual
postal
balloting
process,
away
from
the
collectivism
and
solidarity
of
the

workplace,
it
is
likely
there
would
be
a
higher
level
of
participation.
But
beyond
the
balloting

process,
what
other
factors
might
come
into
play
to
explain
why
some
union
members

participate
and
others
abstain?

The
apparent
apathy
of
some
union
members
in
not
voting
might
be
caused
by
the

fact
they
do
not
think
the
issue
is
important
enough
to
them,
or
because
they
have
busy

working
lives,
families
to
care
for,
and
a
social
life,
and
they
just
do
not
feel
motivated

enough
to
complete
a
voting
paper
and
then
take
the
initiative
to
post
it.
But
as
Paul
Nowak

(2011),
deputy
TUC
general
secretary,
has
suggested,
lack
of
participation
may
also
be

because
union
members
genuinely
can’t
make
up
their
mind,
and
so
decide
to
sit
out
the

vote
to
see
what
others
think;
or
whilst
they
may
be
very
sympathetic
to
the
union
cause,

they
hold
back
from
voting
on
the
assumption
that
strike
action
is
a
‘big
deal’
and
will
cost

them
lost
wages;
or
they
may
balance
the
cost
of
the
substantive
issue
at
stake
–
for

example,
with
government
proposals
on
pensions
meaning
they
would
pay
more,
work

longer,
and
get
less
-‐
with
an
understandable
reluctance
to
do
anything
that
could
impact
on

their
patients,
pupils
or
members
of
the
public
who
rely
on
them,
and
therefore
they
defer

their
decision
in
the
hope
that
an
agreed
compromise
settlement
might
be
reached.

It
should
be
noted
when
proposals
for
strikes
were
voted
for
in
mass
meetings
in

factory
canteens
or
car
parks
in
the
strike-‐prone
days
of
the
1970s,
anecdotal
evidence

suggests
few
people
abstained
(Thornett,
1987).
Of
course,
in
large
part
this
may
have

reflected
a
more
confident
belief
in
the
strength
of
unions
and
their
prospects
of
strike

success.
Nonetheless,
even
during
these
times,
some
people
in
mass
meetings
were
no

doubt
more
hesitant
to
put
their
hands
up
than
others.
When
it
comes
to
today’s
individual

secret
postal
ballots,
it
seems
reasonable
to
assume
that
at
least
a
significant
proportion
of

workers
do
not
necessarily
abstain
because
they
do
not
care
about
the
issues
at
stake,
are

opposed
to
strike
action,
or
are
opposed
to
the
potential
loss
of
wages
involved
in
taking

action,
but
because
they
are
unsure
whether
striking
is
likely
to
succeed
–
otherwise,
if
they

were
sure,
they
would
probably
vote
‘no’
straight
off.
Instead,
they
often
feel
uncertain

about
whether
the
union,
or
the
workforce,
is
strong
and
determined
enough
to
make
the

strike
effective
and
likely
to
succeed.
In
the
past,
at
mass
meetings,
those
unsure
workers

might
have
decided
by
observing
others
and,
if
there
was
a
large
enough
body
of
workers

putting
their
hands
up
for
a
strike
straight
away,
then
casting
their
vote
in
favour

Trade union bill analysis: Professor Ralph Darlington

Trade union bill analysis: Professor Ralph Darlington

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