Gatwick Airport Disruption 2013 - A Case Study

Gatwick Airport
Christmas Eve 2013 disruption
Case Study

Gatwick Airport – background
 Owned by a group of international investment funds:
– New York-based Global Infrastructure Partners
– Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
– California Public Employees’ Retirement System
– National Pension Service of Korea
– Australian Future Fund
 2013 operating profits were £116.4m but company
accounts show Gatwick Airport Ltd (GAL) was funded by
£1.4bn debt with repayment costs being £142m
 Paid no corporation tax in 2013 as interest repayments
drove it into a loss (as was the case in previous year)

Gatwick Airport – facts and figures
 World’s busiest single runway airport
 UK’s second largest airport by passenger traffic (handling approx 25% of
Greater London’s market)
 Operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year
 35.4m passengers passed through Gatwick in 2013
 Over 60 carriers operate regularly from the airport, serving over 215
destinations worldwide
 Largest customer is easyJet (37% of total passengers) with BA second largest
carrier at Gatwick (14% of passenger traffic)
 115 aircraft stands, two terminals, 346 check in desks, 69 self-service kiosks
 Gatwick Express rail link ensures journeys to Central London in 30 minutes
 23,500 on-airport jobs, of which ~2,650 are London Gatwick employees
 Operation of Gatwick contributes around £2bn annually to economy of London
& South-East

Incident Summary
 Airfield operations were severely affected by adverse weather late on 23 and
early on 24 December 2013
 Exceptionally heavy rainfall before Christmas caused all local waterways
around Gatwick to flood, leading to the closure of the main railway line, M23
motorway and local roads
 Electricity sub-stations flooded leading to a power cut at North Terminal
 Christmas Eve departures, apart from BA, were switched to South Terminal –
the poorly coordinated mass movement of thousands of people was widely
condemned as frustrated passengers were stranded with little information
 Poor communication between airport partners and passengers led to ‘chaotic’
conditions with the police being drafted in to diffuse public disorder
 72 departures and 73 arrivals were cancelled, impacting over 13,000
passengers
 Full schedule of flights operated from Christmas Day onwards

Disruption – 23 December 2013
 In response to high winds warning, GAL invoked their crisis
management process and held a Bronze-level meeting at 15.00hrs.
The group agreed no additional staff resource was needed at that
stage, but recognised it would be difficult to increase staffing levels if
the situation changed due to the holiday period.
 GAL instructed airport stakeholders to secure assets but, despite
warning, some airfield equipment was dislodged and damaged three
aircraft.
 High winds made landing difficult resulting in 35 inbound aircraft
(affecting nine airlines) being diverted away from Gatwick.
 Diversions meant aircraft were out-of-position for the following day’s
flight schedules.
 Airport’s largest operator, easyJet, was particularly affected and had
to develop recovery plan.

Disruption – 24 December 2013
 Airfield disruption:
– 03.35am: unsecured baggage containers were dislodged by heavy winds causing damage to the
Instrument Landing System
– 04.15am: airport received telephone call from the Environment Agency (EA) warning the River Mole
was close to bursting its banks (which it did half hour later)
– EA had also copied general flood warnings by fax to Gatwick Airfield Operations at 16.47 & 16.56 on
23 December and 01.28 on 24 December but duty engineering staff failed to see or act on info as
they were dealing with ongoing severe weather issues on the airfield
 North Terminal disruption (escalation to Silver command):
– 05.00am: electrical disruption affected North Terminal (two out of six switch rooms failed) leading to:
• Only two of nine international baggage reclaim belts operating
• No power or lights in baggage reclaim hall
• No check-in, flight information or telephone systems
• Toilet flushing mechanisms on ground and first floors inoperable
– Airport IT basis of flight information system, IDAHO, was inoperable between 05.00 – 10.30 which
compromised flight status communications and passenger security screening facilities
 24 December flight programme:
– Scheduled to handle 260 departures (38,000 passengers) and 300 arrivals (25,000 passengers)
– Airlines decided to re-think flight programmes resulting in cancellations to 72 departures (11,300
passengers) and 73 arrivals (5,000 passengers)

Corporate response - GAL
 Operational decision to switch check-in of North Terminal
passengers with hold luggage to South Terminal was taken
(origins of how decision was reached remain controversial)
 Once bags had been checked in at South Terminal, plan was then
to bus passengers back to North Terminal to board departing
flights (only four buses were available to transport thousands)
 Previous terminal switchover occurred successfully on 16 October
2013 when on-site construction work caused a power failure in the
South Terminal (but only involved 4 departing and 4 arriving
cancellations and relied heavily on back office staff – who were
lacking this time round due to Christmas holiday period)
 Passengers affected by flight cancellations (not those delayed)
were offered £100 of shopping vouchers as goodwill gesture

Gatwick Airport – Twitter response

Corporate response - easyJet
 easyJet passengers received a text message on 24 December from
the airline before 09.00am which led to mass misunderstanding
between passengers that flights would be operating out of the South
Terminal
 The planned flight-by-flight movement of passengers was disrupted
as people felt no need to remain in the North Terminal and moved
en-masse to the South Terminal
 This led to chaotic and unmanageable crowds building up at check-
in desks with easyJet and its handling agents, Menzies, processing
passengers and their bags very slowly
 22 out of 51 planned departures were cancelled after 18.30 with the
consequence being 8.000 angry and frustrated passengers needing
to be decontrolled from the departure lounge
 Suffered a loss of £2m as a result of flooding and power failure

Corporate response – British
Airways
 Made some early cancellations to flight programme, then
continued to operate remaining flights from North
Terminal
 BA’s systems were incompatible with the South Terminal
which is why they decided not to partake in the terminal
switchover
 Implemented a manual check-in process and baggage
handling operations at the North Terminal
 Operated some passenger-only flights with bags being
repatriated the next day

Corporate response – other airlines
 Other airline operators (Emirates, Vietnam Airways,
Turkish Airlines) who switched operations ran relatively
smoothly due to fewer number of flights involved allowing
greater control of passenger movement on a flight by flight
basis
 Thomson also undertook terminal switchover and decided
to reschedule five departing flights for the following day,
making arrangements for passengers to stay in local hotels
 Timing of Thomson’s decision to reschedule flights was
made when many bags had already been checked in
which left many passengers without access to luggage
until following day

Other agencies
 Sussex Police: was called in to deal with public disorder
and had to take on responsibility for providing
information to passengers. The police said this was
because the airport & staff were more focused on
resuming the flight schedule and not on passenger
safety or welfare
 Menzies: passenger handling firm, decided to stop
updating a key database and instructed staff to focus on
check-in assistance, but this was a significant factor in
confusing information being provided to passengers

Public response
 Flight Information Display screens were without power and the PA
system proved inaudible, leaving passengers without vital pieces of
information
 Confusion and frustration amongst passengers due to lack of
communication & misinformation
 Lack of staff on the ground was noticeable which led to irritated &
frustrated passengers
 Widespread outrage at lack of basic facilities & welfare – very few
working toilets and low supplies of food & water at the airport
 Police called in to deal with public disorder
 Mixed reaction to voucher offer
– Some Twitter users expressed surprise Gatwick bosses were apologising for a weather
related incident
– Others felt offer was too small or that it should be extended to those who were delayed for
hours, but eventually got a flight

Contingency planning
 Gatwick offered a robust defence of its contingency plan:
“contingency plans are regularly shared and practised with airline partners, who
are invited to provide feedback on a regular basis”
 easyJet disputed this:
“We have not seen a contingency plan for electrical problems in the North
Terminal. Nor had we seen a plan for any similar kind of event, such as the North
or South Terminal, or parts of them, becoming inoperable for any other reason. We
had also not seen any plan for a single terminal operation. Consequently we had
not been in a position to agree a plan.”

Lessons learned
INVESTIGATIONS:
 House of Commons Transport Committee heard from Gatwick and easyJet on 7 January 2014
following media clashes apportioning blame for chaotic handling
 Review by David McMillan released on 26 February 2014 made 27 recommendations
KEY POINTS:
 Revision in communications protocol between the EA and GAL – written warnings or alerts to
be followed up by verbal confirmation of receipt
 Robust GAL contingency plans for snow to be broadened to cover severe weather disruption
 GAL’s contingency plans to be reviewed and include buy-in from airlines and ground handlers
with agreed Standard Operating Procedures and checklists
 Plans to be made available to the entire airport community to increase awareness and allow
everyone to execute the plan
 No wholesale terminal shift to be attempted unless a thorough assessment of practicality is
undertaken which proves passenger experience would improve
 Clear status and actions to be communicated in contingency meetings to prevent
misunderstandings between participants

McMillan Report – 27 recommendations
(i)
GATWICK AIRPORT’S FLOOD PREVENTION AND ALLEVIATION PLANNING
1. Airport’s proposal to review flood prevention and alleviation plans to be undertaken
urgently
2. Existing flood alleviation plans under construction to be prioritised and assessed for
earlier completion
3. Consideration to bring forward the Ifield element of UMFAS
4. Reviews of Gatwick flood risk protection plans to include assessment of flooding impact
on communities
5. Increase the resilience and redundancy between switch rooms
6. Provision of alternative and back-up power switching for critical systems (such as IT)
7. Electronic monitoring systems deployed in switch rooms to be enhanced and sensitive
equipment checked regularly at periods of high risk
8. Sensitive equipment located in basements or areas susceptible to flooding to be moved
urgently or protected (where relocation impractical)
9. GAL to consider securing water pumping capacity (both assets and operatives) in addition
to its own needs

(ii)
GATWICK AIRPORT’S CONTINGENCY AND RESILIENCE PLANNING
10. Review of Airport’s Contingency Plans, in close collaboration with airline and ground handlers to
ensure buy in and commitment
11. Entire airport community to be made aware of and have access to the Airport’s Contingency
Plans
12. No wholesale Terminal shift to be attempted until it is assessed to demonstrate and
improvement in passenger welfare and experience
13. Each crisis management meeting should reach an agreed airport status. In the case of
disagreement, GAL to assume responsibility
14. Each crisis management meeting should end with an agreed summary of actions which are
shared amongst participants
15. Airport’s crisis management rostering should ensure a member of the airport executive
management team is always available; GAL CEO or COO to establish contact with equivalent
external stakeholders impacted by crisis
16. GAL definition of Gold, Silver and Bronze to be reconsidered to be in line with industry norms
17. Crisis management meetings should include relevant, informed representatives from all parties
18. Joint disruption plans should be agreed between GAL, easyJet and BA to allow for joint decision
processes
19. GAL to review preparation of staff ensuring they are trained, equipped and informed

(iii)
PASSENGER WELFARE ISSUES
20. Standby communications systems to be available for deployment in event of power failure (loud
hailers, flip charts, whiteboards, review of tannoy system)
21. Crisis management meetings should include detailed review of resources available to all affected
parties
22. GAL and airport partners to ensure allocation of sufficient resources to allow for accurate and
timely information to be provided across the airport
23. GAL and airport partners to agree in advance protocols for communicating with passengers
during a crisis. This should include content and timings of comms to avoid conflicting information
24. There should be greater focus from all airport partners on passenger welfare and airlines should
fuflill their obligations, with the airport prepared to provide services where airlines fall short
25. GAL to work with airlines to develop clearer operational protocols for guidance on threshold
conditions that would trigger flights being postponed or cancelled
26. Each terminal should have a GAL Passenger Captain whose sole responsibility would be to
ensure passenger welfare concerns are properly met. Provide liasion role between conditions in
Terminals and crisis management process
SAFETY AND NETWORK ISSUES
27. Direct communication between airport operations centre and Eurocontrol Nettwork management
process to be established in event of major disruption affecting air traffic at Gatwick

House of Commons Transport Committee
 Conducted an investigation and held evidence sessions with
Gatwick and easyJet on 7 January 2014 following media clashes
apportioning blame for chaotic handling
 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve
2013 was published on 11 April 2014
 Focused on passenger welfare issues, complaints centred on:
– Poor & inconsistent provision of information
– Lack of clarity about who was in charge
– Lack of basic facilities such as working toilets & refreshments
– Confusion about reimbursement of expenses, particularly if alternative flights
were arranged
 Recommendations mainly directed towards CAA as it holds
responsibility for oversight of operational resilience

HoC Transport Committee:
Recommendations
 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should ensure the airport’s contingency plans be
developed with airlines and other relevant parties, and for the plans to be properly tested
and widely disseminated
 CAA should ensure the good practice for meetings being minuted, actions identified and
shared with participants be practiced in the future
 The CAA should include consideration of the arrangements made for ensuring passenger
information is current, correct and consistent
 Endorse the appointment of Passenger Champions for each terminal. The CAA should
encourage other airports to take similar steps
 The Government should review the operational agreements between airlines and airports
for when the airport provides welfare and how costs should be allocated
 The CAA should bring forward proposals for improving the provision of information on
passenger rights at times of disruption
 The Govt should push for an amendment to the proposed EU regulation at Transport
Council to include electronic alerts & info sharing
 The CAA should consider the extension of McMillan report recommendations to other
airports
 The CAA should inform the Transport Committee of its assessment of operational
resilience plans being produced by Heathrow & Gatwick, including proposed actions to
address any unsatisfactory elements

Gatwick Airport disruption on
23/24 December 2013

Gatwick Airport Disruption 2013 - A Case Study

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