Professional Documents
Culture Documents
caseNo.
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C t/
3/b&
Petitioner,
UNREDACTED PETITION
TOVACATE ARBITRATION
AWARI)
-v.-
RECEIVED
JUL
2I
Z0l5
',ii^l^ti;?;il'llil[?B?l'
#y'At
on its own behalf and on behalf of Tom Brady, hereby petitions this Court, pursuant to
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Ac\ 29 U.S.C. $
185
("LMRA"), and
l0 ("FA"{'), to vacate
2015 Arbitration Award (*Award") (NFLPA Ex. 210 heretor) issued by National Football
League ("NFL" or ool-eague") Commissioner Roger Goodell.
INTRODUCTION
l.
unprecedented four-game suspension for Brady's purported o'general awareness" that two
New England Patriots equipment personnel allegedly deflated Patriots footballs prior to
the 2015 AFC Championship Game.
2.
Through this Petition, the NFLPA and Brady seek to set aside the Award,
which defies the binding ruling of this Court in Peterson, ignores the "law of the shop"
and the essence of the parties' collective bargaining agreement
Exhibit citations herein refer to the exhibits submitted with this Petition. Petition
exhibit numbers l-203 coincide with the numbers of the exhibits submitted by the
NFLPA and Brady through the June 23, 2015 arbitration hearing in the underlying Article
46 arbitration proceeding before Commissioner Goodell which resulted in tlle issuance of
the Award. Exhibit numbers 205-208 are the NFLPA and Brady's post-hearing brief and
attendant exhibits, also submitted to Goodell. Exhibit number 204 is the full transcript
from the June 23 arbitration before Commissioner Goodell.
Petitioners have also filed contemporaneously with the Court an ex parte motion
to file certain of those exhibits, as well as selected portions of this Petition, under seal
because the NFL insisted upon a confidentiality agreement.
back of the hand to fundamental arbitral principles conceming procedural faimess and
arbitrator bias.
3.
ln Peterson, this Court squarely held that the law of the shop under the
CBA affords players advance notice ofpotential discipline. This Court further held in
Peterson that any arbitration award sustaining discipline in the absence of proper notice
is an award contrary to the essence of the CBA and must be vacated.
4,
upholds Brady's four-game suspension in its entirety despite the undisputed arbitration
record of several egregious notice defects: Brady had no notice of the disciplinary
standards that would be applied to him; no notice of the disciplinary policies that would
be applied; and no notice of the potential penalties. In fact, the NFL collectively
bargained over the punishments (/ines, not suspensions) for alleged equipment tampering
to
5.
are: (i)
The notice defects which each independently require vacating the Award
of alleged misconduct by
other people, an unknown disciplinary standard never previously applied to players in the
history ofthe NFL; (ii) suspending Brady despite the fact that the Player Policies provide
only for specified/zes for any type of equipment violation; (iii) subjecting Brady to the
Competitive
suspending Brady for alleged non-cooperation, when a fine is the only penalty tlrat has
ever been upheld in such circumstances. By ignoring each one of these notice failures,
the Award-as in Peterson-utterly disregards the CBA law of the shop and must be
vacated for deffing the essence of the CBA.
6.
But the Award's legal defects do not stop there. The Award ignores the
law of the shop requirement of fair and consistent treatment by basing discipline on ball
pressure 'testing" that the NFL concedes did not generate reliable information because
of
its failure to implement any protocols for collecting such information. Additionally, the
Award is the product of a fundamentally unfair process, and was issued by an evidently
partial arbitrator who put himself in the position of ruling on the legality of his own
improper delegation
these grounds
7.
Tom Brady quarterbacks tlre New England Patriots and is one of the most
Patriots to their fourth Super Bowl championship during his tenure with the team, tying
8.
investigation into whether the Patriots footballs were improperly deflated below the
pressure range
commissioned one
&
of
the
Garrison ('?aul,
Weiss"), led by partner Theodore Wells, to co-lead the "Deflate-gate" investigation along
with NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeffrey Pash (the "Wells-Pash
9,
1.
"inde.Fendent."
Policy").
Id.
&
Enforcemenr
Howevero
of
Competitive Rules
10.
On May 6, many months and many millions of dollars in legal fees later,
Paul, Weiss and the NFL issued the 'oWells Report' summarizing the findings from their
investigation. The purportedly independent Wells Report was edited by Pash, the NFL's
General Counsel, before its public release, The Report concluded that
probable than
it was "more
deliberate effort to release air from Patriots game balls after the balls were examined by
the referee" prior to the start of the AFC Championship Game. NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells
Report at
2.
of
suppoding the claims of ball deflation. Moreover, even though footballs are expected to
naturally deflate when moving from a warm locker room to a cold-weather environment
(like the AFC Championship Game), the Wells Report concluded that human intervention
was "more probable than not" based on a statistical and scientific analysis. At the same
time, however, the Wells Report conceded that this analysis rested on numerous
;'assumptions"-because of the League's failure
to record the necessary data-and that
"varying the applicable assumptions can have a material impact upon the ultimate
conclusions." Id. at 73.
11.
With respect to Brady's alleged role, the Wells Report findings were even
more limited. The Report concluded it was "more probable than not that Brady was at
least generally awereo' of the alleged misconduct by
Id. at
17
(emphasis added). The Wells Report did not find that Brady actually knew about any
ball deflation at the AFC Championship Game; it did not find that Brady directed or
authorized any ball deflation; nor did
Competitive Integrity Policy pursuant to which he was punished and the Wells-Pash
Investigation was conducted.
12.
whal
if
After the Wells Report was released, the Union and Brady waited to
see
Goodell-and no one else-has the exclusive authority under the CBA to take certain
disciplinary actions against players for conduct detrimental to the League. But" in this
case, Goodell improperly abdicated his CBA role and delegated his disciplinary authority
13.
applicable League Policies for Players ('?layer Policies")), and resting solely on the
limited factual conclusions from the Wells Report about Brady's alleged "general
awareness," suspended Brady for four games. NFLPA Ex. 10. Vincent also based this
was Brady declining, on the advice of his agents who were also acting as his attomeys, to
respond to Wells' requests to produce certain of his private text messages and e-mails.
14.
46 of the CBA. Goodell decided to serve as the arbitrator. Brady and the NFLPA moved
for his recusal because, among other things, Goodell had directed the unlawful delegation
of his CBA disciplinary authority to Vincent. Thus, as arbitrator, Goodell would have to
determine the facts and CBA legality of his own conduct. Moreovero Goodell was an
essential witness on the delegation issue and obviously could not serve as both arbitrator
11.
The Commissioner
15.
On June
8,2415,
,See
hearing defied any concept of fundamental faimess. Prior to the hearing, Goodell had
ruled that Brady and the Union could not question essential witnesses, denied them
access
to the investigative files underlying the Wells Report (which were nonetheless
available
to the NFL's
unlawful delegation argument without considering any evidence (other than 'ofacts"
decreed by Goodell himself
being
for the NFL conducting direct and cross-examinations of witnesses (including Brady's).
A Paul. Weiss partner represented the NFL for most of the hearing, even though he was a
signatory to the Wells Report and his law partner (Wells) was a fact witness at the same
hearing.
16.
NFL had no
procedures
whatsoever for collecting information essential to determining whether the Patriots balls
had deflated due to environmental factors or human intervention. In fact just three days
ago, the NFL let it be known that, for the first time, it is implementing procedures for ball
pressure
testing-a stark
which Brady's punishment was based was collected. The League's admitted failure to
timely implement any such data collection protocols caused the League's scientific and
statistical consultants to make a multitude of unsupported assumptions and rendered their
analysis utterly unreliable.
17.
And, the hearing confirmed all of the undisputed facts about the lack of
proper notice.
18.
Brady's suspension. True to form, Goodell's Award is little more than an exercise in
rehashing the Wells Report, and making unfounded, provocative and mystifying attacks
on Brady's integrity. At the same time, the Award ignores the fundamental legal
arguments presented by the Union which form the basis of this Petition and require that
the Award be set aside.
19.
contending that Brady's knowledge that, in the broadest sense, he could be suspended for
"conduct detrimental" eliminated the need for the League to provide any notice about
whether a general awareness standard of conduct could be applied, which policies could
be applied, and what the potential penalties for violations of the applicable Player
Poiicies might be. But this contention has already been rejected by this Court in NFLPA
v. NFL (Adrian Peterson)o slip op. at 12-14 (D. Minn. Feb.26,2Al5), appeal docketed,
No. 15-1438 (8th Cir. Feb.27,2015) (which the Award also ignores), where the domestic
violence conduct at issue constituted conduct detrimental under any policy, but where the
arbitration award was nevertheless vacated because
requirement that Peterson have advance notice
and penalties to
ZA.
in the
Player
Policies, but the Award deliberately ignores this fact because those Policies expressly
21.
The most the Award has to say about notice is to try to deny, in a footnote,
that either the Competitive Integrity Policy or any other policy was applied. NFLPA Ex.
210, Award at 17, n.19. Putting aside that this assertion belies the arbitration record that
Vincent did apply the Competitive Integrity Policy to Brady and punished him for being
generally aware that Patriots equipment personnel violated that policy" it does not save
the Award from vacatur. According to the Award, Brady was suspended for general
awareness vnder no policy, but there is a speci/ic Player Policy conceming equipment
violations that does not provide for suspensions or "general awareness" violations. This
is
just the type of notice defect which this Court fovnd in Peterson. There, Peterson had
notice of one version of the Commissioneros Personal Conduct Policy, only to have the
Commissioner apply a different version of the Personal Conduct Policy with different
rules and penalties.
22.
of Brady's purported
non-cooperation,
(including a brand new, hyperbolic and baseless accusation that Brady "destroyed" his
agents-lawyers
firm), This
because the NFL already had all ofthe relevant text communications by Brady from other
23.
l,
3.
the punishment for alleged non-cooperation yet again violates the CBA requirement
of
10
NFLPA Ex.
24.
ll3,
The Award further ignores that Wells never once told Brady that discipline
could flow from declining to produce his personal text messages or e-mails.
25,
With respect to the other grounds for vacatuq the Award also tums a blind
eye to the NFL's undisputed failure to implement procedures for testing the footballs at
the AFC Championship Game such that there was no fair and consistent basis for the
NFL to base any punishment on its consultants' conclusions; ignores the procedural
defects depriving Brady
of a
fundamentally
about
26.
ln a public
1l
Yesterday's decision
by
It
27.
As in Peterson, the Court must again intervene and vacate the Award,
which (i) violates the law of the shop requirement of noticeo (ii) violates the law of the
shop requirement of faimess and consistency,
See
Florio: Robert Kraft tees offon Brady ruling, ProFootballTalk.Com (July 29,
2Al\,httpl
lprofootballtalk.nbcsports.com/20BlA7 /29/robert-kraft-tees-off-on/.
t2
28.
Because the Award was issued on the eve of the 2015 NFL season, it
if
will
Petition. Accordingly, the NFLPA and Brady will shortly file a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction or, in the Altemative, for Expedited Disposition so that relief can be granted
prior to September 4, 2015, when the Patriots begin frral preparations for their first
regular season game.
29.
This is an action to vacate the Award pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA
and Section
l0 of the FAA. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this action
30.
The NFL derives revenue from advertising, ticket sales, merchandising and
personal
31.
as the
Venue is proper in this court under 28 U.S.C. $ 1391 and 29 U.S.C. $ 185,
PARTIES
32.
of the
Commonwealth
of all
exclusive
Brady. The NFLPA's offices are located at 1133 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036.
I.]
33.
NFLPA. He was selected by the New England Patriots in the 2000 NFL Draft and
spent his entire career with that
has
Bowls, been named Super Bowl Most Valuable Player three timeso and been awarded the
34.
Respondent NFL maintains its offices at 345 Park Avenue, New York, New
York, 10154, and is an unincorporated association consisting of32 separately owned and
operated professional football franchises, one of which is located in this
District. All
NFL franchises conduct business by playing professional football games in this Disticl.
35.
the exclusive bargaining representative of all present and future employer member
franchises of the NFL.
RELEVANT NON-PARTIES
36.
Roger Goodell is the Commissioner of the NFL, i.e., the de facto chief
38.
Theodore Wells, Jr. is a partner in the law firm of Paul, Weiss who serves
as counsel to the
NFL and declared that his firm was acting as "independent" counsel in
investigating the Patriots and Brady for alleged improper ball deflation.
t4
39.
NFL.
He was identified by the NFL as the co-lead investigator, with Wells, in this
mafler.
A.
40.
behalf of the NFL member teams, and the NFLPA, on behalf of all NFL players. The
current CBA was signed on August 4, 201L
41.
Paragraph 15
standard form
NFL
Player
Contract provides the Commissioner with the exclusive authority to impose discipline on
NFL players for'oconduct detrimental to the League." NFLPA Ex. 108, CBA App. A, tl
15.
42.
discipline on players for conduct detrimental. For example, Article 46 provides the
"exclusive" procedures for conduct detrimental disciplinary appeals and refers only to
"action taken against a player by the Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of proGssional football." NFLPA Ex. 107,
CBA tut. a6, $ l(a) (emphasis added).
43.
it provides for no
15
M.
Although the NFLPA agreed that the Commissioner or his designee could
serve as the arbitrator for ordinary Article 46 disciplinary appeals, the NFLPA did not
agree that the Commissioner could do so under circumstances where, as here, the
Commissioneros own conduct is at issue.
45.
own conduct and statements were at issue-Bounty and Ray Rice-even Commissioner
Goodell concluded that he had to recuse himself. '9ee NFLPA Exs. 113. 124.
46.
Paul Tagliabue, a New York court held that he could not lawfully serve as arbitrator over
l99l).
B.
47.
It is established law of the shop under the CBA that NFL players may not
be subject to discipline without advance notice of what conduct might result in such
discipline, and what the disciplinary consequences might be. NFLPA Ex. 153, Peterson,
slip op. at 12-14: see also NFLPA Ex. 124, Rice, slip op. at 16 (2014) (Jones, Arb.)
(holding retroactive punishment prohibited because
requirement of notice); NFLPA Ex. 113, Bounty, slip op. at 6 (former Commissioner
Tagliabue vacating Commissioner Goodell's discipline
l6
of four New
Orleans Saints
players for, among other things, lack of notice, and holding that
ooa
sharp change
in . . -
discipline can often be seen as arbitrary and as an impediment rather than an instrument
of change"); NFLPA Ex. 91, Reggie Langhorne, slip op. at 25 (1994) (Kashea Arb.)
(setting aside fine and suspension because player '1ras entitled at some time to be placed
on notice as to what consequences would flow from his refusal to [abide by the rules].
Any disciplinary program requires that individuals subject to that program understand"
if
NFLPA Ex. 101, Riclq Brown, slip op. (2010) (Beck, Arb.) (vacating team discipline
because player did not receive notice of rule he was accused of violating); NFLPA Ex.
99, Laveranues Coles, slip op. (2009) (Townley, Arb.) (same).
48.
District Court Judge Barbara Jones in Rice and by this Court in Peterson. Judge Jones,
sitting as Article 46 arbitrator over former Baltimore Ravens running back Ray Rice's
disciplinary appeal, held that-notwithstanding Commissioner Goodell's broad discretion
under the
CBA-he
16.
11
in
situations
49.
discipline Rice under the NFL's new Personal Conduct Policy because the NFL is
"required to ghte proper notification" ofplayer discipline' NFLPA Ex. 122, Rice Tt.
100:13-14 (emphasis added); see also id. 101:7-13.
stay of the decision, and thus the order remains in effect and estops the NFL from any
attempt to relitigate the CBA requirement of notice.
51.
that the six-game minimum penalty set forth in the new Personal Conduct Policy could
not be applied without advance notice-having apparently been chastened by this Court's
C.
52.
be
discipline is not fair or consistent, an abuse of discretion has occurred" and the discipline
must be overtumed. Id.: see also id. at 16
consistent in his imposition
('the Commissioner
of discipline"). No
18
needed to be
fair and
Tagliabue has held, serving as arbitrator in Bounty, that the role of the Article 46 Hearing
for parties similarly situated and patent unfaimess or selectivity." NFLPA Ex.
113,
53.
this CBA requirement'oto be consistent with consistent circumstances, and so if there are
consistent circumstances, I think that's about faimess, and fairness would be you should
be as consistent as possible in your discipline." NFLPA Ex.722,
see a/so NFLP
54.
RiceTr. 164:18-165:6;
AEx.
conduct
detrimental discipline must be fair and consistent. NFLPA Ex. 153, Peterson, slip op. at
9 (quoting
of "fair
and
consistenf' treatment). And the Award itself states Goodell's "belie[fl in the need for
consistency in discipline for similarly situated players." NFLPA Ex.210, Award at 14.
D. THE NFL
GAME
1.
55.
General Manager Ryan Grigson sent an e-mail to NFL operations accusing the Patriots
of
t9
seriously and did not inform the Patriots before the game that there was any issue with
ball tampering. NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at 46 n.25.
56.
Nor, despite the Colts' complainq did the NFL implement any procedures
for measuring the footballs and collecting other information that would be essential to
understanding and assessing a change in football pressure. This was because no one at
the NFL knew that natural forces oftemperature, timingo and wetness could cause balls to
lose pressure after being tested and set by officials before the game.
57.
More specifically, no one at the NFL knew there was something called the
Ideal Gas Law explaining that balls would naturally deflate when brought from a warm
environment (i.e., the officials' locker room) to a cold environment (i.e., the
field). As
result, the NFL did not know how to instruct the referees in terms of what testing to
conduct and what data to record other than simply taking PSI readings. lndeed, the NFL
had no established procedures at all for testing balls during games, at halftime, or after
games.
58.
Although each team's footballs were measured by the game day officials
prior to the game, the PSI measurements were not recorded, the gauge used to measure
(and set) PSI was not recorded, and none
of
Iemperature in the locker room and on the field) were recorded. NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells
Report at 5I-52, 116.
59.
During the first half of the game, the Colts examined a ball intercepted
from the Patriots and made a further complaint to the NFL. In responseo the NFL decided
20
60.
factors are relevant to football deflation, the data collection was a disaster. None of the
following was recorded: the temperature on the field; the temperature in the officials'
locker room where the balls were tested; the specific gauge used to conduct the testing
(where, as here, multiple gauges were used and each had very different calibrations and
yielded different readings); whether the balls were wet or dry (and how wet or dry); the
sequence and timing
because both teams' balls would wann and gain pressure minute-by-minute after being
retumed from the cold and wet field to the warm and dry locker room, yet the balls were
measured at different times). The Wells Report even states that the PSI measurements
of
tlre eleven Patriots balls and four Colts balls that were measured-the only data that was
recorded-contttin
61.
After the game, officials tested the pressure level of four footballs from
each team. Once againo however, none of the critical information necessary to determine
62.
The data collection was so deeply flawed that even Wells and the NFL's
of
is
2l
63.
12.
implement procedures for testing ball pressure during the upcoming NFL Season-a year
too late for Brady.3
2.
64.
Unaware of the Ideal Gas Law and the now undisputed fact that science
predicts that the Patriots (and Colts) balls would drop in pressure after they were brought
from a warm locker room to a cold field, NFL Senior Vice President of Football
Operations David Gardi sent a letter to Patriots owner Robert Kraft on January 19,2415,
informing him that the NFL was launching an investigation based on the measurements
taken at halftime of the AFC Championship Game indicating that the Patriots balls had
lost pressure during the first half of the game. NFLPA Ex. 136; NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells
Report at 100-101.
65.
Not only did this letter fail to acknowledge the fundamental flaw in the
NFL's premise that any drop in ball pressure suggested tamperingo or the absence of
critical data from which to assess any reduction in pressure, the letter got the PSI
measurements wrong. Gardi wrote that one of the Patriots balls had measured at 10.1 PSI
3 See
Pereira: NFL informs ofliciak of new procedures for game 6al/s, FoxSports.com
5?vid4929920 67 892'
22
when in fact none of the Patriots balls had measured at such a low pressure. NFLPA Ex.
136 at 2; NFLP
66.
On January 23,2015, the NFL announced that it had retained Wells and his
firm, Paul, Weiss, to co-lead the investigation along with Pash. NFLPA Ex.
l.
l8l; NFLPA
number of important legal matters. For example, the NFL paid Paul, Weiss more than $7
million to defend the League in a recently settled class action related to concussion
liability.a NFLPA Ex.
4.
With
respect to the Wells-Pash lnvestigation alone, Paul, Weiss had already billed the NFL
millions
of
conducting the
investigation.
67.
Despite its close ties to the Paul, Weiss firm, the NFL touted the purported
181
(emphasis added). Wells publicly declared Paul, Weiss to be "independent" of the NFL.
68.
confirms the NFL and Paul, Weiss considered themselves to have an attorney-client
relationship for purposes of the investigation. Award at 19 n.20 (NFL asserted attomey-
client privilege over its communications with Paul, Weiss). Adding to the circus-like
In re Nat'l Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litig., l2-md-02323 (E.D. Pa.).
23
atmosphere
of the proceedings, Wells' partner Lorin Reisner (who signed the Wells
Report's cover page) sat at counsel table for the NFL at the arbitration, conducted the
Hr'g Tr. And, as the Award acknowledges, Wells asserted attorney-client privilege over
his communications with the NFL in connection with the Wells-Pash Investigation.
NFLPA Ex. 210, Award at
69.
19
n.21.
IIr'g Tr.
70.
Weiss team interviewed a number of individuals from the League, the Colts, and the
Patriots, including Brady. NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at
Brady was interviewed for seven hours and was totally cooperative, answering every
question that Paul, Weiss put to him.
71.
The only Paul, Weiss request that Brady declined was to look for and
produce certain private text messages and e-mails. As Brady testifled, he declined Paul,
Weiss' request for his electronic information solely on the advice of his agents-lawyen.
IJr'g Tr. 84:18-85:9. But it is undisputed that Wells never informed Brady that there
could be azy disciplinary consequences
and texts.
24
72.
if
him he could be
suspended for declining to produce the private communications, he would have produced
73.
Prior to the appeal hearing, Brady voluntarily produced all ofthe requested
all of his phone records (showing whom he texted with and when) and testified at the
hearing-just
as he had
never were any incriminating e-mails or text messages for the simple reason that he had
nothing to do with any ball deflation. Hr'g Tr. 85:13-86:1, 86:21-23,89:24-90:9. While
the Award makes much of the discarded phone, Bradyos phone records confirm that the
League had access to any text messages between Brady and Jastremski and Schoenfeld
because the League had access
3.
74.
1.
On May 6,2015, Pau1, Weiss and the NFL released the Wells Report (after
receiving comments on a draft ftom Pash, the NFL's General Counsel and publicly
proclaimed co-lead investigator), The Report concluded that it was "more probable than
not" that Patriots employees Jastremski and McNally tampered with footballs in violation
25
2. lt reached
this
conclusion despite finding no direct evidence of misconduc! and despite the flaws in data
collection that rendered the statistical and scientific analysis admittedly 'ouncerlain," Id,
at 72-
17 .
75.
The Wells Report also concluded that although its four-month investigation
had not yielded any "direct evidence linking Brady" to this alleged ball tampering, it was
nonetheless 'omore probable than not that Brady was at least generally aware" of the
alleged misconduct of others violating the Competitive Integrity Policy. Id. at
17
this very narrow factual conclusion regarding Brady was entirely inferential.
Even
It
is
76.
To reach the conclusion that Brady was "generally aware" of alleged ball
Award-ftom the fact that Brady would not respond to the request for
his texts and e-mails. But Wells never warned Brady that an adverse inference or any
other penalty could result from a refusal to produce personal communications on the
advice of counsel.
77.
4.
IIis
Exclusive Conduct
78.
delegate to Vincent the job of determining the discipline for Brady. NFLPA Ex. 185 at 4.
He did so without citing any authority under tlre CBA for such a delegation.
79.
On May
lI,
NFLPA Ex. 10. He did so based solely on the Wells Report finding that Brady was
"generally aware" of the alleged ball deflation. Id. at 7. The letter confrms that Vincent
and the
80.
Vincent also advised Brady that his discipline was being imposed in part
for his alleged "failure to cooperate" with the Wells-Pash Investigation. Id.
5.
81.
On May 14, 2015, Brady and the NFLPA appealed the unprecedented
and
Brady objected to Goodell or his designees serving as arbitrator, explaining "that neither
Commissioner Goodell nor anyone with close ties to the NFL c[ould] serve as arbitrator
improper delegation conduct of Goodell himself was going to be at issue, and testimony
fiom Goodell and Vincent would be required to adjudicate this critical point. Id. at2-3.
82.
appointment
After receiving no
response
27
intended
to serye as the Hearing Officer, the NFLPA and Brady formally moved for
83.
On June 2,2A15, Goodell denied the recusal motion. NFLPA Ex. 160.
Moreover, he peremptorily declared in that same ruling that he was rejecting Brady's
improper delegation argument based on the Commissioner's own recitation of the facts
and his conclusion that his own conduct was permitted by the
84.
Goodell never gave the NFLPA or Brady any opportunity to challenge the
to
communicate
in
[Vincent's] recommendation
Id.
and
imposed under
on any other aspect of this issue. He just rejected the argument out of hand without any
evidence.
6.
85.
hearing.
See
information or there [was] information in helping [the NFL] get this right, [he] want[ed]
l9l
28
producing new evidence demonstrating that each purported basis for his discipline was
without any basis.
86.
it
was
"more probable than not that Brady was at least generally aware" of the alleged
misconduct. Brady testified-under oath-that he knew nothing about anyone deflating
footballs in the AFC Championship Game or any other game he played
50:27-51:16, 75:4-25,
in.
Hr'g Tr.
communications cited with reference to him in the Wells Report in order to demonstrate
Id. 6l;18-63:16'
87.
of
of
ball
these individuals
88.
Brady also showed that the Wells Report had improperly concluded that
Brady's involvement, in 20a6, in efforts to change a League rule to allow a visiting team
to prepare its own footballs evidenced his knowledge or concern about the pressure level
of game balls. NFI-PA Ex. 7, Wells Report at 129. Brady produced a copy of the rulechange petition itself, as well as the competition committee report on the change, which
has nothing to do with PSI levels. ,See NFLPA Ex. 203.
89.
possession, along
with his phone records, showing all of his phone calls and text
messages during the relevant time period. NFLPA Exs. 1-3. Not one email was relevant
to, much less evidence of, deflation. Moreover, consistent with what Brady had told NFL
investigators and testified at the arbitration, Brady's phone records demonstrated that he
had never had a single phone call or text message with
McNally.
See
8217, 139:.19-140:8 (Brady) (explaining that he did not know or communicate with
Further, the phone records demonstrated that virtually all of Brady's communications
with Jastremski during the relevant time period were already cited by Wells in his Repod,
because Wells had taken possession
Report at 30 n.5.
90.
At the hearing Brady explained that it was impossible to produce his past
text messages because of his regular and long-standing practice of recycling phones in
order to protect his family's and friends' privacy. FIr'g Tr. 87:7-88:6,90:ll-91:9. This
is what Goodell cynically refers to in the Award as Brady "destroying" his phones (an
accusation that was not a basis for the discipline imposed by Vincent). In any event, the
hearing established-through Brady's phone records, testimony, and the absence ofany
NFL evidence to the contrary-that virtually all of the communications between Brady
and Jastremski are discussed in the Wells Report, confirming that Paul, Weiss already
had those text messages from other sources. NFLPA Ex.
3.
with Jastremski reflected on Brady's phone records but not referenced in the Wells
Report, that is presumably because those communications are irrelevant, and Brady
testified that such communications had nothing to do with the alleged ball tampering, and
no incriminating documents were witiheld. I-Ir'g Tr. 85:13-86:1, 140;9-741:19. Indeed,
the Wells Report confirms that the NFL had full access to the phones ftom Jastremski
and Schoenfeld so that any text messages from Brady would have been available to the
NFL from those sources. NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at 30 n.5. As for McNally'
Brady's phone records confirm they had no text or email or other phone communications.
The shrill emphasis placed by Goodell on Brady discarding an old phone is an attempt to
a red
arbitration
lnvestigation whatsoever.
91.
92.
The hearing was also filled with numerous admissions about the NFL's
lack of procedures to record the necessary information to determine whether the drop in
pressure measured in Patriots balls by halftime was caused by environmental factors or
tampering. Exponent, the League's expert consultants who analyzed the results of the
halftime testing, admitted to this lack of essential information in its own report. Ex. 8,
Exponent Report at 2.
93.
The NFLPA and Brady also presented the testimony of Dr. Edward A.
Snyder, Dean of the Yale School of Management, an expert on statistics, who had led a
team
of
experts affiliated with the Analysis Group in reviewing Exponent's work and
studying the testing data from the AFC Championship Game. As Dean Snyder and the
3t
Analysis Group demonstrated, the failure of the NFL to collect the proper data made it
impossible
for
anyone
measurements. In fact, substituting even a few of the NFL's legions of assumptions with
plausible altematives tumed the Wells Report's and Exponent's conclusions on their
head. Id. 158:11-159:17, 779:15-23, 183:L6-23, 194:.l-13 (Snyder). Dean Snyder thus
established that there was no basis for the NFL to
Patriots balls were tampered with, let alone that Brady was 'ogenerally aware" of such
tampering.
94.
Finally, a// witnesses at the hearing agreed that the Competitive Integrity
Policy does not apply to playerso that there was no notice of (or precedent for)
disciplinary standard of "general awareness" rmder any NFL policy, that no player in the
history ofthe NFL had ever been disciplined for ball tampering, and that no player in the
history ofthe NFL had ever served a suspension for an alleged lack of cooperation with a
League investigation.
E. TITE COMMISSIONER
ISSUES
THE AWARD
AFF'IRMING
BRADY'S SUSPENSION
95.
96.
shopping by
filing-virtually
in
of which was unknown to the Union and Brady)-a proceeding to confirm the award in
the Southern District of New
York.
)z
Union had raised in the arbitration were directly related to the Peterson proceedings
pending before this Court and yet deliberately sought to avoid review by this Court.
97.
The next day, the NFLPA and Brady filed this Petition and will shortly
hereafter file a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or in the Altemative, for Expedited
I.
98.
In affirming Brady's discipline, the Award disregards the CBA law of the
shop requirement that players receive notice of potential discipline for the following
separate and independent reasons.
A.
99.
for
being
"generally aware of the actions of the Patriots employees involved in the deflation of the
footballs"-not for any alleged ball deflation committed or directed or even authorized
by Brady himself. NFLPA Ex. l0; NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at 2 ("Brady . . . was at
least generally aware of the inappropriate activities of McNally and Jastremski.").
disciplined for general awareness of misconduct by other people. For example, no player
J.]
l0l.
Ratheq recent precedent confirms that the NFL has historically refrained
from disciplining players for being "generally aware" of alleged conduct detrimental by
others. For example, in the New Orleans Saints Bounty case, Goodell did not discipline
the entire Saints defense where they would all have been "generally aware" of the alleged
"bounty" program. Instead, Goodetl only imposed discipline on four Saints defenders
based
conducted by
Wells and Paul, Weiss, Wells concluded that several members of the Miami Dolphins'
offensive line were generally aware
of Incognito's bullying of
teammate Jonathan
Martin-conduct held detrimental to the League.5 Yeto consistent with every situation in
NFL history other than Brady's, none of these other players were disciplined for
oogeneral
See NFLPA Ex. 206, Miami Dolphins Investigative Report at 3 ("Martin was indeed
harassed by Incogrrito, who can fairly be described as the main instigator, and by Jerry
5
and Pouncey, who tended to follow lncognito's lead."); id. at 32 ("A few offensive
linemen, however, said that Martin was bothered, especially by the taunts about his
sister."); id. at 72-73 ("One player, whom we found credible, said that Locogtito and
others routinely mocked Martin's sister and described the taunting as 'an everyday
constant thing."').
34
("Equipment
Policy")-which is incorporated into the NFL's Policy Manual for Member Clubs-Game
Operations ("Game Operations Manual") and
to,
players-sets forth the standard for imposing discipline for ball tampering and makes
clear that a player cannot be disciplined for general awareness of an infraction.
B.
105.
As the Award concedes, "no player may have been suspended before for
106.
This is because the Player Policies actually given out and made applicable
for
equipment
violations, including those aimed at obtaining a competitive advantage. For example, the
Player Policies provide that "[a] player may not use unauthorized foreign substances
(e.g., stickum or slippery compounds) on his body or uniform
...
violation affects the integrity of the competition and can give a team an unfair advantage
..
."
NFLPA Ex.
subject to a fine
ll4
35
15.
First-time player
lA7.
20. There is no
provide for any suspensions despite the fact that violations of these Policies can be
"conduct detrimental" to the integrity of the game.
108.
Vincent apparently chose not to apply the Player Policies to Brady because
a fine would not have quenched other NFL owners' thirst for a more draconian penalty.
But the NFL was not at liberty to disregard the specified and collectively bargained
penalties in the Player Policies for which players have notice. No other penalty or policy
applicable to players for equipment violations involving competitive advantage was ever
provided to Brady or any other player,
C.
109.
to, and for being generally aware of, violations of the Competitive Integrity Policy, which
like the Equipment Policy-is only incorporated into the Game Operations Manual and
provided only
to
acknowledges that this Policy "imposes certification and reporting requirements on clubs
and senior club executives."
110. Accordingly,
Award at 17 n.19.
Brady testified that he has no recollection of ever seeing or
receiving the Competitive Integrity Policy. Id. 98:8-99:15 (Brady). And, although the
Wells Report states on its face that the investigation was conducted pursuant to the
Competitive Integrfy Policy (NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at l), there is no evidence that
-to
Wells bothered to investigated whether the Competitive Integrity Policy was given to
players.
lll.
Because the Competitive Integrity Policy has never been given to players,
no player in NFL history has ever been disciplined---or even investigated-for violating
this Policy, let alone for being generally aware of someone else's violation of this Policy.
Rather, only Clubs and Club personnel have been subject to discipline tlereunder. For
example, in 2009, the NFL suspended a member of the New York Jets equipment staff
after he "attempted to use unapproved equipment to prep the K[icking] Balls prior to" a
Jets game against the New England Patriots. NFLPA
Ex.209 at
l.
According to the
to gain a competitive advantage." 1d. However, the Jets' |icker-the player who could
ooattempt
to gain a competitive advantage"
have benefitted from the alleged
(id.)-was
consistent with the Competitive Integrity Policy's application to Clubs, not players, as
well as the fact that even if the Jets kicker was "generally aware" of the infraction,
general awareness is not a basis for discipline.6
ll2.
The only other two incidents conceming potential ball tampering in recent
6 The Award states that "[t]here was no evidence of any player involvement" in this
situation, NFLPA Ex.2lO, Award at 15, but fails to acknowledge that there was also no
League investigation of any player involvement.
37
2014, during a game between the Minnesota Vikings and Carolina Panthers, ball boys
were caught on national television using heaters to warm Vikings footballs in sub-zero
temperatures, Le., tampering with the balls. NFLPA Ex. 174. The NFL sent a waming ta
the CIub and publicly stated that Clubs "can't do anything with the footballs in terms
of
any artificial [sic], whether you're heating them up, whether it's a regular game ball or
kicking ball, you can't do anything to the football;' Id. at 1; NFLPA Ex. 175. No
Vikings players were either investigated or punished. This too was consistent with the
Competitive Integnty Policy's application
oogeneral
113. Additionally,
on that same day during the 2014 season, Green Bay Packers
quarterback Aaron Rodgers stated publicly that he "like[s] to push the limit to how much
air we can put in the football, even go over what they allow you to do and see
it."
if
the
ll4.
Award that "[t]he fCompetitive Integrity] Policy was not the source or the basis for the
discipline imposed here." NFLPA Ex. 210, Award at 17 n.19. That claim is belied by
the undisputed arbitration record and is a post hoc argument that even the NFL's own
7 Similar to the Jets incident, the Award disingenuously states that "[t]here was no
evidence of any intentional attempt to violate or circumvent the rules, no player
involvement, and no effort to conceal the ball attendant's conduct." NFLPA Ex. 210,
Award at 15. But, again, there was no investigation of player conduct and it is selfevident that the Vikings Quarterback would have been 'ogenerally aware" that the balls
felt warm despite the frigid cold.
38
lawyers did not make at the arbitration hearing, More fundamentally, however,
nothing to
pursuant to no
it
does
fine-is
Peterson.
115. At
bottom, there is not a single NFL Policy or precedent that ever gave
Brady any notice that a player could be suspended for any equipment violation, let alone
general awareness of such a violation by others.
D.
t16.
failure to cooperate with any NFL investigation. The Award acknowledges this, too.
NFLPA Ex.2l0, Award at 14. Rather, before Brady, players had been subject only to
limited fines for supposed non-cooperation.
ll7.
For example, Goodell merely fined former NFL quarterback Brett Favre
for lack of
18.
39
player Anthony Hargrove for allegedly obstructing the League's investigation into the
"forty years of association with the NFL," he could not recall arry suspension based on
non-cooperation or obstruction. Id.
119.
Clubs to cooperate with investigations under that Policy (NFLPA Ex. 115 at A3), as set
forth above, the Policy does not apply to players and makes no reference to suspensions
for Policy violations, let alone for failures to cooperate in investigations under the Policy.
Id. at A2. This lack of notice stands in contrast to the notice players do receive that they
might be fined (not suspended) for failing to cooperate with investigations under the NFL
40
Personal Conduct Policy, which is provided to players as part of the Player Policies. See
DA. If all of this were not enough, the arbitration record also indisputably
establishes that no
be
punished for declining to produce his personal communications on his personal device to
firm,
could be suspended for following his agent-lawyers' advice and not tuming over his
private communications on his penonal phone to the NFL's outside law firm.
if
anyone had notified him that he could be suspended for failing to turn
over his elechonic communications, he would have done so notwithstanding his agent-
consequence
of
304:9-305:14. The upshot-as the Award lays bare-is that the improper adverse
inference based upon Brady's purported lack of cooperation infected the entirety of the
suspension-yet the CBA requirement of notice precludes azy suspension on the noncooperation
phone
pursuant to his long-standing practice has no legal significance as the discipline itself was
not based on this at all and the Arbitrator's authority, as this Coud held
Peterson, is
only to review the discipline actually imposed. Peterson, slip op. at 14-16.
II.
the
scientific explanation for the Patriots [footballs] halftime measurements tends to support
a finding that human intervention may account for the additional loss of
exhibited by the Patriots
pressure
Award,
Goodell panots Wells to reach the same exact conclusion. NFLPA Ex. 210, Award at 6.
124.
NFL player on the basis of concededly unreliable evidence is not "fair and consistent"
and therefore contravenes the CBA law of the shop.
the officials did not know to-and therefore did not-record critical
information such as the temperafure of the locker room where the footballs were tested,
the specific gauge used to conduct the testing (here, multiple gauges were used with
diflerent calibrations), whether each of the balls was wet or dry (and how wet or dry), or
the sequence or timing of the measurements (which was critical, as the balls heated up
inside the room but were each measured at different times).
42
of
it is finally
It is hard to imagine a
starker concession about the incurable flaws in the NFL's collection of, and study of, data
Even the pressure at which the Patriots and Colts footballs began the game
is not reliably known, The Wells Report found that although Referee Walt Anderson
tested both teams' balls before the game, he failed to record the PSI measurements or
which of his two gauges he used to test and set the footballs-a distinction with a
significant difference because the gauges measured PSI materially differently. Drawing
conclusions based on the halftime measurements is rendered even less reliable by the fact
that Wells and Exponent decided to assume the opposite of what Referee Anderson stated
was his o'best recollection" of which gauge he used, despite accepting at face value
everything else that Anderson had told the League's investigators. See, e.g., NFLPA Ex.
7, Wells Report at 5l-52; NFLPA Ex. 8, Exponent Report at 2.
128. The
to the
to
understanding of the Ideal Gas Law and the fact that balls would naturally deflate when
Pereira: NFL informs fficials of new procedures for game Dal/s, FoxSports.com
(July 26, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/nIVstory/deflategate-new-england-patriotsmike-pereira-changes-to-game-balls-0726 I 5?vid4929920 67 892.
8
See
43
factors that impact natural deflation-such as timing and temperafure and wetness-were
not recorded. Id. 288:17 -289: 16 (Wells).
129.
Dean Snyder, retained by the NFLPA and Brady, testified that when even a
few of Exponent's assumptions were replaced with plausible altematives, the purported
evidence of tampering disappears. See, e.g.,
194l-13,
id.
There was no basis for anyone to make a reliable conclusion based on the PSI
tampering. As Dean Snyder testified: "Itos important for me as a researcher and evaluator
of data when I
see alternatives,
When I evaluate alternative assumptions, their findings change, so the bottom line is their
results are simply not reliable." ld.757:70-158:16.
130.
unreliable: oo[W]e are mindful that the analyses performed by our scientific consultants
necessarily rely on reasoned assumptions and that varying the applicable assumptions can
have a material impact on the ultimate conclusions.o' NFLPA Ex. 7, Wells Report at 13.
131. For
to collect or record the necessary data-is not fair or consistent and is thus contrary to the
law of the shop. Only when proper procedures for testing are implemented can the
League make fair and consistent disciplinary determinations about the causes
of ball
deflation.
IIL
A.
132.
Under the CBA, the Commissioner has the exclasive authority to impose
for
conduct detrimental discipline on NFL players. NFLPA Ex. 107, CBA Art. 46, $ 1(a);
NFLPA Ex. 108, CBA App. A, fl 15. The NFL has zealously guarded this responsibility
as the
stated
his
disciplinary role and o'allow a new individual to make the initial [Article 46] disciplinary
decision."e That is exactly what Goodell did here. As Vincent's letter disciplining Brady
makes crystal clear, Goodell delegated to Vincent his exclusive CBA authority to impose
brought
a CBA
of any Commissioner delegation are not before this Court. Howeveq the Commissioner's
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell & EVP Jeff Pash League Meeting
Press Conference - December 10, 2014, NFL.com (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://nflcommunications.com/2014/12110/nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-evp-jeffpashleague-meeting-press-conference-december- I 0-20 I 4/
See, e.g. See, e.g.,
45
failure to provide for fair proce&*es for adjudicating the delegation issue
135.
as
i^r
appropriate
ll
before the arbitratioru with no evidentiary record, denying the NFLPA and Brady the
opportunity
examination. See NFLPA Ex. 160; NFLPA Ex. 208, June 22 Goodell Order on
Discovery and Hearing Witnesses ("June22 Ordel').
present an issue central to his appeal, Goodell simply declared as gospel his own version
"I
18
(recounting prior decision). He then repeats his own factual proffer in the Award as a
basis for upholding the discipline. NFLPA Ex. 210, Award at 18-19. But the purpose
of
the arbitration was for the NFLPA and Brady to challenge the League's version of the
facts-not for the Commissioner (the arbitralor) simply to assume his own conclusion.
137. Following the denial of their Recusal Motion, the NFLPA and Brady
moved to compel the testimony of Goodell and Vincent in order to develop a factual
record for Brady's improper delegation ground for appeal. NFLPA Ex. 1.66 at 2'4.
Goodell denied this motion too, stating that he had already decided that there was no
improper delegation. NFLPA Ex. 208, Jrne 22 Order.
46
it
of
Brady's right
to
confront witnesses
Article 46 hearing offtcer has the duty to compel the testimony of relevant NFL
witnesses. For example, in Rice, Judge Jones compelled Goodell and other NFL
executives to testiff, so that the player and the Union could ask about their roles in the
discipline. See, e.9., NFLPA Ex. 166E, Rice Order on Discovery and Hearing Witnesses
at 2 (*Rice Discovery Order"). And, in Bounty, former Commissioner Tagliabueserving as arbitrator---compelled numerous League and Club personnel
to testiff
(including Vincent) so that the NFLPA and the four appellant Saints players would have
the ability to develop the arbitration record and to confront their accusers. NFLPA Ex.
166F, Bounty Pre-FIr'g Conference Tr.220:14-221:3; NFLPA
B.
1.
139. In
produce the investigative files underlying its factual conclusions so that the appellant
players would have a fundamentally fair hearing. See NFLPA Ex. 166 at 6 (investigative
files ordered to be produced nthe Bounty and Rice arbitrations). This precedent became
the law of the shop.
140.
Yet, here, Goodell ignored the precedents set by Judge Jones and former
Commissioner Tagliabue and denied the Union's motion to compel production of the
investigative fies. Id. at5-6t see a/so NFLPA Ex. 159 at2-3.
47
l4l.
Although the NFL took the position that the Paul, Weiss interview notes
played no role in the disciplinary decisions, it was precisely because the Wells Report's
I42.
Weiss-
which acted as defense counsel for the NFL at the arbitration-did have access to the
investigative
files.
of
the witness examinations at the hearing, including Brady's-was the co-lead partner in
the investigation with Wells, and he, and his team, sat at counsel table for the NFL during
the arbitration and were able to utilize the very information denied to Brady. This was a
clear violation of Brady's right to a frrndamentally fair hearing. The Award makes no
mention of the issue at all.
C.
precedents
appeal arbitrations,
to
discipline. See, e.g., NFLPA Ex. 166D, Bounty Pre-IU g Order No. 4;
166E, Rice Discovery
144.
&
c/
NFLPA Ex.
Witnesses Order at 2.
The NFL publicly declared that NFL Executive Vice President and General
Counsel Jeff Pash was the co-lead investisator on the Wells-Pash Investisation. NFLPA
48
Ex. 181 (NFL Press Release stating: "The investigation is being led jointly by NFL
Executive Vice President JeffPash and Ted Wells . . . .').
145.
Accordingly, the NFLPA and Brady moved to compel the testimony of co-
lead investigators Wells and Pash at Brady's appeal hearing (the NFL refused to
voluntarily make either witness available). NFLPA Ex. 166 at 5-6. Although Goodell
granted the NFLPA's motion to compel the testimony of Wells, NFLPA Ex. 208, June 22
Order at 2, the Commissioner denied the motion as to Pash, claiming that he did not play
a substantive
146.
draft of the Wells Report and provided Paul, Weiss with comments prior to the Report's
public release.
in
the
investigationo it was fundamentally unfair to deny Brady the opportunity to confront Pash
involvement as colead
investigator.
147
If
Pash truly had no substantive role, then he simply could have so testified.
Of course, such testimony would beg the question of why the NFL's General Counsel
would then be editing a supposedly independent investigative report. Cognizant of this
49
liom asking
Pash any
148.
The combination of all the actions set forth above rendered Brady's appeal
IV.
I4g.
Neither the CBA nor the LMRA sanctions arbitration awards issued by
150.
for conduct detrimental to the NFL. Goodell and Vincent were thus essential fact
witnesses at the arbitrationo and any arbitrator hearing Brady's appeal would have to
consider the facts and adjudicate the legality of the Commissioner's delegation.
did. He denied
the
r0 The
Award states that the NFLPA has waived this argument by not seeking at the
hearing "reconsideration of [Goodell's] decision denying [the NFLPA's] motion to
compel Mr. Pash's testimony." NFLPA Ex. 210, Award at 19 n.21. This is ridiculous.
The NFLPA preserved the argument by making a formal motion to compel Pash's
testimony which Goodell denied because of Pash's purported lack of any "significant"
role-a findins undermined bv Wells' testimonv. Id.
50
appeal, This conduct shows not merely evident partiality but actual bias, rendering
Goodell unfit to serve as arbitrator under any standard.
152.
Further, prior
lauded the reliability of the Wells Report-the issue at the very heart of Brady's appeal:
NFLPA Ex. 157 at 7 (citation omitted). Goodell's choice to make these public comments
locked him into supporting the Wells Report and rendered him incapable of reaching a
contrary conclusion in Brady's appeal" as doing so would undermine his own competency
point-it
conclusions ofthe Wells Report as though the arbitration hearing never happened.
arbitrator to publicly comment on the very subject matter he has been called upon to
arbitrate and to then continue to serve as arbitrator.
154.
Sports League Commissioners are not somehow above this standard. The
case law is well-established that even when a League Commissioner has specifically been
delegated to serve as arbitrator of parties' disputes, the Commissioner may not arbitrate a
particular dispute in which his own conduct and actions are called into question.
See
v.
)t
affd,
468 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir. 1,972); see also State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, No. SC 93846, 2015 WL
2061986, at *10 (Mo. Apr. 28, 2015) (en banc) (examining facts of case and determining
facts of these cases and found him impermissibly evidently partial in each one despite
being designated arbitrator in the relevant arbitration provisions. The same result is
warranted here.
155.
ifset forth
tully herein.
156.
157.
parties'CBA:
Commissioner Goodell, serving as arbitrator, disregarded the law
of
the shop and this Court's binding ruling in Peterson that the CBA
of
potential
discipline, and
Commissioner Goodell, serving as arbitrator, disregarded the law
the shop that conduct detrimental discipline be fair and consistent.
)z
of
158.
Brady access to evidence and witnesses central to his appeal, and otherwise deprived
Brady of his right to a tundamentally fair hearing.
159. Finally, the Award must be set aside for the independent
circumstances
evidently partial arbitrator and the NFLPA did not agree that Goodell could serve
as
160.
301 of the LMRA and Section 10 of the FAA, the NFLPA and Brady respectfully request
that the Court vacate the Award.
Dated: July
29,2015
Respecttully Submitted,
&MILLERP.A.
53
bsokoly@winston.com
jamoona@winston.com
54
for Brady