SOCIAL NORMS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR LAW
Bryan H. Druzin*
This paper follows the law and norms literature in arguing that
policymakers can use social norms to support or even replace
regulation. Key to the approach offered here is the idea—borrowed
from the folk theorem in game theory—that cooperative order can
arise in circumstances where parties repeatedly interact. This paper
proposes that repeated interaction between the same agents,
specifically the intensity of these interactions, may be used as a
yardstick with which to gauge the potential to scale back regulation
and use social norms as a substitute for law. Where there are very
high levels of repeated interaction between people, policymakers can
reduce regulation and then evaluate the emergent social order on a
case-by-case basis. The contribution of the paper to the law and
norms literature is that it proposes a practical technique to pinpoint
the precise areas of social discourse where the possibility of using
social norms as a substitute for law is most feasible—and perhaps
even more crucially, it highlights precisely where it is not.
INTRODUCTION
There is a war of ideology between those who support an expansive
role for government and those who wish to shrink it. Advocates of
state minimalism—those who wish to shrink it—often speak about
the ability of market forces to sustain social order and the normative
* Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of LL.M. Programs, Faculty of Law, The Chinese
University of Hong Kong. Ph.D. in Law, King’s College London; LL.M., LL.B., B.A., University
of British Columbia. I am deeply indebted to Eric Posner at the University of Chicago; Richard
Epstein at NYU; Bryan Mercuro and Eric Ip at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. My
deepest appreciation also to Andrew Simester at the University of Cambridge for reviewing a
much earlier draft of this paper. As well, the writing of this paper was helped greatly by Direct
Grant CUHK funding.
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benefits in doing so.1 In this sense, the market is put forward as an
alternative to government. This can be thought of as market-based
minimalism. There is a vast literature (much of it heterodox) arguing
that the functions of government may be provided by “the private
sector” and the “market.”2 These theorists often adopt a fiercely
ideological, strident tone in their condemnation of the state—rhetoric
that can be quite off-putting. While these voices often downplay or
simply discount the necessity of regulation,3 this does not, however,
imply that there are no benefits to be had from reducing the intensity
of legislation where possible. A crucial fact that must be understood
is that the law is already minimalist: it does not seek to regulate
every facet of human activity, nor could it. There exists a vast ocean
of informal social ordering that goes unregulated by the state.4 This
paper argues that we may go further in the direction of legal
minimalism,5 and that, crucially, market-based minimalism is not
the only game in town we can use to achieve this. It is possible to
embrace an entirely different notion of minimalism, one that involves
other kinds of “invisible hand” self-ordering. This broader vision is
captured by the law and norms literature, which examines law’s
relationship with social norms.6 Social ordering born from social
norms is all around us, from the spontaneously self-assigned seating
arrangements of students in a classroom, to the social rules of lining
up, or the complex customary law of prepolitical societies.7
1 Bryan Druzin, Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to Shrink the Size
of Law, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 59, 66–67 (2014).
2 CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS, AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE 56 (1998).
3 See id.
4 This ocean of informal social order is the subject of the literature on legal pluralism. It
may be better conceptualized as “normative pluralism”—semidiscrete normative orders that
exist in the shadow of “official” state law. Indeed, “[n]ormative pluralism is an everyday
experience for all of us (the rules of the road, of grammar, of our workplace, etc [sic]).” M.D.A.
FREEMAN, LLYOD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 926 (9th ed. 2014).
5 The term “legal minimalism” is found in the Postmodern Jurisprudence literature. See,
e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Postmodern Transition: Law and Politics, in THE FATE
OF LAW 105, 112, 113 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991) (discussing “the transition
from maximal law to minimal law”). It is used here, however, in a different, narrower sense.
6 For a good summary of the early law and norms literature, see Robert C. Ellickson, Law
and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 537–38 (1998). While the law
and norms literature is mostly entrenched in a homo economicus model of behaviour, it may be
distinguished from purely market-based approaches to self-ordering. See id. at 539, 541–42
(explaining how too many economic theories can overlook the importance of self-interested
individuals).
7 Social ordering of this kind has been defined as “normative order observed by a population,
having been formed by regular social behavior and the development of an accompanying sense
of obligation.” Gordon R. Woodman, A Survey of Customary Laws in Africa in Search of Lessons
for the Future, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 9, 10 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al.
eds., 2011) (employing the term “customary law”). See also H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
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Prominent legal theorists such as Robert Ellickson, Robert Cooter,
Dan Kahan, Lawrence Lessig, and Cass Sunstein advocate using
social norms as efficient alternatives to legal rules.8 As Richard
Posner argues, social norms may be “both a source of law and often a
cheap and effective substitute for law . . . .”9 Following the law and
norms literature, this paper argues that policymakers can harness
the energy of social norms in creating and sustaining social order.10
In contrast to market-based minimalism, we may think of this
approach as norm-based minimalism.
Norm-based minimalism as envisioned here comprises both strong
and weak versions.
These versions permit degrees of state
intercession: from a total absence of regulation, to the codification of
existing social patterns, to minor regulatory adjustments aimed at
correcting inefficiencies, to traditional top-down law.11 In adopting
such an approach, policymakers can take advantage of the natural
patterning of social norms. There is abundant evidence that social
norms can generate complex systems of cooperative order without the
need for a centralized coercive authority. Ellickson’s pioneering work
on cattle ranchers in Shasta County showed that agents who
frequently interact will tend to create cooperative systems that in fact
LAW 91–92 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing “custom” in relation to his primary rules). For a fantastic
treatment of custom and law, see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 181 (2010).
8 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
1 (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992) (noting that the diamond industry
has rejected traditional laws, and instead, use their own internal set of rules when handling
disputes); Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of
Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 215–16 (1994) (noting that courts can find
law through the form of community customs and norms); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 350, 351 (1997) (suggesting that the
relationship between the law and social influence could be utilized to aid in crime deterrence);
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 666 (1998) (suggesting that
norms have the power to offer a wider range of regulatory power than just laws alone); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996) (suggesting that
norms could help further the objectives of laws). See also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (noting the various
aspects of the relationship between the law and norms). But see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS 7–8 (2000) (cautioning against such approaches). However, it should be noted
that many of the law and norm scholars are better understood as advocating using social norms
merely as support for law rather than as endorsing minimalism. Nevertheless, many of their
arguments can be marshaled to support a minimalist approach to law.
9 Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. R.
365, 365 (1997).
10 Throughout, I use the terms “custom,” “customary order,” “customary law,” “bottom-up
order,” and “social norms” interchangeably.
11 Throughout, top-down law is contrasted with bottom-up law or bottom-up order—that is,
normative order not produced formally under the auspices of the state.
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maximize the aggregate welfare of the group.12 Agents, he explains,
who “repeatedly interact can generate [legal] institutions through
communication, monitoring, and sanctioning.”13 Informal social
norms are perfectly capable of producing all three of the core
functions of law: dispute resolution, rule formation, and
enforcement.14 Correctly harnessed, bottom-up social order can be
tremendously useful in that it can lighten the legislative and
enforcement burden on the state.15 Social norms do not need to be
legislated or enforced because they are self-producing and often
highly robust, internalized,16 and self-enforcing.17 Norm-based
minimalism capitalizes on this. Social norms are like an untapped
resource. Policymakers can exploit this resource, letting the natural
emergence of social order do much of, or in some cases, even all of the
heavy lifting. Yet this is not possible in many areas of law. Social
norms are not always able to produce stable ordering. Moreover,
even where social norms can generate bottom-up order, this social
patterning may be massively inefficient. As such, we need to know
exactly where there is at least the potential to utilize social norms
and where there is not. While the law and norms literature is rich,
it has yet to articulate a method by which to clearly identify the
precise areas of law predisposed to such an approach. This paper
proposes such a method.
Borrowing from game theory, this paper argues that repeated
interaction between the same agents, specifically the intensity of it,
12 See ELLICKSON, supra note 8, at 3–4 (“The end reached is exactly the one . . . predicted:
coordination to mutual advantage without supervision by the state.”).
13 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1366 (1993); see also Elinor
Ostrom et al., Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible, 86 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 404, 405 (1992) (outlining empirical support).
14 As Robert Cooter opines, the “utilitarianism of small groups has been demonstrated for
cattle ranchers, Chinese traders, medieval merchants, and modern merchant associations.
Research on property rights has revealed variety and detail in the political arrangements by
which small groups manage their assets.” Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 947, 950 (1997).
15 Indeed:
[I]t is widely held that strong social norms reduce the burden on law enforcement; that
laws supported by social norms are likely to be significantly more enforceable; and that
laws that are formulated in ways that are congruent with social norms are much more
likely to be enacted than laws that offend such norms.
Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 157,
159 (2000).
16 That is, participants feel emotionally obliged to observe these norms. Internationalization
is arguably the most socially powerful component of normative order. For a deeper discussion
of social norms and internalization, see id. at 159–60.
17 See id.; Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Customary Law, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 603, 611
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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may be used as a yardstick with which to gauge the potential to scale
back regulation, and allow social norms to shoulder more of the
burden of creating and sustaining social order. To this end,
policymakers may look to whether an area of law involves preexisting relationships of repeated interaction between the same
actors, using it as a heuristic to pinpoint where norm-based
minimalism is most viable and where it is not. The idea that repeated
interaction can generate cooperation is known in game theory as the
folk theorem.18 Cooperation, however, is only a possible result. The
presence of repeated play is hardly a guarantee that self-sustaining
cooperative equilibria will emerge or, perhaps even more
importantly, that such equilibria, where they do emerge, will be
normatively just and not simply entrench a social imbalance in
power.19 Where the emergent order is unjust or grossly sub-optimal,
the state has a vital role to play in pushing parties toward one
equilibrium over another.20
The characteristic of repeated
interaction between the same individuals is useful in that it indicates
the possibility of stable and efficient ordering.21 The less an area of
law possesses this quality, the weaker its ability to self-order.22
Where there are high levels of repeated play, policymakers can scale
back regulation and then evaluate the consequences on a case-bycase basis. Where results prove sub-optimal, regulation can simply
be reintroduced to whatever degree necessary. What distinguishes
the present thesis from the prior law and norms literature is the
concrete technique and taxonomy of law it provides. The paper
proposes a simple, yet reliable, technique to pinpoint the precise
areas of social discourse where the possibility of decreasing
regulation is most feasible. Law regulates a wide spectrum of human
activity: some of this activity entails repeated interaction and some
of it does not. The paper identifies the areas of law where cooperative
order might arise without, or with minimal state involvement.
However, equally as important, the paper identifies precisely where
such an approach is not possible.
While the discussion deals with the utilization of social norms to
ease the legislative and enforcement burden on the state, the
18 For a good summary of the Folk theorem, see KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY
SHORT INTRODUCTION 75–79 (2007).
19 See supra Part V.B.
20 See supra text accompanying note 142.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
22 See supra text accompanying note 108.
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ideological argument for minimalism is not litigated here.23 This is
not because the matter is closed to debate—far from it. Rather, I do
this because the ideological case for minimalism is not the paper’s
focus. The aim of the discussion is merely to articulate a technique
policymakers may use to gauge the possibility of scaling back
regulation. Whether doing so aligns with our broader social values
is another matter. For advocates of regulatory minimalism, the
discussion provides a practical tool to reduce regulation. For those
unsympathetic to the idea, the discussion will still be of interest in
that it clarifies where minimalism is simply not possible. A good way
to think of this paper is as a kind of conceptual roadmap. Like the
pathways on a map, the potential of norm-based minimalism is
explored and its limits are carefully charted. The paper proceeds as
follows. Part I lays out a basic model for norm-based minimalism.
Part II discusses the importance of repeated interaction in the
emergence of bottom-up social order.
Part III applies this,
differentiating areas of law with respect to the degree of repeated
interaction between private actors implied by those areas (if at all).
Part IV then details how the presence of repeated interaction may
serve as a guide to policymakers in assessing in what situations
norm-based minimalism may be most feasible. Part V then explores
some likely objections to the model.
I. TOWARDS A MODEL OF NORM-BASED MINIMALISM
In the literature, theorists do not usually distinguish clearly
between market-based and norm-based minimalism.24 To some
extent the distinction is present in the two antithetical wings of the
anarchist tradition: what can be thought of as libertarian anarchism,
which has gained recent intellectual ascendency, particularly in the
United States, and socialist anarchism, which has been more
predominant in Europe.25 While libertarian anarchism looks to the
market to sustain stateless order, the latter emphasizes the
importance of community and social forces in the formation of social
order.26 While socialist anarchism has not attracted much interest in
many decades, libertarian anarchism, on the other hand, has enjoyed
23 The ideological argument relates to issues of individual liberty and the implicit injustice
of state encroachment on this liberty. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43
TULSA L. REV. 825, 825 (2008).
24 Henceforth, where the term “minimalism” is used in isolation, it is meant to connote normbased minimalism as opposed to market-based minimalism.
25 MORRIS, supra note 2, at 61.
26 Id. at 61–62.
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a renaissance of late.27 In this view, as is the proclivity of economists,
society is conceptualized as a vast market and all forms of human
interaction are simply tossed into the bin of economic discourse.28
But this is not entirely accurate. While extremely useful, as with
most economic models, this is an overly-simplified paradigm. The
problem is much of human society is not accurately approximated by
microeconomic models.29 The market is just one example of a selfordering system (albeit one with properties that give it significant
heft). The idea of self-ordering (known as self-organization in the
hard sciences) is far more expansive.30 Self-ordering systems exist
everywhere, from the formation of migrating birds to the highlyorganized crystalline structure of snow.
For our purposes, differentiating between market-based and normbased minimalism is important because most areas of social
discourse in fact lack many of the technical properties of a “market”
as defined in mainstream economics (i.e. enforceable contracts,
clearly-articulated property rights, a market-based pricing
mechanism, or trade in the formal sense) yet we see the emergence
of highly complex, robust systems of social order bubbling up with
stunning regularity. The core idea of market-based minimalism is
that society will self-order around market principles.31 There may be
a case for this and many right-of-center libertarians make it;
however, this formal market dynamic is not always present and yet
there exists a massive amount of bottom-up ordering in our social
arrangements. Thus, if we can hone in on what fosters this social
Id. at 61, 74.
Id. at 63.
29 It should be noted that the advocates of market-based minimalism come mostly from
heterodox economic schools, such as the Austrian school of economics. See Druzin, supra note
1, at 71.
30 There is a lot of scientific work regarding self-organization, for example Heinz von
Foerster’s second generation cybernetic model, HEINZ VON FOERSTER, Ethics and Second-Order
Cybernetics, in UNDERSTANDING UNDERSTANDING: ESSAYS ON CYBERNETICS AND COGNITION
287, 303 (2003); Varela and Maturana’s theory of “autopoiesis,” HUMBERTO R. MATURANA &
FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND COGNITION, at xviii–xix (D. Reidel Publishing
Company 1980) (1972); and Ilya Prigogine’s thermodynamics of open systems and dissipative
structures, G. NICOLIS & I. PRIGOGINE, SELF-ORGANIZATION IN NON-EQUILIBRIUM SYSTEMS:
FROM DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES TO ORDER THROUGH FLUCTUATIONS 19, 24, 160 (1977). Swarm
intelligence is a fascinating concept related to self-organization in the biological realm.
Inspired by the collective “intelligence” of self-ordering systems such as ant and bee colonies,
the concept is being applied in artificial intelligence research. ERIC BONABEAU ET AL., SWARM
INTELLIGENCE: FROM NATURAL TO ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS, at xi–xii, 1 (1999). Very much related
to this is the concept of emergence in philosophy, systems theory, complexity theory, and
science. For a good, thorough examination of the concept, see JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE:
FROM CHAOS TO ORDER 11–12 (1998).
31 See Druzin, supra note 1, at 70–71.
27
28
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ordering, we can build a model for minimalism around an entirely
different principle. The principle in short is this: it has been wellestablished in game theory that cooperative social ordering can arise
in situations where there exists sufficient repeated interaction
between people.32 This is the well-known folk theorem in game
theory.
Drawing on this basic insight, the paper sets forth a framework for
norm-based minimalism based on the intensity of repeated
interaction between people. Law regulates a wide spectrum of
human activity: some of this activity entails repeated interaction
between individuals and some of it does not. Where there is repeated
interaction (and the ability to monitor the behavior of other people),
the folk theorem suggests it is possible to scale back formal regulation
and allow social norms to take up some or all of the slack of creating
and sustaining social order.33 Conversely, in areas of law that do not
involve repeated interaction between people, minimalism is not
possible—robust regulation is required to sustain social order.34
Thus, using this principle as a yardstick with which to measure the
built-in potential for self-ordering, the model identifies the areas of
law where norm-based minimalism may succeed and where it cannot.
Such an understanding may be extremely useful for those who wish
to minimize regulation—that is, those who advocate state
minimalism.
Michael Taylor has posited a similar thesis regarding the potential
of repeated interaction to fashion stateless social order, what he calls
“community.”35 Yet Taylor concludes that a stateless society is only
possible in “small and stable communities.”36 Unfortunately, this is
not the world in which we live.37 The present thesis adopts a more
32 In game theory, this has been extensively studied in the context of iterated games which
solve the prisoner’s dilemma. The economics literature alone is extremely large (not to say
anything of its application more broadly in the social sciences), thus I refer the reader to the
foundational work regarding this idea. See generally Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton,
The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390, 1390, 1392 (1981) (outlining various theories of
competition and cooperation, including those which emerge from repeated iterations of the
prisoner’s dilemma) [hereinafter Axelrod & Hamilton]; Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306, 307 (1981) (explaining the cooperation
will result if the players believe an indefinite number of interactions will follow).
33 BINMORE, supra note 18, at 79 (explaining that folk theorem indicates that an external
enforcement agency is not necessarily needed to foster cooperation in repeated interactions).
34 Id. (explaining that folk theorem requires repeated interaction and perfect observation of
the players involved in order to render external enforcement unnecessary).
35 See generally MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 2–3 (1982) (arguing
essentially that spontaneous cooperation emerges in repeated interactions).
36 Id. at 94.
37 Indeed, Taylor himself seems to have little optimism regarding the implementation of his
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practical turn, arguing that this insight may still be of great use even
in a large fragmented society. It applies this idea to identifying
pockets of human discourse presently subjected to regulation that
involve people repeatedly interacting with one another. Armed with
this insight, regulation in these areas may be selectively scaled back
in a strategic fashion, allowing bottom-up ordering to take the reins.
Because not all social behavior flawlessly tracks a market model, we
cannot count on a market-based model as a universal foundation for
minimalism. However, provided certain structural dynamics are
present, what we can count on is the force of social norms. The
paper’s thesis contributes to a much broader conversation regarding
the perceived over-intrusiveness of government regulation—a subject
of intense debate both in Europe and the United States38—by offering
a pragmatic solution to the “problem” of the state that may be
realistically implemented.
A deeper discussion on repeated
interaction is provided in the following section. Here, it is sufficient
to simply note its central role in our thesis. The purpose of the
remainder of this section, rather, is to unpack the concept of social
order driven by social norms.
The idea of this kind of social ordering is extremely counterintuitive. Conventional wisdom suggests that order needs to be
designed and imposed, if not through the vehicle of formal law, then
at least by some other kind of authority. Yet theorists from a broad
range of disciplines reject this Hobbesian hypothesis, asserting that
social order may evolve in the absence of the State.39 The legal
centrist40 belief that social order is to be conceived of in terms of
external coercion “has become so ingrained in the popular
imagination that the position has become almost axiomatic—almost
own theory. Id. at 139.
38 See, e.g., Over-regulated America, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 9 (providing
examples of overregulation in the United States); Mary Ellen Synon, Face the Facts Europe is
Going Bust, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 20, 2006, at 14 (noting that too much regulation is affecting the
European economy).
39 While nowhere near a comprehensive list, in the field of law, see ELLICKSON, supra note
8, at 4–5; Cooter, supra note 8, at 215–16. In economics, see 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 2–3 (1973). See also MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY,
AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 1024 (2d ed. 2009) (concluding that while it
may seem as though intervention by the government imposes order within the community, it
is not necessarily always the case).
40 For an overview of the concept of legal centrism including evidence that refutes this belief,
see generally ELLICKSON, supra note 8, at 138–47 (highlighting the tradition of legal centrism
as well as refutable evidence of the belief). E.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 20–21 (1985)
(offering a brief discussion on the tradition of legal centrism).
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unassailable in its legitimacy.”41 But it is simply not true. Most
social order is not created through an overarching authority—it
arises spontaneously. Indeed, some of the most sophisticated forms
of social order on earth are found among the social insects: the wasps,
the ants, the bees.42 And so it is with much human social order. The
idea that complex systems of social order may be self-generating is
captured by the concept of spontaneous order.43 The economist
Friedrich Hayek wrote extensively on the idea. He argued that there
are two ways in which order may originate: “made” and “grown”
order.44 By “made” order, Hayek meant order that was imposed from
above by some hierarchical overlord promulgating rules: a state, a
monarch, a tribal leader, etc.45 By “grown” order, he meant order that
arises spontaneously through individuals’ actions, yet not as the
result of any centrally-planned coordination.46 It is not difficult to
find earlier traces of the idea of spontaneous order in the theories of
Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Edmund Burke.47
Of these, perhaps Smith is best known for advancing this position.
Smith famously posits a theory of spontaneous order—an “invisible
hand” that guides the market place.48
Top-down regulation of social order can be problematic. In its effort
to order society, the state often over-regulates, arguably creating
more harm than good in the process. An ocean of law has flooded into
the social relationships and institutions within which people live
their lives.49 We arguably live in a more legalistic society than at any
point in human history. This is perhaps most obvious in the case of
41 Bryan H. Druzin, Opening the Machinery of Private Order: Public International Law as a
Form of Private Ordering, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 423, 430 (2014).
42 THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORDER 3 (Michael Hechter & Christine Horne eds., 2d ed. 2009).
43 The term “spontaneous order” is usually used to describe social and economic selfordering, while “self-organization” (mentioned previously) is typically reserved for the
emergence of order in systems of a physical or biological nature.
44 HAYEK, supra note 39, at 37 (“The grown order, on the other hand, which we have referred
to as a self-generating or endogenous order, is in English most conveniently described as a
spontaneous order.”). Similarly, Lon Fuller distinguishes between what he calls “horizontal
forms of order” and “vertical dimension” imposed by the State. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 233 (16th prtg. 1979).
45 See HAYEK, supra note 39, at 37.
46 Id.
47 Norman Barry, The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, 5 LITERATURE LIBERTY 7, 8, 9, 21,
23, 25 (1982), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1303/0353-18_1982v2_Bk.pdf; Timothy
Sandefur, Some Problems with Spontaneous Order, 14 INDEP. REV. 5, 7 (2009).
48 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 400 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1981) (1910) (“[H]e
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
of his intention.”).
49 But see Mila Sohoni, The Idea of “Too Much Law”, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1586–87,
1591 (2012) (disputing the notion that regulations have grown too numerous).
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overcriminalization in the criminal law.50 However, a strong case
could be made that this problem extends to all corners of law and
across many jurisdictions: a general spirit of regulatory intervention
prevails. It is only that with the case of overcriminalization that the
problem has grown so extreme that it has drawn attention.51 From a
public policy perspective, value could be gleaned by scaling back the
degree of legal intervention and allowing bottom-up ordering to
unfold unhindered. Yet we must be careful to not oversimplify the
matter. It would be naïve to assume that relying upon natural
ordering to sustain social order is always realistic. The trick is in
knowing where and to what extent we can safely defer to the ordering
force of social norms, and where we need to impose legal order
through the instruments of formal regulation.
Knowing the
structural limitations of minimalism is thus vital for our project. As
one scholar so insightfully points out: “Law is not the foundation of
social order but a remedy for the deficiencies of custom.”52 We need
to learn how to more deftly use this remedy. To the uninitiated, law
may seem like a relatively straightforward affair: simply write down
the rules and then apply them. Yet to those of us who actually create,
apply, practice, or study the law, reality is far messier. The law is a
highly complex, continually evolving system of inter-related
principles and rules. Because the state assumes a monopoly on
coercive authority, these rules typically proceed “top down,” however,
this need not always be the case. The question we need to ask is what
stimulates and sustains bottom-up order? For this we need to
understand the important role that repeated interaction plays in this
process.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REPEATED INTERACTION IN THE
EMERGENCE OF BOTTOM-UP ORDER
The key to norm-based minimalism is not the machinery of the
market—rather it is the principle of repeated interaction. Agents
that repeatedly interact naturally generate rules to regulate their
50 See SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 21
(1987). There is a growing body of very interesting scholarship within criminal law in relation
to the problem of overcriminalization, for a good introduction to this literature, see id. at 21–
61.
51 See id. at 21.
52 James Bernard Murphy, Habit and Convention at the Foundation of Custom, in THE
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 53, 76 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds.,
2007).
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interactions.53 This may spawn a market dynamic, but this is not
necessary. As already discussed, game theorists have widely noted
that repeated interaction can induce cooperative order (the folk
theorem).54 This holds true across a broad range of social dynamics
captured in game theory.55 The paradigmatic illustration of the
potential for stable cooperation to emerge even in the face of chaotic
uncertainty and a paucity of trust is the well-studied prisoner’s
dilemma. An absence of repeated interaction in the prisoner’s
dilemma invariably drives the participants towards equilibriums of
noncooperation and disorder, yet, with the mere introduction of
repeated play, the same game is capable of producing stable
cooperative order.56 Repeated interaction allows for the possibility of
sophisticated forms of coordination because the shadow of future
encounters can foster a cooperative equilibrium.57 In real-life
settings, even those that resemble the prisoner’s dilemma, social
relationships are typically open-ended and so the mere possibility of
future interaction helps nurture bottom-up order.58 Even where
future interaction is certain to not occur, the reflexive behaviour of
individuals can go far in inducing the emergence of order. Human
behaviour is not always perfectly calculated: Because we are so
habituated to repeatedly interacting with others, cooperative
behaviour is largely ingrained, and thus, often arises reflexively even
where there is no possibility of future interaction, that is, even in oneshot interactions. Indeed it is very difficult to imagine a life where
one encountered all other persons just once, never experiencing a
second interaction.
Repeated interaction is the lynchpin to stable bottom-up social
order. Indeed, many contend that repeated games provide the
foundational constituent of social order.59 Various mechanisms
permitted by repeated interaction help sustain informal order. As a
stick, individuals can rely on the threat of retaliation and
53 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1646–47 (1996).
The dynamic is fleshed out more cleanly in terms of game theory infra.
54 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
55 See generally GEORGE J. MAILATH & LARRY SAMUELSON, REPEATED GAMES AND
REPUTATIONS: LONG-RUN REPUTATIONS 1–8 (2006) (discussing the application of repeated
interactions in regards to prisoner’s dilemma, oligopolies, and the product-choice game).
56 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, in THEORIES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra
note 42, at 175, 178, 179.
57 See ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 308, 309 (1991).
58 See id.
59 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 299 (Jens Beckert & Milan
Zafirovski eds., 2006).
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reputational costs as ex post enforcement mechanisms to promote
rule compliance.60 The carrot of mutual gain can animate cooperative
relationships, strengthening the social rules that emerge.61 The
crucial constituent of monitoring the behaviour of others is possible
where there is repeated interaction. Overtime, these patterns of
social order usually become internalized, strengthening their
dominion.62 All of this has been extensively studied by game
theorists. Game theorists focus specifically on the emergence of
cooperation.63 For our purposes, we may conceptualize this as rulesystems for where there is stable cooperation; by definition this
means there are rules of a formal or informal nature.
That repeated interaction disciplines social behavior is actually not
that extraordinary. It happens all the time, and there is nothing
particularly magical about it. It is common sense: the more people
regularly interact, the more fixed standards of behavior emerge. In
the case of small groups, we see the folk theorem at work quite
clearly. In small, homogenous groups where there is a high level of
repeated interaction, natural enforcement mechanisms can often be
counted on to foster and sustain social order.64 Indeed, it is important
to note that these relationships need not be binary relationships
between just two individuals. They may include multiple actors
60 See Thomas C. Scott-Phillips, Evolutionary Stable Communication and Pragmatics, in
LANGUAGE, GAMES, AND EVOLUTION: TRENDS IN CURRENT RESEARCH ON LANGUAGE AND GAME
THEORY 117, 125 (Anton Benz et al. eds., 2011).
61 See id.
62 Such social order is internalized where people “feel an emotional or psychological
compulsion to obey the norms . . . .” Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1708, 1709 (1996).
63 MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 133 (1994).
Although there is no guarantee that the equlibria that emerges from repeated interaction will
be optimal in terms of social welfare, our basic notions of justice, and so forth, the idea that
repeated interaction can produce stable equilibria in games of various kinds is extensively
written upon. For a concise and not overly-technical overview, see id.at 133–62.
64 This has been written on extensively. For this idea, see, for example, ELLICKSON, supra
note 8, at 123 (discussing the cooperation in close-knit communities); Bernstein, supra note 8,
at 115 (discussing the success of an internal set of rules in regulating the diamond industry);
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1724, 1725 (2001) (noting the fluid
functioning of the cotton industry under a mostly private system of laws since the mid-1800’s);
Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 202, 202, 203 (1997) (finding that trade coalitions in California flourished in the
1800s under private regulations); David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law:
A Historical Case, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1979) (noting the survival of medieval Icelandic
institutions where law enforcement was mostly done privately); Avner Greif, Reputation and
Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 859
(1989) (discussing how traders benefitted from being part of an organization that was selfregulated).
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loosely interacting with each other. While bottom-up order is
produced most robustly by two parties repeatedly interacting,
repeated interaction within small groups is often sufficient to produce
strong social norms.65 In such cases, formal law plays a less
important role. However, in larger groups where participants do not
repeatedly interact, the legislative and enforcement mechanisms of
formal law are critical to maintaining social order.66 Frequently
repeated interaction of a binary nature will often yield the greatest
capacity to produce stable bottom-up order built on strong social
norms, because the intensity of repetition can be very high.67 All the
necessary ingredients—monitoring, reciprocity, retaliation—are
robustly present.68 As numbers grow, this becomes less the case.
Small groups also demonstrate this capacity; however, because
repeated interaction is less intense, this is to a less robust extent.69
Very large groups that experience virtually no repeated interaction
between the same agents, however, fare the worse.70 They lack this
capacity—only custom of an extremely weak kind (generated by
scattered pockets of repeated interactors) will emerge.71 We must be
careful to distinguish custom from more robust and comprehensive
forms of normative ordering. Custom is best understood as the
inchoate traces of order, like wisps of smoke floating at a distance
from a raging fire.72
Extending this logic, this paper simply points out that some areas
of social activity regulated by law capture this crucial dynamic in that
they possess a high degree of repeated interaction between the same
agents, while other areas of law do not exhibit any degree of it, or
markedly less so. Repeated interaction is a powerful engine of
bottom-up social ordering. If repeated interaction is not present,
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Bryan H. Druzin, Planting Seeds of Order: How the State Can Create, Shape, and Use
Customary Law, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 (2014). Social dilemma research clearly shows that
cooperation decreases in large groups. See, e.g., David De Cremer & Geoffrey J. Leonardelli,
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas and the Need to Belong: The Moderating Effect of Group Size,
7 GROUP DYNAMICS THEORY RES. & PRAC. 168, 169 (2003) (noting that past research has found
that cooperation goes down in larger groups); Norbert L. Kerr, Illusions of Efficacy: The Effect
of Group Size on Perceived Efficacy in Social Dilemmas, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
287, 309 (1989) (stating that cooperation decreases in large groups).
67 Druzin, supra note 66, at 377, 380–81.
68 See Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 32, at 1395; Druzin, supra note 66, at 381–82;
Ellickson, supra note 13, at 1366.
69 See Druzin, supra note 66, at 382–83.
70 Id. at 383–84.
71 For a more a more detailed discussion of the ability of small groups to produce stable social
ordering vis-à-vis larger groups, see id. at 382–84.
72 See infra Part V.B for a discussion about custom.
65
66
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robust bottom-up order simply cannot arise. This simple insight is
useful because we can use it to construct a model for minimalism that
may guide legislators.
III. LAW MAY BE DISTINGUISHED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
EXTENT THAT IT INVOLVES REPEATED INTERACTION
BETWEEN PARTIES
Having discussed the importance of repeated interaction in terms
of fostering informal rule-systems, we are now in a position to
consider the conceptual implication that flow from this. The folk
theorem asserts that cooperative social order can arise where there
exists repeated interaction between the same agents.73 The fact that
repeated interaction maximizes the potential for self-ordering—as
the folk theorem establishes—introduces an important conceptual
distinction. Law may be classified with reference to the extent that
it involves repeated interaction between parties. Some forms of law
relate to areas of behaviour that concern existing relationships of
repeated interaction between the same agents.74 Other areas of law
only tangentially so, or do not concern interaction between
individuals at all.75 Where there is repeated interaction between
agents, the folk theorem can be applied; where there is no interaction,
it cannot.76 This implies that certain areas of law are categorically
more predisposed to bottom-up ordering than others.
This distinction is broadly captured by the civil law division
between private and public law. Private law involves relationships
between individuals; public law concerns individuals’ relationship
with government.77 In the case of private law, where these
relationships are repeated interactions between the same agents, it
is possible to apply the folk theorem and all that it entails.78 Areas
of public law, however, do not allow for the application of the folk
theorem in that such areas do not involve interactions between
private parties, let alone repeated interactions.79 This allows us to
See, BINMORE, supra note 18, at 79.
See HILAIRE BARNETT, UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC LAW 1 (2010).
75 See id.
76 See BINMORE, supra note 18, at 76–79 (providing an example of how the folk theorem is
applicable to individuals).
77 BARNETT, supra note 74, at 1.
78 See BINMORE, supra note 18, at 79 (explaining how the folk theorem is successful when
applied repeatedly to individuals).
79 See id. at 77–79; see also BARNETT, supra note 74, at 1 (explaining that public law does
not cover the regulation of private individuals).
73
74
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hone in on which areas of law that are most hospitable to norm-based
minimalism. We can make the general claim that public law
precludes the application of the folk theorem because it does not
involve interaction between individuals, and private law allows for it
because it does involve interaction between individuals. In this
respect, the distinction between private and public law is
tremendously useful. Yet while this classification applies generally,
it is not perfect. For example, some areas of public law actually relate
indirectly to interactions between private parties. This is the case
with, for example, the criminal law and aspects of constitutional
law.80 Making this more confusing, while private law concerns
interactions between individuals, these interactions are often not
repeated, rendering such areas completely unreceptive to the folk
theorem. Interaction must be repeated—the more frequently the
better.81 Thus, the question we need to ask is really this: to what
degree does a specific area of law involve relationships of frequent
and repeated interaction between the same actors? The more
intensely this is the case, the more this area of law will be receptive
to the folk theorem.
This is really a matter of degree and so is best conceptualized as a
continuum rather than a sharp divide. Understanding this as a
continuum rather than in stark binary terms is elaborated upon
below. For now, however, it is sufficient to merely note that areas of
law can be distinguished generally in terms of the degree of repeated
interaction between the same agents they involve. It may be useful
at this point to import new terms into the discussion. I will refer to
the extent that they may be characterized by frequent and repeated
interaction between the same agents as how interactive the area of
law is.82 Highly interactive law relates to law that regulates existing
relationships of interaction between individuals that are frequently
repeated.83 Examples would include many commercial relationships,
familial relationships, long-term contractual relationships, work
relationships, and other such social arrangements that relate to
frequent repeated interaction between the same parties. These
represent pockets of social discourse that involve the same people
repeatedly interacting with one another. This can be clearly
See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
Interaction is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition.
82 I use the terms interactive because it relates to the degree that agents are interacting
with each other.
83 See BARNETT, supra note 74, at 1 (noting areas of law governing relationships between
individuals).
80
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distinguished from areas of law that do not concern relationships
between people and so do not directly relate to interaction (let alone
repeated interaction)—for example, paying income tax and the
procedures to obtain a patent. Because these areas of law do not
directly relate to repeated interactions between the same parties, the
folk theorem and all it entails simply cannot track this dynamic.
Areas of law such as immigration or tax law are not interactive.
Indeed, such areas of law have no (or only oblique) connection to
interactions between private parties.84 Because in very large groups
there is no repeated interaction (or very little of it), law that does not
possess this interactive character needs to be centrally created.85
Thus, the state (or some centralized authority) is required to create
and sustain a great deal of social order in large societies. With giant
masses of disconnected parties that do not repeatedly interact, selfordering is simply not possible.86 The state is necessary to step in
and create legal order.87 Without the state (or some version of
centralized power), such systems languish perpetually within a
condition of social disorder unable to self-organize.88 For law that is
not interactive, the state is required to formulate these rules; such
rules cannot otherwise ever get off the ground.89 However, this does
not mean that the state is necessary to create all forms of social order.
That areas of law can be distinguished with reference to how
interactive they are is theoretically significant because it leads to the
conclusion that certain areas of law are more predisposed to the
emergence of bottom-up ordering than others. This, of course, has
obvious implications for minimalism. It provides us with an entirely
84 There are exceptions of course, for example, sales tax in commercial transactions between
individuals, etc. But, it is not controversial to say that tax law, for the most part, concerns the
individual’s relationship with the State rather than with other individuals. People’s
relationships with each other are merely dragged into this state-individual regulation.
85 See Bryan Druzin, Law Without the State: The Theory of High Engagement and the
Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order Within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 559,
587 (2010) (noting that some laws infrequently have repeat involvement, thus necessitating
state involvement).
86 See S. R. EPSTEIN, FREEDOM AND GROWTH: THE RISE OF STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE,
1300-1750, at 8 (2000) (noting that a joint monopolist is far better than decentralised
monopolists because the later cannot coordinate the group as a whole).
87 See id. at 8–9 (examining the use of political regimes as a positive force for facilitating
cooperation and mutual advantage). The state is also vital in sustaining social rules;
preventing defection through the threat of coercive enforcement. See HART, supra note 7, at 91
(noting that even in societies governed by customs instead of law there still must be restrictions
on unwanted behavior, such as violence and theft).
88 See EPSTEIN, supra note 86, at 8 (noting that without a centralized monopoly, the public
suffers from various coordination failures).
89 See Druzin, supra note 85, at 560–61 (noting that many laws require the backing of the
state in order to be effective).
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fresh set of criteria with which to assess the potential and limits of
minimalism. Because interactive law involves individuals repeatedly
interacting with each other it is more susceptible to degrees of selfordering. The greater the degree of repeated interaction, the greater
the area of law’s potential to self-order. Let us now look at how we
can use this on a practical level.
IV. USING THE CHARACTERISTIC OF HOW “INTERACTIVE”
THE LAW IS AS A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS
In this section, I will discuss how the presence of repeated
interaction may serve as a guide to policymakers in assessing in what
situations minimalism may be most viable. What is offered here is a
heuristic to “cash in” on the energy of bottom-up order. The
characteristic of repeated interaction may be marshaled as a kind of
marker to identify where the state can and cannot realistically adopt
policies in the direction of minimalism. Law that relates to behaviour
characterized by a high level of repeated interaction is fertile soil for
bottom-up order. In contrast, where there is no repeated interaction,
norm-based minimalism really has no hope. Thus, policymakers can
look to the presence of repeated interaction, specifically the intensity
of it, as an indication that there exists the potential for a minimalist
approach—the greater the repetition, the greater this potential.
A. Strong and Weak Minimalism
With highly interactive areas of law, the state can defer to the force
of social norms and contemplate a less interventionist tack. Repeated
interaction helps build coordinating structures (i.e. rules) and lift
men from the blind morass of social disorder.90 Thus contract law,
for example, does not need the state for rule-formation to the same
degree as other forms of law. It is very good at producing rule-based
order precisely because the parties engage in some degree of repeated
interaction.91 This is particularly true in the case of long-term
contracts. Law is needed to set forth and enforce basic property
rights; however, the element of repeated interaction implicit in such
dealings profoundly reduces the need for top-down law—it does not
need the hand of the state to press down quite as hard. Indeed, this
is true for a great deal of commercially-oriented law where
Druzin, supra note 85, at 586–87.
In that the parties can draw up their own terms that the State will then enforce, it is
crafted to achieve precisely this outcome.
90
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individuals repeatedly deal with each other.92
All of this has practical implications for the State’s role as a
producer of social order. The question before us is to what extent can
policymakers make use of social norms and rely less upon top-down
law? Our answer is that the state can favor a more minimalist tack
in areas of law that are more interactive, taking advantage of the selfordering tendencies of such systems. Policymakers can achieve this
by adopting whatever degree of minimalism is viable given how
interactive the area of law is. As this is really a continuum, different
areas of law will allow for different degrees of minimalism.
Minimalism may come in both weak and strong versions. Strong
minimalism is (1) complete noninterference: if the existing pattern of
rules is already optimal (or simply sufficiently functional) there is no
need for legislators to regulate it. It can be just left alone. Of course
the state already does this to a vast and acknowledged extent—the
proposal here is simply that the state may do this more. To take an
extreme example, there is no need to regulate walking patterns.
Simple yet ubiquitous social rules are more than sufficient to
efficiently order massive flows of people through our cities. Indeed,
foot traffic is a simple but excellent illustration of relatively efficient
bottom-up order. There is no such thing as the law of foot traffic. It
does not require regulation.93 While the efficiency of foot traffic in
large congested cities may arguably be improved upon thorough
regulation, the legislative and enforcement burden on the state would
be tremendous, rendering such a proposal ridiculous. A less strong
version of norm-based minimalism is (2) codification. Here the state
simply grants formal recognition to an informal pattern of social
order. Existing customary rules are merely given enforcement teeth
to preempt occasional shifts in incentive structures that may
undermine compliance.94 These sanctions often need not be very
extreme, or in cases where actors are merely trying to coordinate, but
92 This has obvious implications for the evolution of the new law merchant, private law
theory, and the rise of transnational law, more generally where the role of the State is
increasingly minimized. This is expanded upon below. See infra Part IV.C; see also Druzin,
supra note 85, at 586 (positing a theory of “high engagement” that attempts to account for the
ability of commercial law to grow in a transnational context without resorting to a central
legislative authority).
93 This is not the case, however, with vehicular or flight traffic, which is heavily regulated.
94 It should also be noted that the mere act of codifying an existent system of rules is in itself
socially useful in that it clarifies the rules for participants already willing to comply but unable
to perfectly coordinate (a coordination game as it is called in game theory). This is a largely
unappreciated aspect to codification—one completely unrelated to the coercive power of law.
For a fascinating treatment of this idea, see Richard H. McAdams, The Legal Construction of
Norms: A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1712 (2000).
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are unable due to a lack of clarity as to what the social rules are,
codification alone may be sufficient.
A far weaker form of
minimalism is (3) modification. Here legislators tweak the social
patterns on a structural level in order to correct minor inefficiencies
while allowing the bulk of the system to function mostly untouched
by regulation. Finally, a fourth option, always available, is (4) to
simply engage in full and expansive top-down regulation.
A good example of a situation where a small modification may reap
huge benefits is where there is imperfect monitoring. Suppose, for
example, parties engaging in repeated interactions are sufficiently
patient but lack the ability to detect perfectly whether the counterparty shirked. In such situations, some classic results suggest that
there will be inefficient punishment along the equilibrium path.95
This invariably undermines stable social ordering. Such systems,
although they possess repeated interaction, may give rise to free
riding, the existence of which will undermine bottom-up social
ordering.96 With very small groups, the free rider problem is
overcome through informal enforcement mechanisms implicit in
social cooperation (i.e. being kicked out of the group or ostracized,
etc.).97 However, as the size of the group grows larger and monitoring
more difficult, free riding may become harder to prevent.98 Thus, we
may have a fully-functional system of social order that, because the
number of participants is growing, the system is threatening to
collapse as more and more free riders leech its benefits without
contributing. In such situations, policymakers can nudge equilibria
onto a path of stable ordering by simply enhancing the players’ ability
to monitor. Imagine, for example, a successful community watch
program in a small town that emerged on an informal and voluntary
basis being undermined by free riding as there is an influx of new
95 See generally Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under
Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 88 (1984) (noting inefficient punishment in
collusion).
96 See Talia Fisher, Separation of Law and State, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 457–58
(2010).
97 See Lars Udéhn, Twenty-five Years with The Logic of Collective Action, 36 ACTA
SOCIOLOGICA 239, 244 (1993).
98 Id. at 240. For the foundational work on this problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 3 (20th prtg. 2002) (arguing
that as group size increases, the problem of free riding will grow in relation to nonexcludable
public goods). The core problem with informal social sanctions “is that they are, themselves,
collective goods subject to a collective action problem.” Udéhn, supra note 97, at 246. See
Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and the Second-Order Free-Rider Problem, 1
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 78, 98 (1989); Pamela Oliver, Rewards and Punishments as Selective
Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1356, 1368 (1980).
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residents. Previously, the ordering was able to emerge because of the
repeated interaction of these neighbors and the ability to monitor
compliance. However, participants may be tempted to cease
contributing if they believe that other members of the group may be
free riding, something they can no longer be sure of due to the
inability to monitor such large numbers. Codification without
sanctions will achieve very little in this situation, as this will not
discourage free riding. Codification with sanctions against free riders
would resolve the problem in a straightforward fashion. However, a
remedy where participation is forced through the threat of formal
sanctions may prove unacceptably paternalistic.
As such,
modification in the form of improving monitoring may be more
appropriate. For example, a registry system that publicly records
participation could be established by local government. By simply
strengthening monitoring, social norms could still be efficiently
harnessed while top-down regulation is kept to a minimum.
Choosing between weak and strong minimalism is comparable to
medical treatment.99 An experienced physician knows how to work
with the human body. Mostly, this is achieved by simply not
hindering the body’s ability to grow, function, and heal itself
(noninterference). However, sometimes for the body to heal it
requires some gentle intervention—a well-placed splint or cast
around a broken arm (codifying). Sometimes, however, a medical
emergency may require a more drastic measure—invasive surgery to
remove a cancerous tumor (modification). However, in every case,
the experienced physician adopts a minimalist approach unless
absolutely necessary, relying on the body’s natural functioning
wherever possible. Much like a physician, the state can exploit the
natural emergence of bottom-up order—learn how to work with it. If
done skillfully, the state can deftly shift much of the burden and
complexity of legal creation to the participants themselves. The
minimalist approach is quite apparent with the classical theory of
contract, which discourages courts and legislatures from encroaching
upon the autonomy of the contracting parties,100 preferring instead to
99 For a similar analogy regarding gardening, see Druzin, supra note 1, at 60, 62
(articulating a detailed taxonomy of legislative strategies to achieve what the author refers to
as “legislative minimalism”).
100 See Harry N. Schreiber, Introduction, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1–2
(Harry N. Schreiber ed., 1998). The presence of repeated interaction in contractual dealings
demonstrates clearly an area of law where the State can adopt a less interventionist approach.
In many respects, this supports the laissez-faire liberal vision of contract. This does not,
however, necessarily entail a complete lack of regulation, merely the opportunity to scale back
the degree and vigor in which the State presently regulates. Clearly, private parties will still
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allow the parties involved, governed by rational self-interest, to
regulate their own affairs (subject to some basic legal constraints).101
Similarly, in other highly interactive areas of law, the state could
potentially adopt the same kind of hands-off approach, allowing the
self-ordering machinery of interactive law to shoulder as much of the
burden of legal creation and enforcement as possible. However,
regardless of which approach is adopted—noninterference,
codification, or modification—the first step is to know where
minimalism, as a general policy, is even viable. A reliable way to
gauge this is by considering how interactive the particular area of
law is.
B. Identifying the Areas of Law Predisposed to Minimalism
An important point is that the present model is useful for both the
advocates of minimalism and those not persuaded that there is value
in such an approach. To the extent that the model identifies the
limits to minimalism’s scope of application, it is of value in that it
clarifies where top-down law is indispensable. As the degree of
repeated interaction decreases, the State’s role in legal creation
becomes increasingly more vital.102 As already discussed, this is best
understood as a continuum. On one end of this continuum (the highly
interactive end) are areas of private law such as family law with its
well-established relationships of repeated interaction.103 Indeed,
areas of law that traditionally fall under private law tend to be
interactive, some extremely so. These relationships would exist in
the absence of the state. Indeed, they are antecedent to the state and
existed in prepolitical societies.
prefer the extra security of detailed long-term agreements, enforceable in court or through
arbitration.
101 RICHARD STONE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACT 6 (Routledge 10th ed. 2013). Under the
banner of self-regulation and freedom of contract, the courts are generally very reluctant to
interfere with the parties’ agreement. RYAN MURRAY, CONTRACT LAW—THE FUNDAMENTALS
90 (2008).
102 This can be read as a structural argument for government beyond the standard
justifications for the State: for example, as a solution to collective action problems, such as free
riding and the tragedy of the commons, etc.
103 See infra Figure 1.
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_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Figure 1. A selection of areas of private law with respect to the level of frequent and repeated
interaction between the same agents (i.e. how interactive it is). The classification, however,
breaks down with respect to tort law in that it discourages repeated interaction.
Here we see areas of law such as family law, contract law,
employment law, many aspects of commercial law,104 and to a far
lesser extent, aspects of real property.105 In that they involve preestablished relationships of frequent and repeated interaction
between the same agents, these areas of law are more inclined to
minimalism.
On the other end of our continuum, we see areas of law where the
dynamic of repeated interaction between the same individuals is not
present in the same way, if at all—for example, constitutional law,
immigration law, and most other areas of administrative law.106 For
such areas of law, minimalism is not viable. They do not by definition
concern relationships of frequent and repeated interaction between
people. Rather, they concern the individual’s relationship with the
state. As such, the state is required to prop up and sustain such areas
of law. Indeed, these areas of law would not exist but for the state.
They are born with the state.107
104 An umbrella term used here for certain forms of commercially-oriented law where there
is the possibility of repeated individual to individual interaction, such as law related to trade,
corporate contracts, and partnerships.
105 See supra Figure 1.
106 See infra Figure 2.
107 Criminal law is the exception here. However, as discussed below, it is classed here as
noninteractive because it does not involve repeated interaction. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text. In that it obliges inaction, it in fact inhibits interaction. See infra notes
112–14 and accompanying text.
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_______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Figure 2. A selection of areas of public law with respect to the level of frequent and repeated
interaction between the same agents (i.e. how interactive it is). This is a nonexhaustive list. Note
that IP law is traditionally thought of as a form of private law; however, it is placed here in that
it does not directly relate to relationships of repeated interaction (although it may involve
them).108 Criminal law, while regularly concerning relationships between individuals, actually
inhibits repeated interaction and so is included here.
These two figures, however, are far from perfect. Private and
public law is a convenient separation that helps, I think, to clarify
the distinction between interactive and noninteractive areas of law.
Yet while it is a useful (albeit somewhat simplified) dichotomy, the
broad labels of private and public law are at times imprecise. For
example, depending upon which aspect of the law we wish to focus,
some areas of law may be characterized as highly or not at all
interactive. This ambiguity is very much a function of the blunt,
catch-all categories we use to define areas of law. Indeed, some areas
of law defy perfect classification. For instance, financial services law
involves vast numbers of often repeated interactions between the
same individuals, whether in the form of contracts (such as leases) or
dispositions of trust.109 If financial services were conceived as an area
of contract law, then it should be understood as interactive and thus
listed in Figure 1.110 If, however, it is conceived as a form of state
regulation, then it is not at all interactive and should be listed in
Figure 2.111
Another point, already touched upon, is that some areas of law may
concern individual to individual interaction yet are not properly
interactive law because this interaction is not repeated (between the
108 IP law arguably possesses features of both private and public law.
See GRAHAM
DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHERSANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 47, 48 (2008). The
focus here is upon the administrative aspect to intellectual property.
109 See Anita K. Krug, Escaping Entity-Centrism in Financial Services Regulation, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2039, 2041, 2045 (2013).
110 See supra Figure 1.
111 See supra Figure 2.
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same individuals). This is the case with both tort and criminal law.
While interaction between private individuals may occur within
these areas of law, it is very limited in nature. In the language of
game theory, they are one-shot encounters. While the vast majority
of criminal law relates to interaction between private individuals,112
it has almost nothing to do with repeated interaction and so falls in
the noninteractive camp. Criminal law is framed mostly in the
negative as injunctions against certain acts.113 It is what one should
not do.
In that it demands inaction, criminal law actually
discourages interaction. Most aspects of tort law also fall into this
category. However, where it bears upon pre-existing relationships of
frequent and repeated interaction—for example, in the case of
nuisance between two neighbors who regularly interact—it may
show glimmers of interactive law.114 No doubt the basic components
of criminal law and tort law have their roots in the primal soup of
social norms within small groups where informal monitoring and
retaliation are possible, yet in large modern societies they are no
longer the interactive areas of law they once were in times past.115
Some readers may take issue with the taxonomy in Figure 2,
arguing that several of these areas of law at times touch on
relationships between agents. For example, sales tax informs the
relationship between a buyer and a clerk, and intellectual property
will relate to the relationship between a musician and a purchaser of
music. However, while they may at times have relevance to
individual to individual interaction, such areas of law remain distinct
from highly interactive areas of law: tax law and IP law are not
wholly constructed around and related to pre-established
relationships of repeated interaction between the same agents in the
same way as, for example, family law. Family law is an already
complex system of order that antecedes the state. This is not the case
with tax law, IP law, and immigration law. Moreover, and more
importantly, these relationships are not necessarily ones of repeated
and frequent interaction between the same people of the kind that
112 Some areas of criminal law, however, involve the individual’s relationship directly with
the State. For example, tax evasion, treason, obstruction of justice, and perjury.
113 There are, of course, some exceptions; for example, where the criminal law imposes
positive duties. See JOHN FORGE, THE RESPONSIBLE SCIENTIST: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 236
(2008).
114 The reader should note that the taxonomy is not perfect: many sub-areas within these
generalized areas of law may be interactive or noninteractive as the case may be.
115 See generally BINMORE, supra note 18, at 79 (highlighting the different folk theory
limitations which arise in modern, urban life as opposed to smaller bands of historical huntergatherers).
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would allow for a clean application of the folk theorem.
Another way to gauge how predisposed an area of law may be to
minimalism is to pose the question differently. Instead of asking
whether an area of law can produce bottom-up law, we instead ask
how much an area of law needs top-down law. Both methods drive at
the same ends (the capacity for self-ordering); they just do so from
different starting positions.116 Thus we may ask: What would happen
if the state got out of the business of legal creation and enforcement
in that specific area of law? That is, without the state, to what extent
could this area of law continue to function? The need for state
enforcement is a good indication of an area of law’s inability to
generate bottom-up order as robustly as areas of law that more
directly concern relationships of repeated interaction between the
same parties. Tax law, IP law, and immigration law, as indeed all
areas of public law, would all fare rather badly without the state to
create and enforce such law—in fact, they would likely cease to exist
entirely. This is decidedly not the case with, for example, family law.
Order of this kind would evolve with or without government.
Granted, family law, contract law, or commercial law would look
substantially different than their present form; however, unlike tax
law, for example, they do not need the state’s continued patronage for
their very existence because such areas are in fact largely the product
of bottom-up order. This is a crucial difference, and it speaks directly
to their respective capability to generate bottom-up order.
Noninteractive law simply does not possess the mechanics to
generate bottom-up order as robustly as law that entails the
frequent, repeated interaction of private parties.117
Many areas of law militate against any application of the folk
theorem in that they simply do not involve individuals interacting
with each other, or where they do, this is only obliquely. As such,
they are intrinsically inhospitable to minimalism. Yet as we move
along this continuum and encounter ever higher levels of repeated
interaction between agents, minimalism becomes increasingly more
viable. Ultimately, the ability of the state to scale back its legal
involvement will depend on just how interactive the area of law is.
116 Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The
Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 433 (1992).
117 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
933, 933–35 (2006).
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C. Limits in Scope of Application
Many of the above areas of law are not highly interactive. This
suggests that minimalism’s scope of application is somewhat
restricted. On the other hand, areas of highly interactive law are
very good candidates for norm-based minimalism. Compared to other
areas of law, legislation in, for example, contract and commercial law
tends to be fewer, and where it does exist, it often codifies customary
practices among merchants with case law declaring and ascertaining
these practices instead of introducing anything fundamentally at
odds with the status quo. Indeed, the structural stability of
international trade, which has emerged primarily within a vacuum
of State-imposed legal order, is testament to the potential of
commerce to self-order.118 International commerce now constitutes
between 20 and 25 percent of the world’s entire GDP—an impressive
system of private ordering that exists largely within a state of
technical anarchy.119 The ability of commercial communities to
generate customary law in the absence of the state is well
documented. History is replete with examples. The medieval law
merchant, which saw the emergence of commercial customary law
across Europe in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, is perhaps
the most frequently referenced example of this.120 The Law Merchant
sprang from the business customs prevalent at the time and served
as a tool of unified commercial discourse that transcended the
hotchpotch of differing local systems of law that traders in that period
would encounter, such as ecclesiastical, manorial, or civil.121
Arguably this continues today unabated with the new law merchant
and the rise of international arbitration.122 The ability of large
commercial communities to produce customary law, I posit, is
primarily due to the repeated interaction present in such
communities—the natural consequence of trade. Ultimately, it is
118 See Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a
Global Commercial Legal Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1049, 1050–52, 1056
(2014) (arguing that the emergence of a global commercial legal order may be largely attributed
to the structural properties of commerce).
119 Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: How much Order can Spontaneous Order Create?, in
HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 136, 141 (Peter J. Boettke ed., 2010).
120 Barry Macleod-Cullinane, Lon L. Fuller and the Enterprise of Law, 22 LEGAL NOTES 1, 5
(1995).
121 Id.
122 Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 U. TORONTO
L.J. 265, 282 (2003). See also Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, 24 REGULATION
40, 41 (2001) (“From the Middle Ages to the infant digital age, there are examples of law
developed and administered by private entities with varying degrees of state involvement.”).
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possible because commerce is a highly interactive area of law.123
The degree of minimalism the state can adopt is directly
commensurate with how interactive a particular area of law is: the
more interactive, the more the state can consider allowing selfordering to drive the formation of legal structures (such as with
commercial customs), stepping in only where necessary to codify or
tweak informal rule-systems by employing strong or weak forms of
minimalism. Repeated interaction can in this way serve as a
yardstick with which to gauge where the state may adopt a less
interventionist tack.124 Yet we must recognize that, while the
potential for minimalism exists beyond the borders of contract, the
ability of the state to employ such a legislative tack to any significant
extent decreases as we step further beyond the boundaries of highly
interactive law. Contract, at least in the case of long-term contracts,
is a highly interactive form of law and therefore fertile soil for
minimalism. Contract is, in a sense, the definitive example of
minimalism. It is an area of law where the custom-based approach
is already largely in use.125 In less interactive areas of law, however,
the state may find itself seriously hamstrung in its ability to rely on
social norms to help create and sustain social order. While
minimalism need not be restricted to the realm of contract, the state
will eventually run up against a wall where minimalism becomes
increasingly untenable as repeated interaction between the same
agents becomes scarcer. For this reason, some of the most
problematic areas of modern regulation such as banking law,
environmental law, and most areas of administrative law may
remain fundamentally inhospitable to norm-based minimalism.
It is difficult to assess to what extent minimalism can be employed
in less interactive areas of law. This is a question that would have to
be fleshed out through actual implementation. It remains a bit of an
open question. However, in the case of highly interactive areas of
law, minimalism holds great promise. While the guiding hand of
regulation is a necessity in the case of noninteractive law, in the case
of more interactive law, a less interventionist tack is certainly
achievable. The key question is how interactive is the area of law.
Wherever repeated interaction is sufficiently present, even if this is
relatively limited in scope, minimalism to some degree becomes
feasible. The door is swung open for the state to capitalise on
See Druzin, supra note 85, at 561–62, 586.
Another issue that would need to be considered is the frequency with which the
interaction is repeated.
125 Druzin, supra note 66, at 391–92.
123
124
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informal social ordering.
V. LIKLEY OBJECTIONS TO THE MODEL
Let us now turn to some likely objections to the model. Some may
object that the discussion thus far has given short thrift to the
important role of custom across all areas of law—both private and
public. Another likely (and valid) objection is that norm-based
minimalism may lead to socially unjust outcomes. Let us address
these potential objections in this order.126
A. Most Areas of Law Already Incorporate Custom to Some Extent
None of the discussion up to this point should be read as suggesting
that noninteractive areas of law are devoid of custom. Social norms
underpin a great deal of noninteractive law. “Custom” is respected
by courts and lawmakers. The intensity of repeated interaction will
determine the capacity for self-ordering and the generation of
custom. As previously discussed, however, frequent and repeated
interactions of a binary nature will tend to yield the greatest capacity
to produce stable bottom-up order because the intensity of repetition
is high.127 Such relationships thus have the greatest potential to
generate reciprocity, monitoring, retaliation, and self-enforcement.128
Small groups can also achieve this although to a less robust degree
(because the intensity of repeated interaction tends to be less). 129
However, when we jump to far larger groups where repeated
interactions appear very infrequently if at all, the ability to generate
stable cooperative order on any substantial level is virtually
nonexistent.130 Even still, normative order in a relatively weak form
126 Another potential objection may be as follows: from the standpoint of methodological
individualism, one could argue that there is in fact the potential for repeated interaction
between individuals and the state. The state is not a homogenous or lifeless thing; it is made
up of individuals with divergent preferences. Private individuals coordinate with each other
and form groups that interact with state officials repeatedly if not regularly and thus some
areas of administrative law may be understood as interactive law to a limited degree. Indeed,
a la public choice theory, rent-seeking may emerge from repeated interaction between agencies
and interest groups. See Bruce G. Linster, Cooperative Rent-Seeking, 81 PUB. CHOICE 23, 24
(1994). With respect to minimalism, however, this objection is rather odd. The goal of
minimalism is to reduce state involvement in social order, yielding instead to natural ordering.
The partner in these interactions is the very entity we wish to minimize.
127 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
129 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
130 See MYERSON, supra note 57, at 350.
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will still arise.131 This is what the law recognizes as “custom.” We
still see the emergence and use of custom in a wide variety of law that
is not very interactive. Indeed, much of (effective) law is based
(ultimately) on social conventions.132 If not, their prescriptive power
would be much diminished. Constitutional law is a good example of
this. While not dealing directly with pre-existing repeated dyadic
relationships, constitutional law nevertheless draws heavily from
general custom and deeply-entrenched social norms.133 While
ostensibly a purely state affair, constitutional law builds upon
customary rules that are generated from (loosely) interacting
agents.134 These are omnipresent social norms that spring forth from
the greater cultural discourse of a society. Indeed, constitutional law
is underpinned by constitutional conventions,135 and constitutional
law language tends to be vague (separation of powers, equal
protection, etc.).136 In the absence of exhaustive codes, the courts rely
a great deal on “custom” to make decisions.137 This is particularly
true in the case of “unwritten” constitutions, such as the Constitution
of the United Kingdom.138
However, we must exercise conceptual caution. The presence of
custom should not be confused with far more robust forms of selfordering, as is the potential with highly interactive law. While all
areas of law may generate custom—areas of law that are not highly
interactive cannot produce the complex cooperative structures
capable of monitoring and self-enforcement—the ingredients
See id. at 351.
William Twining, A Post-Westphalian Conception of Law, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 199, 230
n.73 (2003) (“[T]he rule of recognition is based on social conventions that identify the sources
of law. These social conventions represent the community’s acceptance of a scheme grounding
the criteria of valid law.”) (citation omitted).
133 See Jeremy Waldron, Are Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697,
1712 (2006).
134 ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 45 (2009). There
is a well-established literature within the fields of law and economics, which speaks to selfenforcing constitutions as coordination devices for iterated interactions within society-at-large,
and/or amongst state officials and/or between the state and individuals. See ELKINS ET AL.,
supra, at 90; MIKHAIL FILIPPOV ET AL., DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELFSUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 142 (2004); RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 14 (1999); Yadira González de Lara et al., The
Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 105, 105, 109
(2008); Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to
Democratic Stability in America’s First Century, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 278, 297–98 (2013).
135 For example, it is impossible to understand the United States Constitution by merely
reading its text and ignoring political customs tied to the party system, etc.
136 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1935, 1950 (2013).
137 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 134, at 84.
138 See id. at 49.
131
132
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required for robust bottom-up order.139 The normative order (if it can
even be called that) that arises is nowhere nearly as robust as with
highly interactive areas of law.140 This can be clearly discerned if we
again consider the degree of state support required by such areas of
law. Indeed, it is very difficult to see how constitutional law or the
various areas of administrative law could survive without a
tremendous amount of state involvement. Notwithstanding the
appearance of custom in areas of noninteractive law, areas of law
such as tax law, immigration law, environmental law, capital
markets regulation, and IP law require the hand of top-down law to
fashion, structure, and sustain it to a far greater degree than, for
example, that of contract, which in its most minimal form, requires
no more than state enforcement of property rights.
Thus,
noninteractive law may at times embrace customary norms, unlike
areas of interactive law that sees vast noninteractive areas of law are
not powerful engines for the generation of normative order. Custom
is but a faint tracing of the powerful bottom-up social ordering
possible where relationships of repeated interaction between the
same agents are involved. We should not confuse the mere presence
of custom with stable complex bottom-up cooperative systems. It
would be like confusing a ripple of water for a surging torrent. The
presence of custom obscures the decisive point that these areas of law
lack the crucial element of discrete relationships of frequent and
repeated interaction that may generate truly robust systems of
bottom-up order. While custom may inform top-down law, something
for it to draw upon when needed, custom can never replace top-down
law.
B. Unjust Outcomes
While highly active areas of law may produce complex cooperative
systems, we must tread very carefully. Clearly, top-down law has a
vital role to play in regulating social behavior in many areas of law.
Even where self-ordering can flourish, the appropriate degree of
minimalism remains an issue. Excessive minimalism may prove
disastrous. The correct dosage of minimalism would have to be
determined in relation to the specific system of order that emerges.
One important consideration is the potential for grossly unfair
bottom-up ordering resulting from an inequality of bargaining power.
139 See id. at 78–80 (arguing that constitutions created with the cooperation of citizens can
be self-enforced).
140 See id. at 78.
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This may be a good reason for the state to step in even where selfordering may otherwise emerge. Indeed, this is precisely what the
state does in the case of contract: strong deference is given to bottomup ordering but the state nevertheless legislatively intervenes where
needed.141 A good illustration of the thorny problem of unequal
bargaining power and how the state has chosen to respond is
minimum wage laws.
Regulation can be viewed as an intercession on the part of the state
to correct an imbalance in bargaining positions. The state imposes
duties that are owed to the state, but which can be claimed by
individuals.
Employment law, consumer protection law, and
antidiscrimination law all involve repeated interactions, but
policymakers intervene to correct equilibria that dictate
inequality.142 For example, it is obviously possible to develop stable
ordering through repeated interaction between a monopoly supplier
and a consumer, or a monopsony employer and an employee. But
policymakers will want to know more about the substantive justice of
the pattern or ordering. Moreover, the motivation for this may not
be purely normative. It may be driven by hard-nosed concerns
regarding market efficiency. Antitrust or competition law is a good
example of an area of law that often exhibits a high degree of
repeated interaction between agents and yet cannot be left to selforder purely for functional reasons related to competition and market
efficiency.143 There is a question of whether bottom-up order will be
able to incorporate broader societal goals rather than merely the
limited self-informed goals of the private actors engaging in areas of
interactive law. As such, many will doubt that minimalism is
necessarily to the interest of society. Put differently, there may well
be self-regulation in certain areas of social interaction, but that does
not mean that the resulting self-regulation necessarily represents a
social optimum, as it may well only regulate the behavior in a way
that maximizes the welfare of the people engaged in the behavior, not
the broader group of people affected by it. Commercial cartels are a
141 See RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 333 (1994)
(“[F]reedom of contract . . . arose from [a] laissez-faire context.”); see also BRUCE W. FRIER &
JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 425 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that very few
statutes directly prohibit the enforcement of contracts).
142 See, e.g., Ami L. diLorenzo, Regulation B: How Lenders can Fight Back Against the
Affirmative Use of Regulation B, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000) (discussing the
implementation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1976).
143 See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications
for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 514, 525 (2005).
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good illustration of this.144
These concerns, while eminently valid, are not fatal to the
minimalist project. The present model in no way claims that all
cooperative equilibria generated by repeated interaction will align
with our social values. Indeed, the emergent order may be
normatively repugnant.
For example, social norms that
institutionalized complex systems of racial, gender, religious, or
sexual discrimination have in the past emerged as very stable, robust
social equilibria.145 The answer to the problem of sub-optimal
equilibria—whether this is defined in normative or economic terms—
is simple. Norm-based minimalism is merely a point of departure—
a conceptual baseline for policymakers. Minimalism does not in any
way preclude legislators from stepping in and deploying massive
doses of regulation to remedy sub-optimal equilibria where it is
deemed necessary. The model outlined a range of legislative options
available to policymakers captured by weak and strong versions of
minimalism—noninterference, codification, modification, and topdown law. Policymakers adopting a minimalist approach can scale
back regulation in interactive areas of law, wait and see if, and what
kind of stable equilibria emerges, then fine-tune as needed. Where
bottom-up order produces strong social norms that help create and
sustain social order, policymakers need not regulate further. Where,
however, bottom-up order produces unacceptable externalities,
regulation is required. The degree of regulatory intercession
necessary can simply be judged on a case-by-case basis. Ever higher
degrees of legislative intervention may be implemented until the
situation is sufficiently remedied. Nothing about a minimalist
approach precludes taking action where bottom-up order proves suboptimal.
144 See John M. Connor & Darren Bush, How to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing:
Using Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN
ST. L. REV. 813, 849–50 (2008).
145 See, e.g., Segregated America, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HISTORY,
http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/1-segregated/segregated-america.html
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2015) (noting how old customs contributed to segregated communities by 1900);
Racial Segregation in the American South: Jim Crow Laws, GALE GRP.,
http://find.galegroup.com/gic/infomark.do?&idigest=fb720fd31d9036c1ed2d1f3a0500fcc2&type
=retrieve&tabID=T001&prodId=GIC&docId=CX2831400031&source=gale&userGroupName=
itsbtrial&version=1.0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) (discussing how slavery was a common
practice in the South and many Southern plantations would not have survived without it).
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that where parties engage in repeated
interaction, policymakers can place greater reliance on informal
social norms instead of top-down law. The value in this is that doing
so may allow for less reliance on the coercive instruments of
government, easing the enforcement and legislative burdens on the
state. The argument draws on the folk theorem in game theory:
parties that repeat interactions tend to police their own behaviour
and self-order.146 It was, however, also acknowledged that repeated
interaction is no guarantee that self-sustaining equilibria or even
equilibria that is normatively palatable will emerge. However, the
presence of repeated interaction provides a reliable and useful
indication as to where minimalism is at least a possibility. The
contribution of this paper to the law and norms literature is that it
proposes a technique to identify the precise areas of social discourse
where the possibility of decreasing regulation is most feasible. The
paper serves a second, perhaps even more useful purpose in that it
clarifies the limitations of minimalism, pinpointing the areas of law
that top-down law remains indispensable. The idea of minimalism is
an intriguing concept. Precisely because informal order is informal,
it cannot be directly created. As a consequence, we naturally tend to
assume that the only way order arises is by directly imposing it, state
law being the paragon of such order. Yet this is not true. Bottom-up
order arises all the time and may be made use of in a strategic
manner. While State-imposed order remains crucial, we may benefit
from learning how to conscript the untapped energy of social norms
as a legislative tool—to the fullest extent that this is possible.
146
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.