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Group Dynamics in Top Management Teams: Groupthink, Vigilance, and Alternative Models of Organizational Failure and Success

This study explored the heuristic value of Janis’ (1982) groupthink and vigilant decision making models as explanations of failure and success in top management team decision making using the Organizational Group Dynamics Q-sort (GDQ). Top management teams of seven Fortune 500 companies were examined at two historical junctures—one when the team was successful (defined as satisfying strategic constituencies) and one when the team was unsuccessful. Results strongly supported the notion that a group’s decision making process is systematically related to the outcomes experienced by the team. Ideal-type Q-sorts organized around Janis’ analysis of groupthink and vigilance were substantially correlated with Q-sorts of failing and successful groups, respectively. The fit was, however, far from perfect. Ideal type Q-sorts derived from other frameworks correlated better with the failure–success classification than did the Janis-derived ideal types. Successful groups showed some indicators of groupthink (e.g., risk-taking, cohesion, and strong, opinionated leaders), whereas unsuccessful groups showed signs of vigilance (e.g., internal debate to the point of factionalism). The results illustrate the usefulness of the GDQ for developing and empirically testing theory in organizational behavior from historical cases.

This study explored the heuristic value of Janis’ (1982) groupthink
and vigilant decision making models as explanations of
failure and success in top management team decision making
using the Organizational Group Dynamics Q-sort (GDQ). Top
management teams of seven Fortune 500 companies were examined
at two historical junctures—one when the team was successful
(defined as satisfying strategic constituencies) and one when the team was unsuccessful. Results strongly supported the notion
that a group’s decision making process is systematically related
to the outcomes experienced by the team. Ideal-type Q-sorts organized
around Janis’ analysis of groupthink and vigilance were
substantially correlated with Q-sorts of failing and successful
groups, respectively. The fit was, however, far from perfect. Ideal type
Q-sorts derived from other frameworks correlated better
with the failure–success classification than did the Janis-derived
ideal types. Successful groups showed some indicators of groupthink
(e.g., risk-taking, cohesion, and strong, opinionated leaders),
whereas unsuccessful groups showed signs of vigilance (e.g.,
internal debate to the point of factionalism). The results illustrate
the usefulness of the GDQ for developing and empirically testing
theory in organizational behavior from historical cases.

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ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES<br />

Vol. 73, Nos. 2/3, February/March, pp. 272–305, 1998<br />

ARTICLE NO. OB982763<br />

<strong>Group</strong> <strong>Dynamics</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Top</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>Teams</strong>:<br />

<strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k, <strong>Vigilance</strong>, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Alternative</strong> <strong>Models</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Organizational</strong> <strong>Failure</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Success</strong><br />

R<strong>and</strong>all S. Peterson<br />

Cornell University<br />

Pamela D. Owens<br />

University <strong>of</strong> California, Berkeley<br />

Philip E. Tetlock<br />

The Ohio State University<br />

Elliott T. Fan<br />

Northwestern University<br />

<strong>and</strong><br />

Paul Martorana<br />

University <strong>of</strong> California, Berkeley<br />

This study explored the heuristic value <strong>of</strong> Janis’ (1982) groupth<strong>in</strong>k<br />

<strong>and</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g models as explanations <strong>of</strong><br />

failure <strong>and</strong> success <strong>in</strong> top management team decision mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Organizational</strong> <strong>Group</strong> <strong>Dynamics</strong> Q-sort (GDQ). <strong>Top</strong><br />

management teams <strong>of</strong> seven Fortune 500 companies were exam<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

at two historical junctures—one when the team was successful<br />

(def<strong>in</strong>ed as satisfy<strong>in</strong>g strategic constituencies) <strong>and</strong> one when<br />

We thank David H. Peterson, Jerome J. Albright, <strong>and</strong> Vera M. Vitels for advice <strong>and</strong> assistance<br />

<strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g this project. We also thank Maura Belliveau, Marlene Turner, Anthony Pratkanis,<br />

<strong>and</strong> three anonymous reviewers for thoughtful reviews on earlier drafts <strong>of</strong> the paper.<br />

Earlier versions <strong>of</strong> this paper were presented at the Nags Head Conference on <strong>Group</strong>s, Networks,<br />

<strong>and</strong> Organizations, Highl<strong>and</strong> Beach, Florida, May 1996, <strong>and</strong> at the Social Psychologists <strong>of</strong> Chicago<br />

meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> March 1996.<br />

Address correspondence concern<strong>in</strong>g this article <strong>and</strong> repr<strong>in</strong>t requests to R<strong>and</strong>all S. Peterson, S.<br />

C. Johnson Graduate School <strong>of</strong> <strong>Management</strong>, Sage Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-<br />

mail: r<strong>and</strong>all.peterson@cornell.edu.<br />

0749-5978/98 $25.00<br />

Copyright 1998 by Academic Press<br />

All rights <strong>of</strong> reproduction <strong>in</strong> any form reserved.<br />

272


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 273<br />

the team was unsuccessful. Results strongly supported the notion<br />

that a group’s decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process is systematically related<br />

to the outcomes experienced by the team. Ideal-type Q-sorts organized<br />

around Janis’ analysis <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> vigilance were<br />

substantially correlated with Q-sorts <strong>of</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> successful<br />

groups, respectively. The fit was, however, far from perfect. Idealtype<br />

Q-sorts derived from other frameworks correlated better<br />

with the failure–success classification than did the Janis-derived<br />

ideal types. <strong>Success</strong>ful groups showed some <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k<br />

(e.g., risk-tak<strong>in</strong>g, cohesion, <strong>and</strong> strong, op<strong>in</strong>ionated leaders),<br />

whereas unsuccessful groups showed signs <strong>of</strong> vigilance (e.g.,<br />

<strong>in</strong>ternal debate to the po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> factionalism). The results illustrate<br />

the usefulness <strong>of</strong> the GDQ for develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> empirically test<strong>in</strong>g<br />

theory <strong>in</strong> organizational behavior from historical cases. 1998<br />

Academic Press<br />

No theory <strong>of</strong> group dynamics has received as much attention <strong>in</strong> the academic<br />

<strong>and</strong> popular press as groupth<strong>in</strong>k. Citations to Janis’ groupth<strong>in</strong>k theory <strong>in</strong> the<br />

Social Sciences Citation Index are copious (averag<strong>in</strong>g over 100 per year s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />

1982). The theory has stimulated dozens <strong>of</strong> empirical studies <strong>and</strong> at least a<br />

dozen critiques. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k is also widely discussed <strong>in</strong> textbooks across the<br />

social sciences. Even top corporate managers <strong>and</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionals receive warn<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

about the dangers <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k (Aldag & Fuller, 1993). Just how prevalent<br />

is groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> how wary should corporate managers be to avoid its dangers?<br />

And might the “cures” sometimes be worse than the disease?<br />

In his book Victims <strong>of</strong> <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k, Janis (1972, 1982) argued that extreme<br />

pressures for unanimity can build <strong>in</strong> a cohesive group that confronts serious<br />

threats (high stress) <strong>and</strong> lacks norms <strong>of</strong> deliberative decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. These<br />

pressures cause decision makers to censor any misgiv<strong>in</strong>gs they may have,<br />

ignore outside <strong>in</strong>formation, <strong>and</strong> overestimate the group’s chances <strong>of</strong> success.<br />

This pattern <strong>of</strong> concurrence-seek<strong>in</strong>g, Janis (1982) argued, is a recipe for <strong>in</strong>effective<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g that leaves groups open to disaster. It expla<strong>in</strong>s how groups<br />

<strong>of</strong> otherwise <strong>in</strong>telligent <strong>and</strong> thoughtful people make serious miscalculations<br />

which result <strong>in</strong> disastrous outcomes.<br />

The <strong>in</strong>fluence <strong>of</strong> the groupth<strong>in</strong>k model is reflected <strong>in</strong> the wide variety <strong>of</strong><br />

fiascoes that have been attributed to the phenomenon. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k has been<br />

named as the chief cause <strong>of</strong> disaster <strong>in</strong> numerous political <strong>and</strong> military decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g episodes suggested not only by Janis (1982), but by others as well (e.g.,<br />

Esser & L<strong>in</strong>doerfer, 1989; Hensley & Griffen, 1986; t’ Hart, 1991). Janis (1985)<br />

himself argued that corporations can fall prey to groupth<strong>in</strong>k by suggest<strong>in</strong>g<br />

that Ford’s decision to build the Edsel <strong>and</strong> The Buffalo M<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Company’s<br />

decision to ignore warn<strong>in</strong>gs about their dam burst<strong>in</strong>g were examples. Other<br />

scholars have also named bus<strong>in</strong>ess groups as victims <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k (e.g.,<br />

Manz & Sims, 1982; Huseman & Driver, 1979). Indeed, a cursory read <strong>of</strong><br />

the group decision mak<strong>in</strong>g literature could lead one to the conclusion that<br />

groupth<strong>in</strong>k is the primary cause <strong>of</strong> fiasco <strong>in</strong> the modern world.


274 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

Another measure <strong>of</strong> the success <strong>of</strong> the groupth<strong>in</strong>k model is the empirical<br />

work it has <strong>in</strong>spired (see Park, 1990). These studies <strong>in</strong>clude experimental<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>of</strong> group cohesiveness <strong>and</strong> leader directiveness (i.e., Flowers,<br />

1977), archival analyses <strong>of</strong> public statements (Tetlock, 1979), case studies <strong>of</strong><br />

historical events blamed on groupth<strong>in</strong>k (e.g., Esser & L<strong>in</strong>doerfer, 1989), <strong>and</strong><br />

quantitative comparisons <strong>of</strong> historical case studies (i.e., Tetlock, Peterson,<br />

McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992).<br />

Yet another measure <strong>of</strong> success—albeit a perverse <strong>in</strong>dicator—is the amount<br />

<strong>of</strong> criticism directed at the groupth<strong>in</strong>k model. A great deal <strong>of</strong> attention has<br />

been focused on the underly<strong>in</strong>g theoretical contentions <strong>of</strong> the model. Revisions<br />

<strong>of</strong> the groupth<strong>in</strong>k model have been suggested by Fischh<strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> Beyth-Marom<br />

(1978), Longley & Pruitt (1980), McCauley (1989). Ste<strong>in</strong>er (1982), Turner, Probasco,<br />

Pratkanis, <strong>and</strong> Leve (1992); t’ Hart (1991), <strong>and</strong> Whyte (1989). Recommendations<br />

have <strong>in</strong>cluded dropp<strong>in</strong>g, add<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>and</strong> clarify<strong>in</strong>g various constructs <strong>in</strong><br />

the model. More specifically, critics <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k have objected to groupth<strong>in</strong>k<br />

on the grounds that, (a) key constructs <strong>in</strong> the model are under- or misspecified,<br />

(b) the strong positive relationship between “good” group process <strong>and</strong> desirable<br />

outcomes is grossly overstated, <strong>and</strong> (c) the facts <strong>of</strong> important historical episodes<br />

have been distorted <strong>in</strong> the dichotomous classification <strong>of</strong> groups.<br />

The current study focuses on an issue that has received relatively less attention<br />

<strong>in</strong> the literature—the heuristic value <strong>of</strong> Janis’ (1982) dist<strong>in</strong>ction between<br />

groupth<strong>in</strong>k as a pathway to failure <strong>and</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g as the antidote<br />

to groupth<strong>in</strong>k (<strong>and</strong> as a general pathway to success) <strong>and</strong> their application to<br />

top management team decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. A primary goal <strong>of</strong> this research was<br />

to test the usefulness <strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> theoretical perspectives <strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

success <strong>and</strong> failure <strong>in</strong> a wider “conceptual universe” <strong>of</strong> case studies than that<br />

<strong>of</strong>fered by Janis. Key questions become: How <strong>in</strong>structive is the model for expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

success <strong>and</strong> failure generally? Is groupth<strong>in</strong>k a widespread cause <strong>of</strong><br />

organizational failure or is it a special case? Can other theories expla<strong>in</strong> top<br />

management team failure better than groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> success better than<br />

vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g?<br />

VIGILANT DECISION MAKING<br />

Janis (1982) contrasted the groupth<strong>in</strong>k fiascoes with the successes <strong>of</strong> groups<br />

that employed vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g (see also Janis & Mann, 1977, 1992).<br />

Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g was designed to encourage deliberation, use <strong>of</strong> statistical<br />

<strong>and</strong> technical processes, <strong>and</strong> extensive process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> group<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. To be “vigilant” <strong>in</strong> decision mak<strong>in</strong>g, groups are required to<br />

carefully survey their objectives, conduct an extensive <strong>and</strong> dispassionate search<br />

for relevant <strong>in</strong>formation, <strong>and</strong> make cont<strong>in</strong>gency plans once an option has been<br />

selected. Specific advice for leaders <strong>in</strong>cludes both accept<strong>in</strong>g criticism <strong>of</strong> her or<br />

his own judgments openly <strong>and</strong> display<strong>in</strong>g impartiality by withhold<strong>in</strong>g policy<br />

preferences at the outset <strong>of</strong> the group discussions (Janis, 1982).<br />

Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g has been cited as a primary contributor to the<br />

Marshall committee’s success <strong>in</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g the rebuild<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Europe after World


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 275<br />

War II (Janis, 1982), the Kennedy adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s decision mak<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the Cuban Missile Crisis (Janis, 1982), <strong>and</strong> the success <strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> other<br />

American foreign policy decisions (Herek, Janis, <strong>and</strong> Huth 1987). Janis (1982,<br />

1989) was a strong proponent <strong>of</strong> the notion that group process <strong>and</strong> probability<br />

<strong>of</strong> success are powerfully l<strong>in</strong>ked. Indeed, the groupth<strong>in</strong>k case studies Janis<br />

(1982) presented exhibit a perfect correlation. In a later study with a wider<br />

variety <strong>of</strong> American foreign policy mak<strong>in</strong>g groups, Herek et al. (1987) found<br />

that the relationship between aspects <strong>of</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> success<br />

was still remarkably strong, albeit far from perfect (r .62).<br />

Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> other “rational” <strong>in</strong>formation process<strong>in</strong>g approaches<br />

to group decision mak<strong>in</strong>g do, <strong>of</strong> course, have their critics. Strategic<br />

management researchers have criticized these normative models <strong>in</strong> three dist<strong>in</strong>ct<br />

ways. First, some critics have argued that advocates <strong>of</strong> vigilant decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g underemphasize the advantages <strong>of</strong> simple decision rules. Although<br />

Tversky <strong>and</strong> Kahneman (1974) emphasize that people make systematic mistakes,<br />

they also argue that the use <strong>of</strong> heuristics <strong>in</strong> decision mak<strong>in</strong>g leads to<br />

more efficient use <strong>of</strong> time. A number <strong>of</strong> contexts have been discovered where<br />

cognitive shortcuts are adaptive. For example, Fredrickson <strong>and</strong> Iaqu<strong>in</strong>to (1989)<br />

found that rational decision mak<strong>in</strong>g processes work well <strong>in</strong> stable, predictable,<br />

<strong>and</strong> relatively simple bus<strong>in</strong>ess environments, but that these same procedures<br />

worked poorly <strong>in</strong> unstable, complex, <strong>and</strong> turbulent environments. Eisenhardt<br />

(1989) showed that successful managers <strong>in</strong> eight microcomputer firms made<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>gency plans for their decisions, but avoided rigorous analysis <strong>of</strong> decision<br />

alternatives <strong>and</strong> were likely to move quickly on <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>in</strong>formation. The<br />

fast-paced environment <strong>of</strong> the computer <strong>in</strong>dustry made extensive search for<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>and</strong> discussion <strong>of</strong> alternatives wasteful. Eisenhardt <strong>and</strong> Zbaracki<br />

(1992) review a number <strong>of</strong> other such cont<strong>in</strong>gencies.<br />

Similarly, several scholars have questioned whether vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

necessarily <strong>in</strong>creases the likelihood <strong>of</strong> success. Suedfeld <strong>and</strong> his colleagues<br />

(1992, 1988; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1992), for example, have argued that vigilant<br />

(“<strong>in</strong>tegratively complex”) decision mak<strong>in</strong>g is not always superior to more simple<br />

strategies. Complex decision mak<strong>in</strong>g procedures overemphasize the benefits <strong>of</strong><br />

complexity <strong>and</strong> ignore or downplay the cognitive <strong>and</strong> emotional costs associated<br />

with engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> such processes. In this view, people are cognitive managers<br />

(not misers) who use meta-decision mak<strong>in</strong>g rules that specify how much energy<br />

to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> a given decision (cf., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Tetlock,<br />

1992). In many contexts, decision makers quickly reach the po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g<br />

marg<strong>in</strong>al returns for further <strong>in</strong>formation search <strong>and</strong> analysis. A simple strategy<br />

employed toward a well-def<strong>in</strong>ed end is, at times, the best strategy (Payne et<br />

al., 1992; 1993; Tetlock, 1991).<br />

The second major critique <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation process<strong>in</strong>g models <strong>of</strong> decision mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

comes from those who argue that mastery <strong>of</strong> politics <strong>and</strong> power is the key<br />

to successful organizational decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. This model has its orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> early<br />

work by political scientists (e.g., Allison, 1971) who challenge the assumption <strong>in</strong><br />

the vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g model that group outcomes can be measured on<br />

a s<strong>in</strong>gle rational dimension. Rather, groups <strong>and</strong> organizations are made <strong>of</strong>


276 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

people who have different purposes <strong>and</strong> act <strong>in</strong> their own self-<strong>in</strong>terest. A “successful”<br />

decision is one where your own coalition w<strong>in</strong>s. Therefore, effective<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> the eye <strong>of</strong> the beholder. Support for this perspective is<br />

found <strong>in</strong> the work <strong>of</strong> Pfeffer <strong>and</strong> his colleagues (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974;<br />

Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974; but see Eisenhardt & Zbaracki,<br />

1992, for a detailed review). Their studies <strong>of</strong> university decision mak<strong>in</strong>g found<br />

that powerful departments get more resources <strong>and</strong> are more likely to have<br />

their ideas implemented <strong>and</strong> that these effects are particularly strong when<br />

resources are scarce. Pfeffer (1992; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) further argues<br />

that successful management <strong>in</strong>volves protect<strong>in</strong>g important projects <strong>and</strong> ideas<br />

from others who would like to sabotage them rather than establish<strong>in</strong>g a spirit<br />

<strong>of</strong> open <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>and</strong> vigilant <strong>in</strong>formation process<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

The strongest critique (e.g., Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; L<strong>in</strong>dblom, 1980;<br />

Starbuck, 1985) ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s that there is little or no relationship between how<br />

groups make decisions <strong>and</strong> the likelihood <strong>of</strong> successful outcomes. This argument<br />

takes two <strong>in</strong>terrelated forms. First, Cohen et al. (1972) have argued that organizational<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g is a quasi-r<strong>and</strong>om process <strong>of</strong> match<strong>in</strong>g decision makers,<br />

problems <strong>and</strong> opportunities, <strong>and</strong> potential solutions. From this st<strong>and</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t,<br />

there is no reason to expect systematic relationships between process <strong>and</strong><br />

outcome <strong>in</strong> top management team decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. The process or “<strong>in</strong>dependent<br />

variable” is too <strong>in</strong>determ<strong>in</strong>ant. Other critics advance the flipside argument;<br />

advocates <strong>of</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g fail to acknowledge the probabilistic<br />

nature <strong>of</strong> the outcomes that elite decision makers attempt to <strong>in</strong>fluence<br />

(Starbuck, 1985). No group can ever fully anticipate, less still control, events<br />

<strong>in</strong> so complex <strong>and</strong> stochastic a world. The best laid plans <strong>of</strong> a group can be<br />

easily undone by bad luck or an unforseeable event such as the reduction <strong>in</strong><br />

air travel after the bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotl<strong>and</strong>, or<br />

the immediate consumer shift away from larger American automobiles <strong>and</strong><br />

toward the smaller cars produced by the Japanese after the Arab oil embargo<br />

<strong>of</strong> 1973.<br />

THE CURRENT RESEARCH<br />

The primary research goal here was to assess the usefulness <strong>of</strong> Janis’ (1982)<br />

analysis <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g failure<br />

<strong>and</strong> success <strong>of</strong> top management teams. Is groupth<strong>in</strong>k a pervasive cause <strong>of</strong><br />

failure? Is vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g the “cure-all” for group decision mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

ills as Janis (1982) argued? Are top management team group dynamics systematically<br />

related to the outcomes those teams experience? These questions were<br />

addressed by <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g at the top <strong>of</strong> seven large corporations.<br />

Decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> each <strong>of</strong> these seven corporations was <strong>in</strong>vestigated<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g two time periods—one when the top management team was effective<br />

<strong>and</strong> another when the team was <strong>in</strong>effective. A strategic constituencies approach<br />

to organizational effectiveness was taken <strong>in</strong> select<strong>in</strong>g cases to study (cf., Pfeffer<br />

& Salancik, 1978). Cases were sought where the top management team<br />

was produc<strong>in</strong>g outcomes <strong>and</strong> activities acceptable to all core constituencies or


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 277<br />

to none <strong>of</strong> their core constituencies. Wide scholarly <strong>and</strong> popular consensus that<br />

the companies were flourish<strong>in</strong>g or languish<strong>in</strong>g was required. The cases had to<br />

provide evidence that demonstrable consensus held both <strong>in</strong>side (e.g., rank <strong>and</strong><br />

file employees) <strong>and</strong> outside (e.g., Wall Street) <strong>of</strong> the company.<br />

The teams studied were the CEO <strong>and</strong> immediate subord<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

companies: (a) CBS News <strong>in</strong> the unsuccessful (1982–1984) Van Gordon<br />

Sauter period <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful (1978–1979) Richard Salant period, (b)<br />

Chrysler <strong>in</strong> the unsuccessful (1989–1990) Lee Iacocca period <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful<br />

(1984–1985) Lee Iacocca period, (c) Coca-Cola <strong>in</strong> the unsuccessful (1978–<br />

1979) Paul Aust<strong>in</strong> period <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful (1984–1986) Roberto Goizueta<br />

period, (d) General Motors <strong>in</strong> the unsuccessful (1985–1986) Roger Smith period<br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful (1993–early 1994) Jack Smith (no relation) period, (e)<br />

IBM <strong>in</strong> the unsuccessful (1988–1989) J. Paul Akers period <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful<br />

(1979–1980) Frank Cary period, (f) KKR/RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout groups 1<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1988 with the unsuccessful management group lead by F. Ross Johnson<br />

<strong>and</strong> the successful KKR group lead by Henry Kravis, <strong>and</strong> (g) Xerox <strong>in</strong> the<br />

unsuccessful (1975–1979) C. Peter McColough period <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> the successful<br />

(1984–1986) David Kearns period. The case histories studied for each <strong>of</strong> these<br />

periods are listed <strong>in</strong> Appendix A <strong>and</strong> a brief narrative description <strong>of</strong> each case<br />

is available upon request from the first author.<br />

Two sets <strong>of</strong> dependent measures were assessed <strong>in</strong> this study. First were<br />

measures <strong>of</strong> group process. Seven group process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales were developed<br />

from the Q-sort <strong>in</strong>strument that measure a wide variety <strong>of</strong> group dynamics.<br />

These scales were, (a) <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigidity–flexibility—higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate<br />

greater likelihood <strong>of</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>in</strong> multidimensional ways <strong>and</strong> chang<strong>in</strong>g<br />

one’s m<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> response to new evidence, (b) sense <strong>of</strong> control–crisis—higher<br />

scores <strong>in</strong>dicate a sense <strong>of</strong> urgency or emergency, (c) optimism–pessimism—<br />

higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate that the group is pessimistic about achiev<strong>in</strong>g its goals,<br />

(d) leader weakness–strength—higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate greater leader control<br />

over the organization <strong>and</strong> a more directive approach to subord<strong>in</strong>ates, (e) factionalism–cohesion—higher<br />

scores <strong>in</strong>dicate a group where the members get along<br />

with each other <strong>and</strong> work together as a mutually supportive team, (f) legalism–<br />

corruption—higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate a group <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly run by back-room deals,<br />

nepotism, <strong>and</strong> self-serv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terests, (g) decentralization–centralization <strong>of</strong><br />

power—higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate an organization that is more centrally controlled<br />

<strong>and</strong> a management group that is controlled by a strong leader or a small<br />

subgroup, (h) risk aversion–risk tak<strong>in</strong>g—higher scores <strong>in</strong>dicate group will<strong>in</strong>gness<br />

to take calculated risks (see Appendix B for a list<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> items <strong>in</strong> each<br />

scale). These seven scales were used to test for systematic differences <strong>in</strong> group<br />

dynamics across the top management teams at successful versus unsuccessful<br />

times.<br />

1 This pair is not one company at two different times. It is the RJR Nabisco management group<br />

<strong>and</strong> the KKR group compet<strong>in</strong>g for control <strong>of</strong> RJR through a LBO under the same tight constra<strong>in</strong>ts<br />

on time, money, <strong>and</strong> rules established by the RJR board <strong>of</strong> directors.


278 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

The second set <strong>of</strong> dependent measures assessed were pattern matches between<br />

theory-derived ideal types <strong>and</strong> the actual groups studied (see Methods<br />

for further discussion <strong>of</strong> how these templates were developed <strong>and</strong> used). The<br />

ideal type for groupth<strong>in</strong>k was derived from Tetlock et al. (1992) <strong>and</strong> Irv<strong>in</strong>g<br />

Janis’ (1982) Victims <strong>of</strong> <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k (described earlier). Later revisions <strong>of</strong> the<br />

model were not used <strong>in</strong> construction <strong>of</strong> the type.<br />

The vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g type was drawn primarily from Janis’ (1982)<br />

prescriptions for prevent<strong>in</strong>g groupth<strong>in</strong>k, but also from later work (1989; Janis &<br />

Mann, 1977, 1992) as well as the Tetlock et al. (1992) ideal type for multiple<br />

advocacy (cf., George, 1972). The focus <strong>of</strong> these prescriptions is to “counteract<br />

<strong>in</strong>itial biases <strong>of</strong> the members, prevent pluralistic ignorance, <strong>and</strong> elim<strong>in</strong>ate<br />

other sources <strong>of</strong> error that can arise <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k” (p. 262).<br />

Exemplary groups <strong>in</strong>clude the Marshall Plan committee <strong>and</strong> Kennedy adm<strong>in</strong>istration<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g dur<strong>in</strong>g the Cuban Missile Crisis (discussed earlier).<br />

Based on a survey <strong>of</strong> the literature <strong>in</strong> organizational behavior, ideal types<br />

were derived from five <strong>in</strong>fluential analyses <strong>of</strong> top management team success<br />

<strong>and</strong> failure. First, Pfeffer <strong>and</strong> Salancik’s (1978) The External Control <strong>of</strong> Organizations<br />

was used to represent the ideal effective decision mak<strong>in</strong>g team with<strong>in</strong><br />

the “resource dependence” perspective. Here an effective management team<br />

reduces dependencies by (a) us<strong>in</strong>g symbolism to create a compell<strong>in</strong>g sense <strong>of</strong><br />

stability, (b) creat<strong>in</strong>g organizational slack to cushion the team through lean<br />

times, <strong>and</strong> (c) deflect<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s made by outside constituencies.<br />

Second, the “corporate social responsibility” ideal type was created from<br />

Etzioni’s (1993) Spirit <strong>of</strong> Community which emphasizes the communitarian<br />

responsibilities <strong>of</strong> corporations, <strong>in</strong> particular the need for top management <strong>and</strong><br />

corporate boards to feel accountable not just to shareholders (the neoclassical<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it-maximization model) but to diverse stakeholders with<strong>in</strong> the organization<br />

(employees) <strong>and</strong> outside it (e.g., customers, suppliers, surround<strong>in</strong>g localities).<br />

The third <strong>and</strong> fourth theoretical ideal types were created from work on<br />

organizational life cycles by Kimberly <strong>and</strong> Miles’ (1980), The <strong>Organizational</strong><br />

Life Cycle <strong>and</strong> Adizes’ (1988) work on Corporate Lifecycles. Two organizational<br />

life cycles that represent the management dynamics <strong>in</strong> mature organizations<br />

were developed. The first is the ideal or “prime organization.” This is an organization<br />

that has reached maximum productivity by balanc<strong>in</strong>g the flexibility <strong>of</strong><br />

earlier stages <strong>of</strong> development aga<strong>in</strong>st the controllability found <strong>in</strong> complex control<br />

systems <strong>of</strong> mature organizations. In “organization <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e,” control systems<br />

are highly developed to the po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g oppressive. The organization<br />

seeks predictability <strong>and</strong> safety at the expense <strong>of</strong> risk tak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> flexibility.<br />

The fifth ideal type, “absolutist cult,” was derived from historical sources<br />

(see Tetlock et al., 1992). This type describes an organization where authority<br />

<strong>and</strong> power are completely centralized <strong>in</strong> one person who claims to embody the<br />

culture <strong>and</strong> direction <strong>of</strong> the organization. The best example <strong>of</strong> this type <strong>in</strong><br />

our sample is Lee Iacocca’s adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>of</strong> Chrysler Corporation after the<br />

company repaid the government-backed loans. Iacocca was so closely identified<br />

with Chrysler that most Americans never knew he had already had a long<br />

career at Ford. Iacocca himself betrayed his absolutist tendencies by repeatedly


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 279<br />

justify<strong>in</strong>g his op<strong>in</strong>ions with the assertion that he had “saved the damn company”<br />

(Ingrassia & White, 1994).<br />

In summary, the goals <strong>of</strong> this paper were tw<strong>of</strong>old. First we tested, the hypothesized<br />

relationship between top management team decision mak<strong>in</strong>g process<br />

<strong>and</strong> organizational performance. The research questions were: Is there any<br />

difference <strong>in</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g processes <strong>of</strong> successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful<br />

teams? If so, what is the nature <strong>of</strong> the relationship? The second purpose was<br />

to test the usefulness <strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> theoretical perspectives <strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

success <strong>and</strong> failure <strong>in</strong> an exp<strong>and</strong>ed “conceptual universe” <strong>of</strong> case studies from<br />

that <strong>of</strong>fered by Janis. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k has been identified as the cause <strong>of</strong> fiasco <strong>in</strong><br />

numerous cases, but how useful is it <strong>in</strong> expla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g general failure? Is vigilant<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g a suitable prescriptive ideal type for corporate success? Or is<br />

reduc<strong>in</strong>g resource dependency a better strategy for top management team<br />

success? Indeed, will any <strong>of</strong> the theory-derived ideal types discussed provide<br />

<strong>in</strong>sight <strong>in</strong>to these cases?<br />

METHODS<br />

This study used the Corporate <strong>Group</strong> <strong>Dynamics</strong> Q-sort (GDQ) to assess the<br />

group dynamics <strong>in</strong> top management teams <strong>of</strong> seven Fortune 500 companies.<br />

The Q-sort methodology was selected to allow for a systematic approach to<br />

study<strong>in</strong>g elite level groups that are normally not open to quanititative study.<br />

Such groups are normally accessible only through historical case studies. Data<br />

for this study were derived from such historical case studies <strong>of</strong> top management<br />

team decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. Two case histories were studied for each <strong>of</strong> seven corporations<br />

<strong>in</strong> successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful times (28 total texts). Each <strong>of</strong> the selected<br />

case histories was translated <strong>in</strong>to the st<strong>and</strong>ardized data language <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Organizational</strong><br />

GDQ. The 100-item <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ assesses a wide variety <strong>of</strong><br />

possible patterns <strong>of</strong> <strong>Organizational</strong> group dynamics. The GDQ provides: (a) a<br />

common descriptive language for captur<strong>in</strong>g expert assessments <strong>of</strong> <strong>Organizational</strong><br />

group dynamics, (b) a st<strong>and</strong>ardized metric for <strong>in</strong>terjudge <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tergroup<br />

comparisons, <strong>and</strong> (c) a systematic framework for accumulat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>sights across<br />

case studies (cf. Block (1978) on Q-sort methodology <strong>in</strong> general; see Tetlock et<br />

al. (1992) for details <strong>of</strong> the GDQ).<br />

Instrument Development<br />

The <strong>Organizational</strong> version <strong>of</strong> the GDQ was developed <strong>in</strong> three steps. First,<br />

the Political GDQ (for <strong>in</strong>formation on the development on the orig<strong>in</strong>al version<br />

<strong>of</strong> the GDQ, see Tetlock et al. (1992)) was rewritten to reflect the unique<br />

properties <strong>of</strong> the corporate environment rather than the elite political environment.<br />

For example, item 2 <strong>in</strong> the Political GDQ read:<br />

There is a widely shared belief that leadership requires technical <strong>and</strong> scientific knowledge.<br />

versus<br />

Religious or ideological beliefs dom<strong>in</strong>ate technical <strong>and</strong> scientific considerations <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g decisions.


280 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

The item was rewritten as follows:<br />

There is a widely shared belief that leadership requires technical or scientific knowledge<br />

unique to that <strong>in</strong>dustry.<br />

versus<br />

The group has no use for scientific or technical knowledge.<br />

Eight items that were <strong>in</strong>appropriate for the <strong>Organizational</strong> version <strong>of</strong> the<br />

GDQ were replaced entirely with items that are critical for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<br />

environment <strong>in</strong> organizations.<br />

Second, a sample <strong>of</strong> three Fortune 500 executives <strong>and</strong> three academics reviewed<br />

the GDQ to ensure that the items provided comprehensive coverage <strong>of</strong><br />

the range <strong>of</strong> group dynamics <strong>in</strong> the corporate sett<strong>in</strong>g. On the basis <strong>of</strong> their<br />

comments a number <strong>of</strong> items were modified, added, <strong>and</strong> deleted.<br />

The f<strong>in</strong>al step <strong>in</strong> development <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ was <strong>in</strong> apply<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the sort to a diverse set <strong>of</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess groups. Five Q-sorters read <strong>and</strong> assessed<br />

the top management team group dynamics <strong>of</strong> Ben <strong>and</strong> Jerry’s Homemade,<br />

Inc. (Lager, 1994), Circus-Circus Enterta<strong>in</strong>ment (Provost, 1994), Big Eight<br />

account<strong>in</strong>g firms (e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co, <strong>and</strong> Price Waterhouse<br />

— now Big Six) (Stevens, 1984), <strong>and</strong> the Coca-Cola Company (Pendergrast,<br />

1993). The sorters unanimously agreed that the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ captured<br />

the important dynamics <strong>of</strong> the groups they Q-sorted. The f<strong>in</strong>al list<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> GDQ<br />

items is presented <strong>in</strong> Appendix B (listed by process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales).<br />

Theoretical Ideal Types<br />

Ideal types were created for template match<strong>in</strong>g theory-derived descriptions<br />

<strong>of</strong> group dynamics with actual groups (cf., Bem & Funder (1978) <strong>and</strong> Block<br />

(1978) on template match<strong>in</strong>g with the Q-sort methodology). The process <strong>of</strong><br />

template match<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volves Q-sort<strong>in</strong>g the group dynamics described by a theory<br />

<strong>and</strong> compar<strong>in</strong>g this with the Q-sort <strong>of</strong> the dynamics <strong>in</strong> an actual group. The<br />

strength <strong>of</strong> this template match<strong>in</strong>g approach over more impressionistic case<br />

study comparisons is that the theory (i.e., the template) <strong>and</strong> the actual cases are<br />

translated <strong>in</strong>to the same data language. This allows for detailed <strong>and</strong> systematic<br />

comparisons between an actual group <strong>and</strong> the theoretical ideal type <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest.<br />

For example, Tetlock et al. (1992) p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ted how Janis overemphasized conformity,<br />

optimism, <strong>and</strong> rigidity <strong>in</strong> the groupth<strong>in</strong>k cases he studied.<br />

The ideal types were Q-sorted from historical <strong>and</strong> theoretical literature by<br />

at least two <strong>of</strong> the first three authors. Each text from which an ideal type was<br />

drawn was double Q-sorted (average <strong>in</strong>terrater agreement, r .80, range <br />

.65 to .91). Disagreement was resolved through discussion. These Q-sort pr<strong>of</strong>iles<br />

were matched aga<strong>in</strong>st actual groups to gauge the resemblance to particular<br />

templates (cf. Bem & Funder, 1978). The seven ideal types <strong>in</strong>clude three ideal<br />

types hypothesized to predict failure, (1) groupth<strong>in</strong>k—an overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g desire<br />

for consensus (Janis, 1982), (2) absolutist cult—authority <strong>and</strong> power are totally<br />

centralized <strong>in</strong> one person who claims to embody the culture <strong>and</strong> direction <strong>of</strong><br />

the organization (from historical source), <strong>and</strong> (3) organization <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e—the<br />

activities <strong>of</strong> the organization are rigidly controlled <strong>and</strong> scripted (Kimberly &


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 281<br />

Miles, 1980; Adizes, 1988). Four ideal types hypothesized to predict success<br />

were also created, (1) vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g—complex <strong>and</strong> detailed <strong>in</strong>formation<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g (Janis, 1982), (2) corporate social responsibility—corporations<br />

should be accountable not just to shareholders, but to stakeholders (Etzioni,<br />

1993), (3) prime organization—the organization balances flexibility <strong>and</strong> control<br />

(Kimberly & Miles, 1980; Adizes, 1988), <strong>and</strong> (4) resource dependence—<br />

managers can make a significant difference by avoid<strong>in</strong>g resource dependencies<br />

that severely limit their autonomy <strong>and</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> maneuver (Pfeffer & Salancik,<br />

1978). Extreme items for the ideal types are listed <strong>in</strong> Appendix C.<br />

Q-Sort Assessment Sources<br />

The raw data for this study were bus<strong>in</strong>ess histories <strong>of</strong> the seven corporations<br />

studied. Only major books published on Fortune 500 companies that discussed<br />

<strong>in</strong> detail the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g dynamics <strong>of</strong> upper management were used. At<br />

least two sources were identified for each company at each <strong>of</strong> two time periods—<br />

one time when the top management team was broadly believed to be satisfy<strong>in</strong>g<br />

core constituencies <strong>and</strong> one time when the team was widely perceived to be<br />

fail<strong>in</strong>g. Four <strong>in</strong>dependent observers carefully read each source <strong>and</strong>, based on<br />

the <strong>in</strong>formation conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> that source <strong>and</strong> only that source, completed a Q-<br />

sort that captured as closely as possible the portrayal <strong>of</strong> the group <strong>in</strong> the source<br />

(i.e., the group was always def<strong>in</strong>ed as the Chief Executive Officer <strong>and</strong> those<br />

who reported directly to him). Q-sorts were based on the group as portrayed<br />

by the author <strong>of</strong> the text, not the way the Q-sorter believed the group to be.<br />

Q-sorters were also <strong>in</strong>structed not to carry <strong>in</strong>formation conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> one source<br />

<strong>in</strong>to another Q-sort. The order <strong>in</strong> which raters read texts was counterbalanced<br />

to control for any possible carryover effects. In addition, the Q-sorters received<br />

st<strong>and</strong>ard procedural <strong>in</strong>structions for how to place the items <strong>in</strong> a st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

quasi-normal distribution (for details see Tetlock et al. [1992]). All four Q-<br />

sorters (one faculty, two graduate students, <strong>and</strong> one undergraduate student)<br />

sorted all 28 sources.<br />

The texts for each historical case, the time period covered, <strong>and</strong> the chief<br />

executive with operat<strong>in</strong>g responsibility for the corporation at the time Q-sorted<br />

are all listed <strong>in</strong> Appendix A. Cases were selected by the follow<strong>in</strong>g four criteria:(a)<br />

only Fortune 500 size companies were sorted, 2 (b) all sources had to <strong>in</strong>clude<br />

sufficient detail about group dynamics to permit hypothesis-bl<strong>in</strong>d Q-sorters to<br />

perform a Q-sort <strong>of</strong> the group (books that focused exclusively on corporate<br />

strategy, market share, etc., were excluded), (c) all cases had to have occurred<br />

with<strong>in</strong> the past 25 years, <strong>and</strong> (d) companies to be selected had to have at<br />

least two sources for both successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful time periods. This last<br />

criterion for selection was <strong>in</strong>cluded to give comparisons that were controlled<br />

2 Our sorts <strong>in</strong>cluded two groups that are not technically on the Fortune 500 list, (1) CBS News<br />

is only one segment <strong>of</strong> CBS (which was on the list at that time) <strong>and</strong> (2) Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts,<br />

which, at the time sorted, did own <strong>and</strong> manage enough operations to be listed had it been counted<br />

as a s<strong>in</strong>gle entity.


282 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

for <strong>in</strong>dustry <strong>and</strong> organizational culture. General economic <strong>and</strong> regulatory climate<br />

was controlled to some extent by selection <strong>of</strong> multiple cases with<strong>in</strong> the<br />

same time period. This was accomplished generally by sort<strong>in</strong>g cases with<strong>in</strong><br />

the past 25 years, but more specifically by sort<strong>in</strong>g both positive <strong>and</strong> negative<br />

cases <strong>in</strong> the same time period (e.g., CBS News successful <strong>and</strong> Coca-Cola unsuccessful<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1978–1979 <strong>and</strong> Coca-Cola successful <strong>and</strong> General Motors unsuccessful<br />

<strong>in</strong> 1985–1986). Time period <strong>and</strong> leader were allowed to vary among the<br />

comparison cases.<br />

In summary, this study addressed the usefulness <strong>of</strong> the groupth<strong>in</strong>k–vigilance<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>uum for underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g success <strong>and</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> top management teams<br />

by (1) select<strong>in</strong>g a set <strong>of</strong> case histories <strong>of</strong> seven corporations, one set when each<br />

corporation is experienc<strong>in</strong>g success <strong>and</strong> another set when each corporation is<br />

experienc<strong>in</strong>g failure, (2) ask<strong>in</strong>g theoretically neutral assessors to describe group<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful group histories<br />

us<strong>in</strong>g the Corporate GDQ, <strong>and</strong> (3) compar<strong>in</strong>g these Q-sorts with one another,<br />

with theory-derived ideal types <strong>of</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

<strong>and</strong> with other ideal types derived from theory <strong>in</strong> organizational behavior.<br />

Reliability <strong>of</strong> the Q-Sort Assessments<br />

RESULTS<br />

Three measures <strong>of</strong> Q-sort reliability were computed: (a) <strong>in</strong>terrater agreement<br />

(do readers <strong>of</strong> the same case study <strong>in</strong>terpret the text <strong>in</strong> similar ways?), (b)<br />

<strong>in</strong>tertext agreement (do different historical accounts lead readers to similar<br />

conclusions?), <strong>and</strong> (c) <strong>in</strong>ternal consistency <strong>of</strong> the process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales (do<br />

conceptually related items <strong>in</strong>tercorrelate?). Interrater reliability was good with<br />

an average Pearson correlation <strong>of</strong> .77, rang<strong>in</strong>g from .54 to .86 (based on 84<br />

<strong>in</strong>terrater comparisons). These reliabilities are with<strong>in</strong> the normal range for<br />

widely used psychological tests <strong>and</strong> justified proceed<strong>in</strong>g to the next level <strong>of</strong><br />

analysis: collaps<strong>in</strong>g across raters to create composite Q-sorts for each case.<br />

Intertext agreement was also good. Fourteen correlation coefficients between<br />

Q-sort composites were computed from different authors’ perspectives on the<br />

same group. The average correlation was .83, with a range from .71 to .90.<br />

This level <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tertext agreement justified collaps<strong>in</strong>g across texts to create<br />

supercomposites that could be compared directly to each other <strong>and</strong> to theoretical<br />

ideal types.<br />

The average Cronbach alpha coefficient for the eight process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales<br />

was .89. Individual coefficients were .97 for <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigidity–flexibility, .86<br />

for control–crisis, .91 for optimism–pessimism, .83 for leader weakness–leader<br />

strength, .85 for factionalism–cohesiveness, .86 for legalism–corruption, .87 for<br />

decentralization–centralization <strong>of</strong> power, <strong>and</strong> .94 for risk aversion–risk tak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Process Indicator Scales<br />

Table 1 presents the process-<strong>in</strong>dicator scale scores for all 14 supercomposite<br />

Q-sorts (collapsed across raters <strong>and</strong> texts).


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 283<br />

TABLE 1<br />

Process Indicator Scores for <strong>Group</strong> Composite Q-Sorts<br />

<strong>Group</strong> R–F C–C O–P W–S F–C L–C D–C A–T<br />

CBS News 6.6 3.3 1.9 6.1 6.1 2.8 3.5 5.4<br />

CBS News 4.1 6.0 4.9 6.4 4.8 6.1 6.3 7.9<br />

Chrysler 4.7 5.1 2.5 8.3 6.1 4.7 6.2 7.4<br />

Chrysler 2.9 7.8 6.8 6.4 4.7 5.8 6.5 4.6<br />

Coca-Cola 6.4 4.3 2.5 7.1 6.3 3.7 5.8 8.1<br />

Coca-Cola 3.5 6.0 5.1 3.8 3.8 5.9 6.4 3.4<br />

General Motors 7.1 6.3 4.1 6.4 6.3 3.9 3.8 7.7<br />

General Motors 3.1 5.1 4.1 5.9 5.2 6.0 7.3 7.1<br />

IBM 6.2 3.4 2.7 6.7 6.0 3.7 5.2 6.8<br />

IBM 2.9 5.3 4.9 4.8 5.3 5.5 6.7 2.3<br />

KKR/RJR 6.4 4.9 3.6 6.7 6.3 4.6 6.2 7.5<br />

KKR/RJR 3.4 6.7 2.7 5.7 4.9 7.0 7.3 6.9<br />

Xerox 7.1 5.0 3.6 7.1 6.1 3.7 4.2 7.8<br />

Xerox 3.5 5.1 3.0 4.6 5.5 5.0 6.1 2.6<br />

Note. Scores are collapsed across texts. The higher the score, the greater the second attribute.<br />

R–F, <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigidity–flexibility; C–C, control–crisis; O–P, optimism–pessimism; W–S leader<br />

weakness–strength; F–C, factionalism–cohesiveness; L–C, legalism–corruption; D–C decentralization–centralization<br />

<strong>of</strong> power; A–T, risk averse–risk tak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Table 2 presents the correlations among the process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales. The<br />

average (absolute value) correlation among the process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales was<br />

.54, with particularly high correlations among <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigidity–flexibility,<br />

factionalism–cohesiveness, legalism–corruption, <strong>and</strong> decentralization–<br />

centralization <strong>of</strong> power. The magnitude <strong>of</strong> these correlations may reflect the<br />

universe <strong>of</strong> groups from which we sampled — large, well-established corporations<br />

function<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> reasonably competitive markets <strong>and</strong> accountable to the<br />

rule <strong>of</strong> law.<br />

Assess<strong>in</strong>g the Relationship between Process <strong>and</strong> Outcome<br />

A one-way multivariate analysis <strong>of</strong> variance (MANOVA) detected significant<br />

differences between the successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful groups, Wilks’ F(5, 8) <br />

TABLE 2<br />

Process Indicator Scale Intercorrelations (N 14)<br />

Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8<br />

1. Rigidity–flexibility —<br />

2. Control–crisis .54 —<br />

3. Optimism–pessimism .52 .75 —<br />

4. Leader weakness–strength .54 .20 .31 —<br />

5. Factionalism–cohesiveness .81 .59 .64 .66 —<br />

6. Legalism–corruption .86 .72 .53 .42 .80 —<br />

7. Decentralization—centralization .83 .45 .35 .29 .61 .87 —<br />

8. Risk averse—risk tak<strong>in</strong>g .59 .13 .32 .78 .49 .23 .21 —<br />

Note. Scores are collapsed across texts. The higher the score, the greater the second attribute.


284 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

18.5, p .01. 3 Discrim<strong>in</strong>ant analysis clarified the relative importance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales <strong>in</strong> differentiat<strong>in</strong>g the two categories <strong>of</strong> groups (st<strong>and</strong>ardized<br />

discrim<strong>in</strong>ant function coefficients <strong>in</strong> parentheses): <strong>in</strong>tellectual rigidity–flexibility<br />

(2.1), leader weakness–strength (1.9), risk aversion–risk tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(1.6), decentralization–centralization <strong>of</strong> power (1.3), legalism–corruption<br />

(.74), optimism–pessimism (.61), factionalism–cohesiveness (.42), <strong>and</strong><br />

control–crisis (.20). Overall, the discrim<strong>in</strong>ant function was significant at the<br />

.002 level, 2 (9, N 14) 26.4, <strong>and</strong> allowed prediction <strong>of</strong> the successful <strong>and</strong><br />

unsuccessful outcome groups with 100% accuracy (aga<strong>in</strong>st a chance accuracy<br />

<strong>of</strong> 50%).<br />

These multivariate tests were followed with analysis <strong>of</strong> variance (ANOVA)<br />

planned comparisons that revealed significant differences on all eight <strong>of</strong> the<br />

process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales. <strong>Success</strong>ful decision mak<strong>in</strong>g groups showed, (a) more<br />

<strong>in</strong>tellectual flexibility, F(1, 12) 70.8, p .0001, 2 .86 (M 6.4 vs 3.4);<br />

(b) less consciousness <strong>of</strong> crisis, F(1, 12) 6.6, p .03, 2 .36 (M 4.6 vs<br />

6.0); (c) less pessimism (more optimistic), F(1, 12) 6.3, p .03, 2 .34<br />

(M 3.0 vs 4.5); (d) greater leader strength, F(1, 12) 11.1, p .01, 2 .48<br />

(M 6.9 vs 5.4); (e) more cohesiveness, F(1, 12) 35.7, p .0001, 2 .75<br />

(M 6.2 vs 4.9); (f) less corruption (more concerned with observ<strong>in</strong>g correct<br />

rules <strong>and</strong> procedures), F(1, 12) 36.0, p .0001, 2 .75 (M 3.9 vs 5.9);<br />

(g) less centralization, F(1, 12) 13.0, p .004, 2 .52 (M 5.0 vs 6.7); <strong>and</strong><br />

(h) more risk tak<strong>in</strong>g, F(1, 12) 5.7, p .04, 2 .32 (M 7.2 vs 5.0). Figure<br />

1 presents these differences.<br />

Exploratory ANOVAs were also conducted to identify which <strong>of</strong> the 100 Q-<br />

sort items most clearly differentiated successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful groups. The<br />

conservative Scheffé test was used to control for Type I error. Fourteen items<br />

proved to be significant predictors even by this conservative estimate: Item<br />

11, F(1, 12) 34.0, p .05, M 7.1 vs 4.6 (successful groups were characterized<br />

by a stronger feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> “common fate”); Item 18, F(1, 12) 55.5, p .05,<br />

M 6.1 vs 3.0 (successful groups were more open <strong>and</strong> c<strong>and</strong>id); Item 19,<br />

F(1, 12) 37.0, p .05, M 7.1 vs 2.9 (successful groups were more likely<br />

to adjust fail<strong>in</strong>g policies <strong>in</strong> a timely fashion); Item 35, F(1, 12) 66.2, p .05,<br />

M 2.8 vs 5.0 (successful groups were more likely to be genu<strong>in</strong>ely committed<br />

to solv<strong>in</strong>g the problems <strong>of</strong> the group); Item 36, F(1, 12) 33.0, p .05, M <br />

3.3 vs 6.5 (successful leaders were more explicit about their policy preferences);<br />

Item 40, F(1, 12) 32.8, p .05, M 6.9 vs 3.0 (successful groups encouraged<br />

more dissent <strong>in</strong> private meet<strong>in</strong>gs); Item 54, F(1, 12) 42.3, p .05, M 3.5<br />

vs 6.5 (successful groups could act more decisively <strong>in</strong> emergencies); Item 55,<br />

F(1, 12) 53.5, p .05, M 7.4 vs 5.0 (successful groups showed more team<br />

spirit); Item 58, F(1, 12) 51.5, p .05, M 3.1 vs 7.3 (successful groups<br />

were more attuned to changes occurr<strong>in</strong>g around them); Item 59, F(1, 12) <br />

81.3, p .05, M 6.9 vs 3.5 (successful groups are more likely to be focused<br />

3 A causal conclusion that group process produced organizational success or failure should not<br />

be drawn from these data. It is also plausible that the process differences are a result <strong>of</strong> experienc<strong>in</strong>g<br />

success or failure.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 285<br />

FIG. 1. Process <strong>in</strong>dicator scale scores for successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful group (n 7).<br />

on achiev<strong>in</strong>g shared goals); Item 74, F(1, 12) 61.3, p .05, M 3.8 vs 7.0<br />

(successful groups are more likely to realize that pa<strong>in</strong>ful <strong>and</strong> divisive trade<strong>of</strong>fs<br />

cannot be avoided); Item 75, F(1, 12) 68.1, p .05, M 3.1 vs 6.2 (successful<br />

groups are more likely to be good at improvis<strong>in</strong>g solutions to unexpected events);<br />

Item 78, F(1, 12) 34.6, p .05, M 3.6 vs 6.9 (successful groups are more<br />

likely to demonstrate a capacity for “double-loop learn<strong>in</strong>g”); <strong>and</strong> Item 98, F(1,<br />

12) 35.9, p .05, M 4.1 vs 6.9 (successful groups are more likely to assume<br />

that policy decisions require a fluid process).<br />

Comparison <strong>of</strong> Cases with Theoretical Ideal Types<br />

Table 3 presents the correlations between the theoretical ideal types. The<br />

average correlation among the types is .39 for the failure types with a particularly<br />

high relationship between groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> absolutist cult (e.g., extremely<br />

TABLE 3<br />

Ideal Type Intercorrelations<br />

Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7<br />

1. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k —<br />

2. Absolutist cult .63 —<br />

3. Organization <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e .32 .21 —<br />

4. Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g .31 .55 .44 —<br />

5. Corporate social responsibility .17 .52 .15 .67 —<br />

6. Prime organization .01 .17 .24 .68 .47 —<br />

7. Resource dependence .03 .17 .21 .62 .49 .70 —


286 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

TABLE 4<br />

Supercomposite Correlations with Theoretical Ideal Types<br />

Ideal type<br />

Negative types<br />

Positive types<br />

<strong>Group</strong> GT AC OD VDM CSR PO RD<br />

CBS News .04 .21 .13 .64 .61 .73 .56<br />

CBS News .35 .53 .17 .23 .24 .00 .02<br />

Chrysler .50 .54 .08 .01 .07 .47 .38<br />

Chrysler .34 .54 .28 .61 .45 .42 .28<br />

Coca-Cola .25 .14 .29 .47 .25 .68 .55<br />

Coca-Cola .16 .37 .37 .51 .24 .33 .27<br />

G. Motors .11 .15 .50 .63 .36 .58 .49<br />

G. Motors .40 .53 .42 .54 .44 .29 .30<br />

IBM .23 .09 .11 .44 .30 .66 .52<br />

IBM .38 .36 .77 .49 .25 .33 .27<br />

RJR/KKR .22 .20 .32 .38 .13 .49 .47<br />

RJR/KKR .38 .52 .20 .49 .44 .35 .25<br />

Xerox .07 .07 .49 .65 .42 .71 .62<br />

Xerox .30 .19 .69 .26 .11 .19 .13<br />

Note. GT, groupth<strong>in</strong>k; AC, absolutist cult; OD, organization <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e; VDM, vigilant decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g; CSR, corporate social responsibility; PO, prime organization; RD, resource dependence.<br />

The best match for each composite Q-sort is underl<strong>in</strong>ed.<br />

high leader strength). The success types had an average correlation <strong>of</strong> .60<br />

with high correlations among the vigilance, prime organization, <strong>and</strong> resource<br />

dependence types (e.g., rigorous <strong>in</strong>formation search). Despite the overlap, there<br />

were significant differences <strong>in</strong> how well each theoretical ideal type matched<br />

with the actual groups. Table 4 presents the correlations between the supercomposite<br />

Q-sorts for each decision mak<strong>in</strong>g episode <strong>and</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the seven theoretical<br />

ideal types. The prime organization type was the best predictor for five <strong>of</strong> the<br />

successful groups (CBS News, Coca-Cola, IBM, KKR, <strong>and</strong> Xerox) <strong>and</strong> was<br />

a significantly better match to the successful groups than vigilant decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g, 4 , t(6) 2.5, p .05 (M .62 vs .46), resource dependence, t(6) 5.7,<br />

p .01 (M .62 vs .51), <strong>and</strong> corporate social responsibility, t(6) 6.4, p <br />

.01 (M .62 vs .29). Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g was a significantly better match<br />

than corporate social responsibility, t(6) 4.7, p .01 (M .46 vs .29). For<br />

failure types, absolutist cult was a marg<strong>in</strong>ally better match to the cases studied<br />

than groupth<strong>in</strong>k, t(6) 2.3, p .06 (M .43 vs .33). 5<br />

Twenty-one correlation coefficients among the successful case supercomposites<br />

(collapsed across raters <strong>and</strong> texts) were also computed. The average correlation<br />

was .60, with a range from .28 to .82. This third-order composite (collapsed<br />

4 Block (1961, 1978) argues that differences <strong>in</strong> fit between two ideal types should be assessed<br />

by treat<strong>in</strong>g the correlations between ideal types <strong>and</strong> subjects (<strong>in</strong> this <strong>in</strong>stance cases) as scores<br />

<strong>and</strong> conduct<strong>in</strong>g paired t tests.<br />

5 The marg<strong>in</strong>al difference is reported because the power <strong>in</strong> these tests is extremely low <strong>and</strong> even<br />

a marg<strong>in</strong>al effect requires a large effect size.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 287<br />

across raters, texts, <strong>and</strong> cases) was developed for comparison with the vigilant<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g ideal type. The third-order composite <strong>of</strong> successful groups<br />

differed from vigilance <strong>in</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g greater leader strength (2.3), more centralization<br />

<strong>of</strong> power (2.0), greater rigidity (1.8), more will<strong>in</strong>gness to take risks (1.5),<br />

less legalism (1.4), <strong>and</strong> more optimism (1.4). These differences are shown <strong>in</strong><br />

graphic form <strong>in</strong> Fig. 2.<br />

Twenty-one correlation coefficients among the unsuccessful case supercomposites<br />

were also computed. The average correlation was .43, with a range<br />

from .00 to .79. This third-order composite was developed for comparison with<br />

the groupth<strong>in</strong>k ideal type. The third-order composite <strong>of</strong> unsuccessful groups<br />

differed from groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g greater factionalism (2.4), less leader<br />

strength (1.6), less optimism (1.5), <strong>and</strong> less rigidity (1.1). The differences are<br />

shown graphically <strong>in</strong> Fig. 3.<br />

DISCUSSION<br />

The discussion is divided <strong>in</strong>to three sections that explore (a) limitations <strong>of</strong><br />

the study, (b) the validity <strong>and</strong> usefulness <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ, <strong>and</strong><br />

(c) the implications <strong>of</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs for the groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> vigilant decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g models.<br />

Limitations <strong>of</strong> the Study<br />

There are at least two potential alternative <strong>in</strong>terpretations for the data<br />

presented. First, it could be that the raters read differences <strong>in</strong>to the group<br />

FIG. 2.<br />

Process <strong>in</strong>dicator scale scores for successful groups <strong>and</strong> vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g.


288 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

FIG. 3.<br />

Process <strong>in</strong>dicator scale scores for unsuccessful groups <strong>and</strong> groupth<strong>in</strong>k.<br />

processes based on their preconceived notions <strong>of</strong> successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful<br />

groups. Although the raters were hypothesis-bl<strong>in</strong>d, it was not possible to shield<br />

them from the relative success or failure <strong>of</strong> the groups they rated. While there<br />

is no way to completely dismiss this <strong>in</strong>terpretation, there is evidence to suggest<br />

that this is not the cause <strong>of</strong> the results reported here. All four raters for this<br />

study were asked to sort a “prototypical group that is most likely to fail to<br />

achieve its objectives” <strong>and</strong> a “prototypical group that is most likely to achieve<br />

its objectives.” The analysis yielded a composite “failure” sort that was only<br />

moderately correlated with unsuccessful group sorts (average r .40 with a<br />

range from .19 to .63). The process <strong>in</strong>dicator scale scores for the composite<br />

failure ideal type diverged significantly from average scores <strong>of</strong> the unsuccessful<br />

groups, however. The unsuccessful groups demonstrated greater cohesion (1.3),<br />

less corruption (1.6), <strong>and</strong> more flexibility (1.0) than the composite failure sort.<br />

The composite “success” sort was more strongly correlated with successful<br />

groups (average r .51 with a range from .23 to .79). The process <strong>in</strong>dicator<br />

scale scores for the composite success sort differed significantly from average<br />

scores <strong>of</strong> the successful groups, however. The successful groups showed greater<br />

rigidity (1.6), stronger leadership (1.2), more corruption (1.1), <strong>and</strong> greater centralization<br />

<strong>of</strong> authority (1.7) than the composite success sort. Given these<br />

differences, it seems reasonable to conclude that the preconceptions <strong>of</strong> the Q-<br />

sorters did not cause the differences detected.<br />

The second <strong>and</strong> related alternative explanation revolves around the historical<br />

texts from which Q-sorts were derived. The case study authors themselves<br />

were not bl<strong>in</strong>d to the success or failure <strong>of</strong> the group at the time the case was<br />

written. Perhaps they fell prey to the certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> h<strong>in</strong>dsight effect <strong>and</strong> allowed


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 289<br />

outcome knowledge to contam<strong>in</strong>ate their assessments <strong>of</strong> group process. They<br />

may have looked selectively for decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g precursors <strong>of</strong> success <strong>and</strong><br />

failure <strong>in</strong> the appropriate groups. Aga<strong>in</strong>, there is evidence to suggest that this<br />

does not expla<strong>in</strong> the results <strong>of</strong> the study reported here. In a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>stances<br />

one author had only immediate outcome knowledge (based on date <strong>of</strong> publication)<br />

<strong>and</strong> the other author had longer term knowledge <strong>of</strong> events that one might<br />

expect to change <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> group dynamics. For example, one <strong>of</strong> the<br />

texts used to sort Chrysler Motors <strong>in</strong> 1984–1985 was published <strong>in</strong> 1985 while<br />

the other was published <strong>in</strong> 1994 (after the problems at Chrysler dur<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

1980s become public <strong>in</strong> 1990). If knowledge <strong>of</strong> the eventual outcome <strong>of</strong> the<br />

group changes the portrayal <strong>of</strong> the group, then one would expect the 1994<br />

source to portray the 1985 group dynamics at Chrysler <strong>in</strong> much more negative<br />

terms than the one published <strong>in</strong> 1985. This did not occur (r .84). Such<br />

differences <strong>in</strong> outcome knowledge exist <strong>in</strong> three <strong>of</strong> the seven successful cases<br />

(Chrysler, IBM, <strong>and</strong> GM 6 ). The average <strong>in</strong>tertext reliability for these sources<br />

(r .81) is not significantly different from those <strong>of</strong> the other successful cases<br />

(r .85), or those <strong>of</strong> the unsuccessful cases (r .83). Another testable hypothesis<br />

is that authors <strong>of</strong> cases who were participants <strong>in</strong> unsuccessful groups might<br />

also have written cases that are somehow different from those <strong>of</strong> outside observers.<br />

These differences were not found. In three cases, one <strong>of</strong> the texts was<br />

written by a member <strong>of</strong> the decision mak<strong>in</strong>g group — David Kearns was President<br />

<strong>and</strong> later CEO <strong>of</strong> Xerox, Ed Joyce was Vice President <strong>of</strong> CBS News dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the time studied, <strong>and</strong> Bill Leonard was Vice President <strong>of</strong> CBS News dur<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the time studied. The <strong>in</strong>tertext reliability for these cases (r .78) was not<br />

significantly different from those with only outside sources (r .85).<br />

There is, <strong>of</strong> course, no way <strong>of</strong> completely dismiss<strong>in</strong>g the possibility that<br />

author participation or outcome knowledge has some effect on retrospective<br />

accounts <strong>of</strong> group decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. The analyses presented here do shift the<br />

burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> to those who still hold such suspicions. Such critics would need<br />

to expla<strong>in</strong> not only the wide agreement among textual perspectives, but also<br />

the complex correlational patterns reported here. More specifically, why did<br />

the actual successful groups differ so systematically from the vigilant decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g type (e.g., greater leader strength <strong>and</strong> more cohesion) <strong>and</strong> the “success”<br />

stereotypes <strong>of</strong> the Q-sorters (e.g., greater rigidity <strong>and</strong> centralization <strong>of</strong> authority)?<br />

Also, why did unsuccessful groups differ so systematically from the groupth<strong>in</strong>k<br />

type (e.g., more factionalism <strong>and</strong> lower leader strength) <strong>and</strong> the “failure”<br />

stereotypes <strong>of</strong> the Q-sorters (e.g., less corruption <strong>and</strong> rigidity along with<br />

greater factionalism)?<br />

Beyond the potential alternative explanations, there are two closely related<br />

limitations that should be recognized. The first is the type <strong>of</strong> organizations<br />

studied here. All seven <strong>of</strong> the organizations are large, American companies<br />

that caught the public eye <strong>in</strong> recent history. It is unknown whether the results<br />

6 In 1995, after Comeback was written, GM experienced a slack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> energy <strong>and</strong> negative results<br />

that are reported <strong>in</strong> Collision Course.


290 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

will replicate to smaller, less visible companies <strong>in</strong> the United States or elsewhere.<br />

Second, the data reported here are all generated from second or thirdorder<br />

sources (managers’ accounts <strong>of</strong> process or the accounts <strong>of</strong> authors who<br />

<strong>in</strong>terviewed top management team members). The implications <strong>of</strong> this limitation<br />

are also unknown. However, this limitation should be weighed aga<strong>in</strong>st<br />

the benefits <strong>of</strong> the methodology—the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ allows systematic<br />

comparisons across top management teams that would not otherwise be open<br />

to quantitative study.<br />

Implications for the GDQ<br />

Beyond its role <strong>in</strong> assess<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>ks between process <strong>and</strong> outcome <strong>in</strong> group<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g or the usefulness <strong>of</strong> Janis’ (1982) groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> vigilant<br />

decision mak<strong>in</strong>g models, the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ represents a bridge methodology<br />

between qualitative <strong>and</strong> quantitative approaches to study<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>esses<br />

<strong>and</strong> organizations. It blends the richness <strong>of</strong> the case study approach (by ask<strong>in</strong>g<br />

a wide variety <strong>of</strong> questions) with the rigor <strong>of</strong> the quantitative approach (cf.<br />

Tetlock et al., 1992). In this study, systematic, quantitative, <strong>and</strong> reliable assessments<br />

<strong>of</strong> group dynamics were made across (1) different writers on the same<br />

group, (2) the same group across time, <strong>and</strong> (3) different groups. For example,<br />

differences <strong>in</strong> author perspectives on the same group were p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>ted. Ed Joyce<br />

(1988) portrayed CBS News as more <strong>in</strong> crisis (1.3) <strong>and</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g a less centralized<br />

power structure (1.1) than did Peter Boyer (1988). The <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g pessimism<br />

(2.5 to 6.8), risk aversion (7.4 to 4.6), <strong>and</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> crisis (5.1 to 7.8) was tracked<br />

<strong>in</strong> Lee Iacocca’s adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>of</strong> Chrysler between 1985 <strong>and</strong> 1990. Direct<br />

comparisons between different groups were also made. The most similar cases,<br />

for example, were the successful sorts on General Motors <strong>and</strong> Xerox (r .82),<br />

followed by the unsuccessful sorts for Xerox <strong>and</strong> IBM (r .79). The Corporate<br />

GDQ also permitted systematic comparisons <strong>of</strong> real groups to theory-derived<br />

ideal types. Rather than rely<strong>in</strong>g on impressionistic comparisons <strong>of</strong> overall group<br />

or team function<strong>in</strong>g, the <strong>Organizational</strong> GDQ could p<strong>in</strong>po<strong>in</strong>t specific differences<br />

between real groups <strong>and</strong> the theoretical ideal type <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest. For example,<br />

the case most similar to the ideal type for groupth<strong>in</strong>k was the successful<br />

Chrysler case (r .50). However, Chrysler still differed from groupth<strong>in</strong>k by<br />

show<strong>in</strong>g greater flexibility (2.3), more will<strong>in</strong>gness to take risks (2.1), <strong>and</strong> a<br />

greater sense <strong>of</strong> control (1.6) than the ideal type.<br />

Although there are clear advantages to the GDQ, the method is not perfect.<br />

The GDQ has two limitations. First, the GDQ does not allow for strong causal<br />

conclusions like those that can be drawn from controlled experiment. The<br />

second limitation is that reliability (which the Q-sorts presented clearly possess)<br />

is no guarantee <strong>of</strong> validity. These reliabilities could be the product <strong>of</strong><br />

shared misconceptions among authors <strong>of</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess history or among readers<br />

who translate texts <strong>in</strong>to Q-sorts. The limitations <strong>of</strong> the GDQ should not, however,<br />

be exaggerated. Confidence <strong>in</strong> the method can be justified by the convergence<br />

<strong>of</strong> theory <strong>and</strong> history. Ideal type Q-sorts derived from theories purport<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to identify the group-dynamics <strong>in</strong>gredients <strong>of</strong> success were associated with


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 291<br />

successful groups, whereas ideal types derived from theories purport<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

identify the sources <strong>of</strong> failure were associated with unsuccessful groups <strong>in</strong><br />

predicted ways. In other words, the patterns <strong>of</strong> match <strong>and</strong> mismatch mesh<br />

nicely both with exist<strong>in</strong>g theory <strong>and</strong> current evidence derived from laboratory<br />

experiments, field <strong>in</strong>vestigation, <strong>and</strong> case studies.<br />

Implications for the <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> Vigilant Decision Mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Models</strong><br />

The current study provides strong supportive evidence <strong>of</strong> Janis’ (1982) position<br />

that a relationship exists between group process <strong>and</strong> outcome <strong>in</strong> decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g. This claim rests on two features <strong>of</strong> the results reported: (a) hypothesisbl<strong>in</strong>d<br />

readers <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependent historical sources reached quite similar conclusions<br />

about the group dynamics <strong>of</strong> the groups we studied (reflected <strong>in</strong> high<br />

<strong>in</strong>terrater <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tertext reliabilities), <strong>and</strong> (b) there were significant differences<br />

<strong>in</strong> the composite Q-sorts for successful <strong>and</strong> unsuccessful groups (as demonstrated<br />

<strong>in</strong> the discrim<strong>in</strong>ant analysis, the overall MANOVA, <strong>and</strong> ANOVA tests<br />

on the process <strong>in</strong>dicator scales).<br />

Although the results generally support Janis’ (1982, 1989) claims that vigilant<br />

process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation leads to favorable outcomes <strong>in</strong> group decision<br />

mak<strong>in</strong>g, the case should not be overstated. The results diverge from Janis’<br />

(1982) work <strong>in</strong> three important ways. First the unsuccessful groups showed<br />

weaker leaders, more factionalism (less cohesion), less rigidity, <strong>and</strong> greater<br />

optimism than the groupth<strong>in</strong>k type would suggest. These results square nicely<br />

with those found by Tetlock et al. (1992), who found that Janis (1982) overstated<br />

the role <strong>of</strong> group cohesion <strong>and</strong> sense <strong>of</strong> crisis when compared with other historical<br />

observers. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k provided the best fit to none <strong>of</strong> the seven unsuccessful<br />

groups studied. The absolutist cult type was a consistently better match to<br />

the unsuccessful groups than groupth<strong>in</strong>k. Moreover, the different predictive<br />

abilities <strong>of</strong> these two ideal types are not an artifact <strong>of</strong> trivial differences between<br />

them. <strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k is related to absolutist cult <strong>in</strong> its focus on leader strength<br />

<strong>and</strong> cohesiveness, but differs <strong>in</strong> greater flexibility (1.8), greater sense <strong>of</strong> control<br />

(2.1), <strong>and</strong> greater risk tak<strong>in</strong>g (1.8), (r .61). In sum, the results reported here<br />

suggest that groupth<strong>in</strong>k may not be as common a phenomenon as implied by<br />

the high level <strong>of</strong> attention that groups researchers have paid to the groupth<strong>in</strong>k<br />

model (cf., t’ Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 1997). Other theoretical perspectives,<br />

especially absolutist cult, may better capture what can go wrong at the top<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> corporations.<br />

The second way <strong>in</strong> which our results diverge from those <strong>of</strong> Janis (1982, 1989)<br />

is <strong>in</strong> the successful groups’ greater leader strength, more centralization <strong>of</strong><br />

authority, greater rigidity, more will<strong>in</strong>gness to take risks, less legalism, <strong>and</strong><br />

more optimism than the ideal type for vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>Vigilance</strong> was<br />

the best fit for only one <strong>of</strong> the seven successful groups (General Motors, r <br />

.64). It is also worth not<strong>in</strong>g that, although the leadership <strong>and</strong> group membership<br />

rema<strong>in</strong>ed unchanged, this group experienced serious setbacks shortly after the<br />

time period studied. Moreover, the prime organization type was a significantly<br />

better match to the groups studied here than vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g. These


292 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

two ideal types are by no means redundant. Like vigilance, prime organization<br />

encourages dissent <strong>and</strong> flexibility, but differs <strong>in</strong> its emphasis on can-do confidence<br />

<strong>and</strong> buoyant optimism (2.6), (r .67). As with groupth<strong>in</strong>k <strong>and</strong> the<br />

negative ideal types, other models appear to provide a better explanation for<br />

the success <strong>of</strong> the top management teams studied than the one proposed by<br />

Janis (1982). In particular, the prime organization type appears to be a better<br />

model <strong>of</strong> success. Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g is clearly not the only path, <strong>and</strong><br />

may not be the best path, to corporate success.<br />

The third way <strong>in</strong> which our results differ from Janis’ (1982) work is <strong>in</strong> its<br />

implications for leader strength. Janis (1982) argued that effective leaders<br />

should be “impartial” <strong>and</strong> withhold their op<strong>in</strong>ions from the group at the outset<br />

<strong>of</strong> discussion. Leaders should also refra<strong>in</strong> from exert<strong>in</strong>g undue pressure on<br />

their fellow group members. These recommendations were made to encourage<br />

an atmosphere <strong>of</strong> “open <strong>in</strong>quiry” <strong>and</strong> reduce the likelihood <strong>of</strong> conformity to a<br />

leader’s views. Results reveal that successful decision mak<strong>in</strong>g groups had<br />

strong leaders who were more likely to try to persuade others <strong>in</strong> the organization<br />

<strong>of</strong> their views than leaders <strong>of</strong> unsuccessful groups. Moreover, leaders <strong>of</strong> successful<br />

groups were more likely to be explicit about their policy preferences with<br />

others (item 36). At first blush these results seem to oppose a number <strong>of</strong> other<br />

f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs reported here that support successful groups as more <strong>in</strong>tellectually<br />

flexible <strong>and</strong> decentralized. This comb<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs is consistent, however,<br />

with those reported by Peterson (1997) (see also Peterson, June 1997). In a<br />

study <strong>of</strong> leader directiveness <strong>in</strong> elite political <strong>and</strong> experimental groups, the<br />

quality <strong>of</strong> group process <strong>and</strong> outcomes was not affected by the degree to which<br />

the leader advocated a position (i.e., high outcome directiveness). <strong>Group</strong> process<br />

<strong>and</strong> outcome quality depended only on whether the leader was open to dissent<br />

(i.e., high process directiveness). Item 40 <strong>in</strong> this study found that successful<br />

leaders were also more open to dissent.<br />

APPENDIX A<br />

Historical Cases <strong>and</strong> Texts Used (Unsuccessful Case Listed First)<br />

<strong>Group</strong> Time Leader/CEO Texts<br />

CBS News<br />

U 1982–1984 Van Gordon Sauter Boyer, P. J. (1988). Who killed CBS?<br />

The undo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> America’s number one<br />

news network. New York: R<strong>and</strong>om<br />

House.<br />

Joyce, E. (1988). Prime times, bad<br />

times. New York: Doubleday.<br />

S 1978–1979 Richard Salant Boyer, P. J. (1988). Who killed CBS?<br />

The undo<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> America’s number one<br />

news network. New York: R<strong>and</strong>om<br />

House.<br />

Leonard, B. (1987). In the storm <strong>of</strong> the<br />

eye: A lifetime at CBS. New York:<br />

G. P. Putnam’s Sons.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 293<br />

APPENDIX A—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

<strong>Group</strong> Time Leader/CEO Texts<br />

Chrysler<br />

U 1989–1990 Lee Iacocca Ingrassia, P., & White, J. B. (1994).<br />

Comeback. New York: Simon &<br />

Schuster.<br />

Lev<strong>in</strong>, D. P. (1995). Beh<strong>in</strong>d the wheel at<br />

Chrysler. New York: Harcourt<br />

Brace.<br />

S 1984–1985 Lee Iacocca Gordon, M. M. (1985). The Iacocca management<br />

technique. New York:<br />

Lev<strong>in</strong>, D. P. (1995). Beh<strong>in</strong>d the wheel at<br />

Chrysler. New York: Harcourt<br />

Brace.<br />

Coca-Cola<br />

U 1978–1979 Paul Aust<strong>in</strong> Allen, F. (1994). Secret formula. New<br />

York: HarperColl<strong>in</strong>s.<br />

Pendergrast, M. (1993). For God, country<br />

<strong>and</strong> coca-cola. New York: Macmillan.<br />

S 1984–1986 Roberto Goizueta Allen, F. (1994). Secret formula. New<br />

York: HarperColl<strong>in</strong>s.<br />

Pendergrast, M. (1993). For God, country<br />

<strong>and</strong> coca-cola. New York: Macmillan.<br />

General Motors<br />

U 1985–1986 Roger Smith Ingrassia, P., & White, J. B. (1994).<br />

Comeback. New York: Simon &<br />

Schuster.<br />

Lee, A. (1988). Call me Roger. Chicago:<br />

Contemporary Books.<br />

S 1993–1994 Jack Smith Ingrassia, P., & White, J. B. (1994).<br />

Comeback. New York: Simon &<br />

Schuster.<br />

Maynard, M. (1996). Collision course.<br />

New York: Birch Lane Press.<br />

IBM<br />

U 1988–1989 J. Paul Akers Carroll, P. (1993). Big blues: The unmak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong> IBM. New York: Crown.<br />

Ferguson, C. H., & Morris, C. R. (1993).<br />

Computer wars: The fall <strong>of</strong> IBM<br />

<strong>and</strong> the future <strong>of</strong> global technology.<br />

New York: R<strong>and</strong>om House<br />

S 1979–1980 Frank Cary Carroll, P. (1993). Big blues: The unmak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>of</strong> IBM. New York: Crown.<br />

Sobel, R. (1981). IBM: Colossus <strong>in</strong> transition.<br />

New York: Times Books<br />

KKR/RJR Nabisco<br />

U 1988 F. Ross Johnson Burrough, B.,& Helyar, J. (1990). Barbarians<br />

at the gate. New York:<br />

Harper & Row.<br />

Lampert, H. (1990). True greed. New<br />

York: New American Library.


294 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

APPENDIX A—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

<strong>Group</strong> Time Leader/CEO Texts<br />

S 1988 Henry Kravis Burrough, B.,& Helyar, J. (1990). Barbarians<br />

at the gate. New York:<br />

Harper & Row<br />

Lampert, H. (1990). True Greed. New<br />

York: New American Library.<br />

Xerox<br />

U 1977–1979 C. Peter Jacobson, G., & Hillkirk, J. (1986).<br />

McColough<br />

Xerox: American samurai. New<br />

York: Macmillan.<br />

Kearns, D. T., & Nadler, D. A. (1992).<br />

Prophets <strong>in</strong> the dark: How Xerox re<strong>in</strong>vented<br />

itself <strong>and</strong> beat back the Japanese.<br />

New York: HarperColl<strong>in</strong>s.<br />

S 1985–1986 David Kearns Jacobson, G., & Hillkirk, J. (1986).<br />

Xerox: American samurai. New<br />

York: Macmillan.<br />

Kearns, D. T., & Nadler, D. A. (1992).<br />

Prophets <strong>in</strong> the dark: How Xerox re<strong>in</strong>vented<br />

itself <strong>and</strong> beath back the<br />

Japanese. New York: HarperColl<strong>in</strong>s.<br />

Note. U, unsuccessful groups; S, successful groups.<br />

APPENDIX B<br />

<strong>Organizational</strong> <strong>Group</strong> <strong>Dynamics</strong> Q-Sort: Process Indicator Scales<br />

Intellectual Rigidity–Flexibility<br />

19. The group refuses to ab<strong>and</strong>on fail<strong>in</strong>g or unsound policies <strong>in</strong> response to serious setbacks<br />

(i.e., an aversion to serious self-criticism).<br />

vs<br />

***The group adjusts fail<strong>in</strong>g policies <strong>in</strong> a timely fashion (i.e., the group recognizes shortcom<strong>in</strong>gs<br />

<strong>and</strong> attempts to cut its losses by mak<strong>in</strong>g midcourse changes).<br />

37. There is a great deal <strong>of</strong> xenophobia or suspiciousness toward outsiders with<strong>in</strong> the group.<br />

vs<br />

***The group is open to a wide range <strong>of</strong> cultural <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tellectual <strong>in</strong>fluences.<br />

40. Dissent is not acceptable even with<strong>in</strong> private group meet<strong>in</strong>gs; the group ostracizes dissenters<br />

<strong>and</strong> punishes them severely.<br />

vs<br />

***Private criticism with<strong>in</strong> group meet<strong>in</strong>gs is not only acceptable, it is actively encouraged<br />

as a way <strong>of</strong> improv<strong>in</strong>g decision mak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

58. ***<strong>Group</strong> members are highly attuned to their environment <strong>and</strong> major changes occurr<strong>in</strong>g<br />

around them.<br />

vs<br />

Members are extremely slow to recognize the major changes occurr<strong>in</strong>g around them.<br />

***Direction <strong>of</strong> Q-sort item that measures the extreme end <strong>of</strong> the right-h<strong>and</strong> side <strong>of</strong> the scale.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 295<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

65. Key group members are megalomaniacs who have lost all sense <strong>of</strong> their limitations.<br />

vs<br />

***Key group members are balanced people who know the limits <strong>of</strong> their own skills <strong>and</strong><br />

usefulness to the organization.<br />

66. ***The group places heavy emphasis on consultation <strong>and</strong> solicit<strong>in</strong>g expert advice.<br />

vs<br />

The group places little emphasis on consultation <strong>and</strong> expert advice.<br />

68. The group leader is <strong>in</strong>sulated from criticism.<br />

vs<br />

***The leader is exposed to a wide range <strong>of</strong> views <strong>and</strong> arguments. (Note: Item refers to<br />

whether the leader is exposed <strong>and</strong> not whether leader responds [see items 92 <strong>and</strong> 40].)<br />

71. ***Key members are open, confident people who are will<strong>in</strong>g to consider that they might<br />

be wrong.<br />

vs<br />

Key members <strong>of</strong> the group are defensive, <strong>in</strong>secure people who respond sharply to any criticism.<br />

74. ***The group recognizes that pa<strong>in</strong>ful <strong>and</strong> divisive choices cannot be avoided.<br />

vs<br />

The group believes that trade-<strong>of</strong>fs can be avoided (i.e., that it will be possible to achieve<br />

everyth<strong>in</strong>g on their wish list).<br />

78. ***The group demonstrates a capacity for “double-loop learn<strong>in</strong>g” (i.e., the capacity not just<br />

to monitor performance with respect to established <strong>in</strong>dicators, but also to undertake periodic<br />

reassessments <strong>of</strong> performance <strong>in</strong>dicators to ensure that they are measur<strong>in</strong>g the right th<strong>in</strong>gs).<br />

vs<br />

The group has no capacity for self-reflective learn<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., group shows no <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong><br />

reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dicators <strong>of</strong> success that are customary to the organization).<br />

81. The group leader is <strong>in</strong>sensitive to other po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> view with<strong>in</strong> the group <strong>and</strong> society at large.<br />

vs<br />

***The leader is a good listener (i.e., pays careful attention to what others say, is good at<br />

underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g divergent viewpo<strong>in</strong>ts).<br />

88. The group subscribes to a rigid, dichotomous view <strong>of</strong> the world (i.e., there are good guys<br />

<strong>and</strong> bad guys <strong>and</strong> noth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> between).<br />

vs<br />

***The group has a flexible multidimensional world view (i.e., good guys are not always<br />

good, bad guys are not always bad, <strong>and</strong> reasonable people can <strong>of</strong>ten disagree over what<br />

counts as good or bad).<br />

98. ***The group assumes that most policy decisions require a fluid process, weigh<strong>in</strong>g compet<strong>in</strong>g<br />

values <strong>and</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g subtle trade-<strong>of</strong>f judgments (i.e., decisions are made <strong>in</strong> many ways depend<strong>in</strong>g<br />

on the circumstances).<br />

vs<br />

The group assumes that there are clear right <strong>and</strong> wrong, good <strong>and</strong> bad ways <strong>of</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

decisions (i.e., the process by which decisions are made is rigid).<br />

Sense <strong>of</strong> Control–Crisis<br />

10. ***The group focuses exclusively on short-term concerns (e.g., next quarter pr<strong>of</strong>its or current<br />

public image).<br />

vs<br />

Long-term concerns loom large <strong>in</strong> group decision mak<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

21. ***The group cannot act decisively without the stimulus <strong>of</strong> a crisis.<br />

vs<br />

The group is capable <strong>of</strong> decisive action before problems deteriorate <strong>in</strong>to crises. (Note: Item<br />

implies a capacity to both anticipate events <strong>and</strong> mobilize resources to shape those events.)<br />

31. ***The group perceives a serious external threat to its cont<strong>in</strong>ued existence (e.g., unfriendly<br />

takeover, government regulators, tough competitors, creditors, etc.).<br />

vs<br />

The group perceives the bus<strong>in</strong>ess environment to be placid <strong>and</strong> relatively benign (the environment<br />

may even be supportive).


296 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

38. The group can easily cope with exist<strong>in</strong>g problems <strong>and</strong> challenges.<br />

vs<br />

***The group is under enormous pressure or stress (i.e., challenges far exceed capabilities).<br />

46. The group can afford to make a variety <strong>of</strong> mistakes (i.e., the group/organization can draw<br />

upon enormous resources—f<strong>in</strong>ancial, reputational, etc.).<br />

vs<br />

***The group cannot afford to make mistakes (i.e., the group/organization is on the precipice<br />

<strong>of</strong> ru<strong>in</strong>, even one mistake can ru<strong>in</strong> them).<br />

54. The group can act decisively <strong>in</strong> emergencies.<br />

vs<br />

***Even <strong>in</strong> emergencies, the group cannot act decisively.<br />

56. ***The group cannot reconcile the conflict<strong>in</strong>g dem<strong>and</strong>s <strong>of</strong> important constituencies.<br />

vs<br />

The group has no difficulty satisfy<strong>in</strong>g all important constituencies.<br />

75. The group has formidable problem-solv<strong>in</strong>g skills <strong>and</strong> is adept at improvis<strong>in</strong>g solutions to<br />

unexpected events.<br />

vs<br />

***The group has no problem-solv<strong>in</strong>g skills (i.e., clueless when someth<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> the ord<strong>in</strong>ary<br />

happens).<br />

93. ***The group’s legitimate authority has been utterly discredited.<br />

vs<br />

The group’s legitimacy is widely accepted. (Note: Item refers to perceptions <strong>of</strong> others, not<br />

to group’s perception <strong>of</strong> its legitimacy [see item 22].)<br />

Optimism–Pessimism<br />

8. There is an <strong>in</strong>fectious can-do spirit with<strong>in</strong> the group.<br />

vs<br />

***The group’s spirit is broken (i.e., apathy, despair, <strong>and</strong> defeatism prevail).<br />

17. ***The group has lost faith <strong>in</strong> its capacity to control events.<br />

vs<br />

The group feels fully <strong>in</strong> control <strong>of</strong> events.<br />

22. The group is confident <strong>in</strong> its legitimacy (i.e., it assumes there is widespread acceptance <strong>of</strong><br />

its “right” to lead).<br />

vs<br />

***The group is very unsure <strong>and</strong> self-conscious <strong>of</strong> its legitimacy (Note: Item refers to group’s<br />

perception <strong>of</strong> its legitimacy, not to the perceptions <strong>of</strong> others, [see item 93])<br />

64. ***The group suffers from an <strong>in</strong>feriority complex.<br />

vs<br />

The group displays enormous confidence <strong>in</strong> itself <strong>and</strong> its traditions.<br />

76. ***The group has suffered serious setbacks (i.e., <strong>in</strong>juries to its collective self-esteem).<br />

vs<br />

The group is “rid<strong>in</strong>g high” as a result <strong>of</strong> past successes (i.e., a euphoric atmosphere <strong>in</strong><br />

group meet<strong>in</strong>gs).<br />

Leader Weakness–Strength<br />

32. ***The leader has complete control over who is admitted to the group.<br />

vs<br />

The group consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals with autonomous bases <strong>of</strong> power (i.e., group members do<br />

not owe their positions to the leader).<br />

39. The leader is passive <strong>and</strong> withdrawn (i.e., has apparently lost <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> the job <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong><br />

achiev<strong>in</strong>g orig<strong>in</strong>al goals).<br />

vs<br />

***The group leader is an extremely forceful <strong>and</strong> ambitious personality.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 297<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

60. The leader is <strong>of</strong>ten ignored or even overruled by group members.<br />

vs<br />

***The group displays automatic <strong>and</strong> unquestion<strong>in</strong>g obedience toward the leader. (Note:<br />

Code as neutral if the group leader can generally expect deference but does not have license<br />

to rule arbitrarily.)<br />

63. Members harbor serious doubts about the leader’s effectiveness.<br />

vs<br />

***<strong>Group</strong> members are conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the leader possesses skills that are critical for achiev<strong>in</strong>g<br />

group goals.<br />

83. ***No member <strong>of</strong> the group comes even close to match<strong>in</strong>g the skills <strong>and</strong> stature <strong>of</strong> the leader.<br />

vs<br />

The leader is overshadowed or eclipsed by other group members.<br />

97. ***The group leader makes major efforts to persuade others to redef<strong>in</strong>e their goals <strong>and</strong> priorities.<br />

vs<br />

The leader places little emphasis on persuad<strong>in</strong>g others (i.e., works with<strong>in</strong> or around current<br />

op<strong>in</strong>ion).<br />

Factionalism–Cohesion<br />

1. ***The group requires absolute loyalty (i.e., members must show 100% dedication to the<br />

group <strong>and</strong>/or organization or they are out).<br />

vs<br />

The group places no importance on loyalty (i.e., members are loyal either only to themselves<br />

or to external constituencies whom they represent.)<br />

3. ***<strong>Group</strong> members make good faith efforts to implement the leader’s policies, even when<br />

they do not agree with those policies.<br />

vs<br />

Influential members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ner decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g circle are block<strong>in</strong>g the group leader’s policies.<br />

7. <strong>Group</strong> members are acerbic <strong>and</strong> confrontational <strong>in</strong> their deal<strong>in</strong>gs with each other.<br />

vs<br />

***Members are tactful <strong>and</strong> accommodative <strong>in</strong> their deal<strong>in</strong>gs with each other.<br />

11. <strong>Group</strong> members see their own success as <strong>in</strong>extricably tied to the failure <strong>of</strong> other group<br />

members (i.e., members have <strong>in</strong>dividual, subgroup, or divisional agendas).<br />

vs<br />

***<strong>Group</strong> members assume that they share a “common fate” (i.e., either they will succeed<br />

together or fail together).<br />

23. Relations among group members are charged with hostility <strong>and</strong>/or rivalry.<br />

vs<br />

***Relations among group members are warm <strong>and</strong> friendly. (Note: Code as neutral if relations<br />

among group members tend to be affectively neutral <strong>and</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>esslike.)<br />

41. ***The group is united on the pace <strong>of</strong> change.<br />

vs<br />

There is a serious rift with<strong>in</strong> the group between the forces <strong>of</strong> organizational change <strong>and</strong><br />

forces support<strong>in</strong>g the traditions, privileges, <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> the past.<br />

47. Authority with<strong>in</strong> the group is highly fragmented, with different facets <strong>of</strong> policy becom<strong>in</strong>g<br />

the autonomous prov<strong>in</strong>ces <strong>of</strong> different <strong>in</strong>dividuals.<br />

vs<br />

***Authority is highly centralized; policy <strong>in</strong> different doma<strong>in</strong>s is tightly controlled <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrated.<br />

51. The group consists <strong>of</strong> representatives <strong>of</strong> various <strong>in</strong>terest groups <strong>and</strong> bureaucratic constituencies.<br />

vs<br />

***The group consists <strong>of</strong> “generalists” who are not obliged to represent any particular<br />

power base.


298 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

55. The group shows no team spirit <strong>and</strong> group solidarity.<br />

vs<br />

***The group shows strong team spirit.<br />

59. <strong>Group</strong> members devote virtually all their time to play<strong>in</strong>g self-serv<strong>in</strong>g political games (e.g.,<br />

claim<strong>in</strong>g expensive perks, redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g criteria for success, etc.).<br />

vs<br />

***<strong>Group</strong> members have no time for gamesmanship; their focus is on achiev<strong>in</strong>g shared<br />

goals.<br />

70. ***The group leader demonstrates <strong>in</strong>tense loyalty to close supporters <strong>and</strong> advisors (i.e.,<br />

keeps them aboard long after they have become political liabilities).<br />

vs<br />

The leader shows no loyalty to close supporters <strong>and</strong> advisors (i.e., ab<strong>and</strong>ons them at the<br />

earliest signs <strong>of</strong> trouble).<br />

72. ***The group never acts unless unanimity has been achieved.<br />

vs<br />

The group frequently undertakes decisions that a substantial fraction <strong>of</strong> the group<br />

opposes.<br />

73. There is <strong>in</strong>tense pressure to forget disagreements <strong>and</strong> forge a common front.<br />

vs<br />

There is little external pressure to forge a common front.<br />

96. ***The group leader is charismatic <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>spir<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., gives subord<strong>in</strong>ates someth<strong>in</strong>g to<br />

believe <strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> to shoot for).<br />

vs<br />

The leader is bl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> un<strong>in</strong>spir<strong>in</strong>g at best (an embarrassment at worst).<br />

99. There is an atmosphere <strong>of</strong> suspicion <strong>and</strong> fear with<strong>in</strong> the group (i.e., no one knows who will<br />

be next to fall out <strong>of</strong> favor <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>to oblivion).<br />

vs<br />

***There is an atmosphere <strong>of</strong> trust <strong>and</strong> mutual support among group members.<br />

Legalism–Corruption<br />

16. There is a pervasive belief that st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>of</strong> appropriate conduct should apply to everyone.<br />

vs<br />

Corruption is rampant; cronyism, nepotism, favoritism, <strong>and</strong> backroom deals are accepted<br />

as a natural part <strong>of</strong> life.<br />

18. ***False appearances <strong>and</strong> deceptive manipulation are so common as to be a way <strong>of</strong> life (i.e.,<br />

noth<strong>in</strong>g can be taken at face value).<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members are remarkably open <strong>and</strong> c<strong>and</strong>id <strong>in</strong> their deal<strong>in</strong>gs with one another.<br />

67. The group is always careful to act with<strong>in</strong> the law.<br />

vs<br />

***The group is unconstra<strong>in</strong>ed by law or common conceptions <strong>of</strong> morality.<br />

79. ***There is a pervasive lack <strong>of</strong> accountability with<strong>in</strong> the group (e.g., when key projects fail,<br />

resignations or censure <strong>of</strong> responsible decision-makers do not follow.)<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members feel strictly accountable for their job performance (i.e., when they fail, they<br />

take full responsibility).<br />

89. ***The group blatantly discrim<strong>in</strong>ates aga<strong>in</strong>st disliked ethnic, racial, or religious<br />

groups.<br />

vs<br />

The group bends over backward to display its ethnic, racial, <strong>and</strong> religious impartiality.<br />

95. ***<strong>Group</strong> members are opportunists guided only by calculations <strong>of</strong> personal self<strong>in</strong>terest.<br />

vs<br />

Members are strongly committed to the norms, roles, <strong>and</strong> goals <strong>of</strong> the organization (i.e.,<br />

want to do the “right th<strong>in</strong>g” for the “right reasons”).


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 299<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

Decentralization–Centralization <strong>of</strong> Power<br />

4. ***The group deeply dislikes delegat<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>and</strong> shar<strong>in</strong>g responsibility (i.e., control must<br />

be all or noth<strong>in</strong>g).<br />

vs<br />

The group appreciates the value <strong>in</strong> delegat<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>and</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g with fluid, power-shar<strong>in</strong>g relationships.<br />

5. ***The group believes <strong>in</strong> a top-down, pyramidal, <strong>and</strong> control-oriented style <strong>of</strong> management<br />

(i.e., lots <strong>of</strong> rules, checks, <strong>and</strong> surveillance).<br />

vs<br />

The group believes <strong>in</strong> a bottom-up style <strong>of</strong> management that encourages <strong>in</strong>itiative <strong>and</strong> selfcontrol<br />

among employees with m<strong>in</strong>imal reliance on formal rules <strong>and</strong> surveillance.<br />

6. The group is aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>and</strong> believes that it should be responsive to community concerns.<br />

vs<br />

***The group is oblivious to or ignores community concerns.<br />

12. ***The group cloaks its deliberations <strong>in</strong> the highest secrecy.<br />

vs<br />

The group is remarkably open about its deliberations with those outside the group.<br />

53. ***Power is concentrated with<strong>in</strong> a small subgroup.<br />

vs<br />

Power is dispersed across a wide range <strong>of</strong> constituencies <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest groups.<br />

82. The group believes that it should be responsive to employee concerns.<br />

vs<br />

***The group is oblivious to employee concerns (<strong>in</strong> extreme cases may even be hostile to<br />

employee concerns).<br />

Risk Aversion–Risk Tak<strong>in</strong>g<br />

25. ***Advocates <strong>of</strong> a more risk-tak<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess strategy hold the upper h<strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the<br />

group.<br />

vs<br />

Advocates <strong>of</strong> a more cautious strategy hold the upper h<strong>and</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the group.<br />

29. ***The group consists <strong>of</strong> visionaries driven to achieve extremely ambitious objectives.<br />

vs<br />

The group consists <strong>of</strong> “satisficers” content with adopt<strong>in</strong>g any acceptable option that<br />

comes along.<br />

50. The group attaches great importance to preserv<strong>in</strong>g traditional arrangements <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

vs<br />

***The group attaches no importance to preserv<strong>in</strong>g traditional arrangements <strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

62. ***The group pursues bold or high-risk <strong>in</strong>itiatives.<br />

vs<br />

The group acts <strong>in</strong> highly cautious or risk-averse ways.<br />

84. The leader has positioned himself/herself <strong>in</strong> the middle <strong>of</strong> the cont<strong>in</strong>uum <strong>of</strong> op<strong>in</strong>ion with<strong>in</strong><br />

the group.<br />

vs<br />

***The leader is identified with an extremist w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the group.<br />

87. ***There is a radical atmosphere <strong>in</strong> the group (i.e., reth<strong>in</strong>k old approaches, adopt new<br />

strategies <strong>and</strong> goals).<br />

vs<br />

There is a conservative (don’t-rock-the-boat) atmosphere <strong>in</strong> the group.


300 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

Additional Q-Sort Items<br />

2. There is a widely shared belief that leadership requires technical or scientific knowledge<br />

unique to that <strong>in</strong>dustry.<br />

vs<br />

The group has no use for technical or scientific knowledge.<br />

9. Communication with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ner circle <strong>of</strong> decision-makers is highly formal, with few breaches<br />

<strong>of</strong> protocol.<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs are raucous <strong>in</strong>formal affairs, with frequent <strong>and</strong> loud <strong>in</strong>terruptions (Note:<br />

Code as neutral if the meet<strong>in</strong>gs are orderly but relaxed.)<br />

13. <strong>Group</strong> members devote enormous attention to detail.<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members are oblivious to detail.<br />

14. The group believes <strong>in</strong> sophisticated <strong>and</strong> sensitive means <strong>of</strong> monitor<strong>in</strong>g trends, problems,<br />

<strong>and</strong> performance throughout the organization.<br />

vs<br />

The group does not place a priority on keep<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> touch with important trends <strong>and</strong> problems<br />

with<strong>in</strong> the organization.<br />

15. Members <strong>in</strong> good st<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the group must conform to strict norms <strong>in</strong> their personal lives<br />

(i.e., group membership implies hold<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> attitudes).<br />

vs<br />

The group tolerates a wide range <strong>of</strong> lifestyles among its members (i.e., how group members<br />

live is their own bus<strong>in</strong>ess).<br />

20. The group places enormous importance on public relations (i.e., appreciates the need to<br />

manipulate public perceptions <strong>of</strong> the group, the organization, <strong>and</strong> its products).<br />

vs<br />

The group is oblivious to these concerns.<br />

24. <strong>Group</strong> members compete <strong>in</strong> obsequious <strong>and</strong> sycophantic ways for the attention <strong>of</strong> the leader<br />

(i.e., members <strong>of</strong> the group have become fawn<strong>in</strong>g “yes-men”).<br />

vs<br />

The group consists <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> dom<strong>in</strong>ant (<strong>and</strong> approximately equally dom<strong>in</strong>ant) personalities.<br />

26. The group has achieved a balance <strong>of</strong> expertise from different functional doma<strong>in</strong>s critical to<br />

organizational survival (e.g., market<strong>in</strong>g, product design, manufactur<strong>in</strong>g, f<strong>in</strong>ance, law).<br />

vs<br />

One functional division <strong>of</strong> the organization dom<strong>in</strong>ates decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., key areas <strong>of</strong><br />

expertise are unrepresented).<br />

27. The group ab<strong>and</strong>ons well-reasoned policies at the first h<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> trouble or controversy (i.e.,<br />

no capacity to stay the course).<br />

vs<br />

The group sticks by well-reasoned policies even <strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> adversity.<br />

28. The group s<strong>in</strong>gle-m<strong>in</strong>dedly focuses on maximiz<strong>in</strong>g “bottom-l<strong>in</strong>e” or f<strong>in</strong>ancial performance <strong>in</strong>dicators.<br />

vs<br />

The group tries to balance many objectives <strong>in</strong> decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g (i.e., pr<strong>of</strong>itability is but one<br />

<strong>of</strong> many concerns).<br />

30. <strong>Group</strong> members represent a variety <strong>of</strong> constituencies <strong>and</strong> po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>of</strong> view.<br />

vs<br />

The group is remarkably homogeneous.<br />

33. Peculiar, even pathological, conduct by the leader is tolerated.<br />

vs<br />

Peculiar or pathological conduct is not tolerated.<br />

34. Interaction among group members is conf<strong>in</strong>ed to <strong>of</strong>ficial meet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>and</strong> work-related gather<strong>in</strong>gs.<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members know each other well <strong>and</strong> socialize together.


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 301<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

35. There is a genu<strong>in</strong>e common commitment to solv<strong>in</strong>g problems confront<strong>in</strong>g the group (i.e., a<br />

no-nonsense task-oriented feel<strong>in</strong>g to the group).<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members <strong>in</strong>vest little energy <strong>in</strong> their work.<br />

36. The group leader makes no secret <strong>of</strong> his/her policy preferences.<br />

vs<br />

Members are <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>in</strong> doubt as to exactly where the group leader st<strong>and</strong>s on important<br />

issues.<br />

42. The group attaches remarkably little importance to maximiz<strong>in</strong>g efficiency. (Note: This is<br />

not the same as pr<strong>of</strong>itability.)<br />

vs<br />

The group places enormous importance on maximiz<strong>in</strong>g efficiency.<br />

43. The group is amaz<strong>in</strong>gly tolerant <strong>of</strong> lackadaisical <strong>and</strong> shoddy performance.<br />

vs<br />

The group dem<strong>and</strong>s maximum effort <strong>and</strong> exceptional performance from executives, managers,<br />

<strong>and</strong> workers.<br />

44. The leader closely monitors the work <strong>of</strong> other group members.<br />

vs<br />

The leader has a laissez-faire govern<strong>in</strong>g style (i.e., leader allows wide lattitude <strong>in</strong> completion<br />

<strong>of</strong> responsibilities; pays no attention to how other group members manage their responsibilities).<br />

45. The group lavishes rewards upon a select few.<br />

vs<br />

The group has little tolerance for <strong>in</strong>come <strong>in</strong>equality with<strong>in</strong> the organization (i.e., tries to<br />

m<strong>in</strong>imize the gap between best <strong>and</strong> poorest paid employees).<br />

48. <strong>Group</strong> members have no f<strong>in</strong>ancial stake <strong>in</strong> the success or failure <strong>of</strong> the organization.<br />

vs<br />

<strong>Group</strong> members’ personal fortunes are completely l<strong>in</strong>ked to the success or failure <strong>of</strong> the organization.<br />

49. The group has a bewilder<strong>in</strong>g array <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation at its disposal; the amount <strong>and</strong> complexity<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation stra<strong>in</strong>s the capacity <strong>of</strong> even brilliant managers (e.g., a very rapidly<br />

chang<strong>in</strong>g bus<strong>in</strong>ess environment).<br />

vs<br />

The group has remarkably little to do (e.g., the <strong>in</strong>dustry is relatively static).<br />

52. The group functions like a th<strong>in</strong>k-tank (i.e., people pursue whatever projects <strong>in</strong>terest them,<br />

with no central coord<strong>in</strong>ation).<br />

vs<br />

The group functions like a Prussian military unit (i.e., everyone is assigned a well-def<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

project that fits <strong>in</strong>to a well-def<strong>in</strong>ed master plan).<br />

57. The group leader fails to deal with the succession problem.<br />

vs<br />

The leader has personally designated a successor or specified a procedure for identify<strong>in</strong>g one.<br />

61. The leader behaves <strong>in</strong> a stable, predictable manner.<br />

vs<br />

The group leader behaves <strong>in</strong> an unpredictable, even mercurial, manner.<br />

69. The group has a chaotic, seat-<strong>of</strong>-the-pants managerial style <strong>and</strong> structure (i.e., no rules,<br />

blurry l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> responsibility).<br />

vs<br />

The group has a crisp, organized managerial style <strong>and</strong> structure (i.e., explicit rules, clear<br />

l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> responsibility).<br />

77. The group acts impulsively (i.e., the group responds emotionally <strong>and</strong> rarely makes cont<strong>in</strong>gency<br />

plans).<br />

vs<br />

The group acts <strong>in</strong> a methodical <strong>and</strong> deliberate manner.<br />

80. A new generation <strong>of</strong> leadership has recently come to power.<br />

vs<br />

A new, fresh cohort <strong>of</strong> leaders is be<strong>in</strong>g systematically excluded.


302 PETERSON ET AL.<br />

APPENDIX B—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

85. The group can plausibly blame others for current woes (i.e., even outside observers agree<br />

that responsibility lies elsewhere).<br />

vs<br />

The group must accept responsibility for current woes (i.e., the group is be<strong>in</strong>g held accountable<br />

for their problems).<br />

86. The group consists <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>novative pioneers (i.e., people who have created new technologies,<br />

opened up new markets, etc.).<br />

vs<br />

The group consists <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essional managers <strong>and</strong> bureaucrats (i.e., people who have experience<br />

<strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g large organizations on steady trajectories).<br />

90. The most <strong>in</strong>fluential members <strong>of</strong> the group are poorly educated (i.e., little formal education<br />

or narrow technical tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g).<br />

vs<br />

The most <strong>in</strong>fluential members are extremely well-educated (i.e., advanced degrees from<br />

major universities).<br />

91. The group is confident that, even if its current plans fail, it will be “bailed out” by powerful<br />

protectors (i.e., the group believes there will be guaranteed rescue from its own <strong>in</strong>eptitude;<br />

little <strong>in</strong>centive to take on unpleasant tasks). (Note: protection could come from large cash<br />

reserves, government action, reputation, etc.)<br />

vs<br />

The group realizes it is “on its own” (i.e., success or failure depends on its own efforts <strong>and</strong><br />

failure could lead to bankruptcy or the fold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the organization).<br />

92. The leader respects the concerns <strong>and</strong> feel<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> other group members <strong>and</strong> honors private<br />

underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>gs with them.<br />

vs<br />

The leader shows contempt for other group members (i.e., may attempt to bully or <strong>in</strong>timidate<br />

them).<br />

94. The relationship between the group leader <strong>and</strong> other group members is remarkably easygo<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>and</strong> relaxed (i.e., people feel free to speak their m<strong>in</strong>ds, even to joke).<br />

vs<br />

The relationship is formal <strong>and</strong> tense (e.g., no spontaneity or humor).<br />

100. Virtually all we know about the group is based on speculative reconstruction <strong>of</strong> fragmentary<br />

evidence.<br />

vs<br />

There is a great deal <strong>of</strong> reliable evidence about the <strong>in</strong>ternal function<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the group.<br />

APPENDIX C<br />

Extreme Items for the Theoretical Ideal Types<br />

Ideal type Category Item Nos.<br />

<strong>Group</strong>th<strong>in</strong>k 1 1, 40, 72, 73, 88<br />

2 4, 8, 24, 31, 36, 37, 53, 68<br />

8 30, 34, 39, 60, 64, 66, 98, 99<br />

9 11, 38, 55, 74, 78<br />

Absolutist cult 1 1, 24, 33, 37, 83<br />

2 4, 12, 32, 53, 68, 88, 96, 99<br />

8 26, 58, 61, 64, 66, 74, 78, 98<br />

9 16, 39, 43, 60, 92<br />

Organization <strong>in</strong> decl<strong>in</strong>e 1 9, 22, 43, 50, 88<br />

2 5, 10, 19, 21, 40, 42, 46, 79<br />

8 6, 7, 29, 54, 58, 69, 77, 78<br />

9 25, 62, 64, 86, 87


TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS 303<br />

APPENDIX C—Cont<strong>in</strong>ued<br />

Ideal type Category Item Nos.<br />

Vigilant decision mak<strong>in</strong>g 1 16, 35, 66, 92, 98<br />

2 13, 26, 29, 30, 71, 74, 75, 78<br />

8 18, 19, 36, 37, 53, 68, 95, 99<br />

9 11, 40, 59, 81, 88<br />

Corporate social responsibility 1 6, 16, 30, 67, 92<br />

2 14, 20, 22, 26, 50, 51, 66, 98<br />

8 12, 18, 24, 45, 53, 81, 88, 93<br />

9 4, 5, 28, 32, 89<br />

Resource dependence 1 20, 58, 74, 85, 98<br />

2 22, 26, 31, 42, 54, 71, 78, 96<br />

8 10, 11, 17, 56, 63, 64, 77, 93<br />

9 19, 21, 65, 88, 91<br />

Prime organization 1 8, 35, 58, 75, 98<br />

2 1, 13, 14, 16, 22, 54, 74, 78<br />

8 4, 11, 19, 21, 55, 64, 88, 93<br />

9 17, 28, 69, 95, 99<br />

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