Iraq war inquiry - Monday 12 July

1.45pm: Carne Ross is not a household name. But he could turn out to be one of the most interesting figures to give evidence to the Iraq inquiry. That's because he's the Foreign Office "whistleblower" who resigned after speaking out about the war. He worked as a British diplomat at the UN and, in a submission to the Butler inquiry (which was originally secret, but which was subsequently published in 2006), he said that officials did not regard Iraq's WMD programme as a threat to the UK.

Here's a key extract from his submission.

I read the available UK and US intelligence on Iraq every working day for the four-and-a-half years of my posting. This daily briefing would often comprise a thick folder of material, both humint and sigint. I also talked often and at length about Iraq's WMD to the international experts who comprised the inspectors of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC, whose views I would report to London. In addition, I was on many occasions asked to offer views in contribution to Cabinet Office assessments, including the famous WMD dossier (whose preparation began some time before my departure in June 2002).

During my posting, at no time did HMG assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests. On the contrary, it was the commonly-held view among the officials dealing with Iraq that any threat had been effectively contained. I remember on several occasions the UK team stating this view in terms during our discussions with the US (who agreed). (At the same time, we would frequently argue, when the US raised the subject, that "regime change" was inadvisable, primarily on the grounds that Iraq would collapse into chaos.)

Ross also said in his submission that the war was illegal.

You can read his three-page submission to the Butler inquiry here. For anyone who wants more background, I'd also recommend this news story about how Ross's evidence to the Butler inquiry came to be published, this interview with him in the Guardian, and this post by Paul Waugh, who suggests that the Iraq inquiry might not have been set up if it had not been for Ross's whistleblowing activities.

We know broadly what he's going to say. But that's been true of many witnesses. These hearings have been interesting when they have provided new details. This afternoon's session should be a good one.

2.08pm: The hearing is about to start. There's been a slight delay.

2.14pm: Sir John Chilcot says the inquiry is publishing a witness statement from Carne Ross on its website, and a declassified document. They are on the website now.

Chilcot makes a point which he says he is making in response to an assertion in the Ross witness statement. Without having read the witness statement, it's difficult to work out what he's saying. But it seems as if Ross implied that some of the other witnesses might not have told the truth. Chilcot says that the inquiry has had access to all the written documents (implying that they will find out who's telling the truth). He also says that Ross did not ask for any documents to be declassified.

2.15pm: The Ross witness statement runs to 17 pages. It starts with a tribute to David Kelly.

2.20pm: In the hearing Ross says that some other witnesses said that the policy of "containment" (containing Saddam through sanctions) was breaking down in 2001. But that was never stated in policy documents at the time, he says.

I do not remember anyone ever saying containment is collapsing.

2.31pm: I'm still reading the witness statement, which is full of strong claims and which I'll summarise in a moment. But in the hearing Ross is saying that he and American officials who were trying to make containment work felt like a "very beleaguered small group of people". They received "little senior support", Ross says.

2.54pm: Here are the main points in Carne Ross's witness statement.

He accuses the government of lying about Iraq's WMD. In paragraphs 21 and 22, he provides examples of the way he thinks claims about Iraq's WMD were exaggerated. Talking about the September dossiser and other documents, he says:

This process of exaggeration was gradual, and proceeded by accretion and editing from document to document, in a way that allowed those participating to convince themselves that they were not engaged in blatant dishonesty. But this process led to highly misleading statements about the UK assessment of the Iraqi threat that were, in their totality, lies.

He says the civil service was politicised under Labour.

The culture of questioning, of debate, was little in evidence in the years and months leading up to the Iraq war. There was in effect a deep politicisation of the civil service; contrary opinion was suppressed.

He accuses some (unnamed) witnesses of not telling the truth to the inquiry. And he implies that Chilcot and his team have allowed themselves to be misled.

It is striking that in my preparations for this testimony, I found several documents germane to the inquiry whose existence was not revealed by earlier witnesses, including those who authored them. Other documents by certain officials contradicted the testimony they have given at this inquiry and yet these witnesses were not questioned about these contradictions.

He insists that Britain did not believe Iraq had any substantial stocks of WMD.

Before I took the New York post in late 1997, I was briefed by relevant departments in the FCO. At Non-Proliferation Department (NPD), which was responsible for the Iraq disarmament issue, I was told that the UK did not believe that Iraq possessed any substantial stocks of CW, BW or nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them. None of the intelligence I saw subsequently in the 4½ years that I covered the issue, where I read on most days a thick folder of "humint" and "sigint" relating to Iraq, or the Joint Intelligence Committee assessments, during this period, substantially changed this assessment.

He claims that "containment" was working in 2001 and 2002 and that witnesses who said otherwise were not telling the truth.

The UK did not judge that Iraq had the means substantially to rearm, which was the key test of the effectiveness of the containment policy. It is therefore inaccurate to claim, as some earlier witnesses have done, that containment was failing and that sanctions were collapsing (and thus to claim that there was little alternative to military action to deal with the Iraqi threat).

He says that Britain turned a blind eye to the breach of sanctions imposed on Iraq.

We could for instance have seized the illegal bank accounts held by Saddam in Amman, Jordan. Instead, this egregious breach of sanctions was ignored. Likewise, we could have intercepted Syria's illegal exports of Iraqi oil from Banias ... no such attempt was made.

One footnote relating to this passage has been redacted on the grounds of international relatons.

British officials at the UN leaked an anti-US story to the Washington Post to get the Americans to support tighter controls on Iraq, Ross says. The British wanted to stop the UN paying Iraq too much oil under the oil-for-trade scheme. Ross says ministers and officials offered little or no support. And the Americans did not support the initiative until this informtion was leaked to the Washington Post.

3.02pm: In the hearing Carne Ross says that the US state department asked the Foreign Office, at regularly bilateral meetings before the war, to state that the UK did not support regime change. The state department wanted this in writing, because they thought that would help them win the argument within the US administration about how to deal with Iraq.

3.15pm: Sir John Chilcot asks about the amount of time allowed for weapons inspections. In UN security council resolution 1284 (the anti-Iraq one adopted in 1999) weapons inspectors were given at least nine months to assess whether Iraq was complying. But in 1441, the resolution adopted in 2002, the weapons inspectors were given just 60 days to make a judgment about Iraq's compliance.

Ross says that Britain pushed for a lengthy timetable in 1284. But, when 1441 was being negotiated, Britain and the UK were pushing for a short timetable.

By the time 1441 was agreed, Ross was no longer working at the British mission in Iraq. But he says that, when he saw the terms of it, he was clear what was being intended.

This is not about serious inspections. This is about a trigger.

3.21pm: On WMD, Chilcot asks about the ability of Iraq to regenerate WMD.

Ross says any "moderately industrialised country" has the capacity to develop biological weapons or chemical weapons. Individuals did this in Japan, he says. (He's talking about the sarin gas attack, I assume.)

3.23pm: Sir John Chilcot asks if Ross believes the government misrepresented the intelligence about Iraq's WMD. Ross says the government turned uncertainty into certainty.

Chilcot asks if it was realistic to say that Iraq could "soon" have posed a threat to UK interests.

Ross says this claim was "extraordinary". He and his colleagues never used this argument, he says.

In his witness statement Ross refers to an assessment that Iraq had up to 12 dismantled Scud missiles. But there was no hard evidence that they existed, he says.

3.32pm: Sir John Chilcot mentions the Scud missile claim. In his witness statement Ross says the "up to 12 dismantled Scud missiles" became "up to 20 Al-Hussain variant extended range Scud missiles" in the government's public statements. Chilcot says that these two claims actually refer to different assessments. Ross appears to accept this.

3.38pm: Chilcot ends by asking Ross if he has anything more he wants to say. Ross says he has already "spilled quite a lot of ink" on the subject of Iraq. But he wants to make one point.

I think the thing that I felt was important ... was the alternative to military action, that there was no deliberate discussion of available alternatives to military action in advance of the military invasion. There is no record of that discussion, no official has referred to it, no minister has talked about it. And that seems to me to be a very egregious absence in history, that at some point a government before going to war should stop and ask itself are there available alternatives.

As my testimony makes clear, there was an available alternative. All that argument about tightening sanctions and stopping illegal breaches to me amounted to a very viable, robust alternative to military action that would have had the possible effect of undermining the Saddam regime, and certainly would have prevented any major rearmament ... The fact that that deliberation, that consideration of alternatives, did not take place is, to me, a disgrace.

With that, the session is over. I'll sum up in a moment.

4.09pm: Well, where does that leave us? Carne Ross's views about the threat posed by Iraq before 2003, and the reliabliity of government claims about Saddam's WMD, were well known long before 2pm. (See 1.45pm). John Rentoul has had some fun this afternoon pointing out that someone who was opposed to the war six years ago is still opposed to it. That's true. But it hasn't been entirely predictable. In his witness statement Ross attacked the Labour government for telling "lies" about Iraq in stronger terms, I think, than he has before. It probably qualifies for a "strongest attack yet" news story. But I think the real interest lies in other parts of his evidence.

Ross accused the UK and the US of not fully enforcing sanctions against Iraq. See 2.54pm, and paragraphs 9 to 16 of Ross's witness statements. Ross was the specialist in this area, and the inquiry seemed to be taking his claims seriously.

He said the failure to consider proper alternatives to war was a "disgrace". Tony Blair was willing to go to war because he thought "containment" was no longer working. In other hearings some members of the inquiry panel have asked questions that suggest they think he should have spent more time considering non-military alternatives. Ross has probably put the argument that "containment" could have worked as effectively as anyone who has given evidence.

He challenged the credibility of the inquiry. In his witness statement, he said that some witnesses had misled the inquiry and he suggested that Chilcot and his colleagues were at fault for failing to expose this. In his opening statement Chilcot rejected this, insisting that he and his team had read all the relevant documents. But Ross's comments will reinforce the suspicions of those who claim that that inquiry is turning out to be a whitewash.

Thanks for the comments.